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ABSTRACT
CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE EMERGENCE
OF THE NON-STATE SECURITY ACTOR: AL QAEDA
Konur, Nur Çağrı
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı
July 2004
This thesis analyzes the nature of transnational terrorism and the actorness of
transnational terrorists in order to answer the question of whether it is possibility to give
an effective international response to transnational terrorism. A dualistic approach of
world politics has been developed in order to understand the ‘international’ nature of the
response on the one hand, and the ‘transnational’ nature of the threat on the other hand.
Accordingly, international nature of the response has been explained with the state-
centric world image, while transnational nature of the threat has been explained with the
multi-centric world image. Then, the term transnational terrorism has been
conceptualized and the differences of the threat percerptions within the multi-centric
world, of which transnational terrorism is a part, than those of the state-centric world
have been analyzed. Thus, the rise of transnational terrorists as non-state security actors
with the help of the multi-centric world and the actorness characteristics of these non-
state security actors have been mentioned. The evolution and the characteristics of Al
Qaeda transnational terrorist organization, which fits the non-state actorness criteria the
best, has been evaluated in order to demonstrate the arguments made. In conclusion, it
has been found out that the existing international response mechanisms cannot meet the
challange posed by transnational terrorism effectively. This is because while the response
mechanisms are international and developed to meet the challanges posed by states,
transnational terrorism is a transnational threat that is posed by non-state security actors,
namely by transnational terrorists.
Keywords: Transnational Terrorism, Non-state Security Actor, Al Qaeda, Dualistic
Image of  World Politics, State-centric World, Multi-centric World
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ÖZET
ULUSÖTESİ TERÖRİZMİN KAVRAMSALLAŞTIRILMASI VE DEVLET-DIŞI
GÜVENLİK AKTÖRÜNÜN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI: EL KAİDE
Konur, Nur Çağrı
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Ersel Aydınlı
Temmuz 2004
Bu tez, ulusötesi terörizme etkili bir uluslararası karşılık verilebilir mi
sorusunu cevaplayabilmek için, ulusötesi terörizmin doğasını ve ulusötesi teröristlerin
aktörlüğünü incelemektedir. Bir yandan, verilmeye çalışılan karşılığın ‘uluslararası’
niteliğini, diğer yandan da karşı karşıya olunan tehdidin ‘ulusötesi’ niteliğini
anlayabilmek için ikili bir dünya politikası anlayışı geliştirilmiştir. Buna göre, verilmeye
çalışılan karşılığın uluslararası niteliği devlet-merkezli dünya anlayışı ile açıklanırken,
karşı karşıya olunan tehdidin ulusötesi niteliği çok-merkezli dünya anlayışıyla
açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra, ulusötesi terörizm terimi kavramsallaştırılmış ve uluötesi
tererizmin de parçası olduğu, çok-merkezli dünyadaki tehdit algılamalarının devlet-
merkezli dünyadakilerden farkı incelenmiştir. Böylece, çok-merkezli dünyanın
yardımıyla ulusötesi teröristlerin aktör  olarak ortaya çıkışı ve devlet-dışı aktörlerin
aktörlük özellikleri ortaya konmuştur. Yapılan argümanları somutlaştırmak için, bu
aktörlük özelliklerini en iyi taşıyan ulusötesi terörist organizasyon El Kaide’nin evrimi ve
özellikleri değerlendirilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, var olan uluslararası karşılık
mekanizmalarının ulusötesi terörizm tehdidiyle etkili bir şekilde başaçıkmakta yetersiz
olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun sebebi, karşılık mekanizmaları uluslararası ve devletlerin
oluşturduğu tehdidlere karşı geliştirilmişken, ulusötesi terörizm tehdidinin ulusötesi ve
devlet-dışı aktörler, yani ulusötesi teröristler, tarafından oluşturulan bir tehdit oluşudur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusötesi Terörizm, Devlet-dışı Güvenlik Aktörü, El Kaide, İkili
Dünya Politikası Anlayışı, Devlet-merkezli Dünya, Çok-merkezli Dünya
vACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to begin with expressing my special thanks and gratitude to my
supervisor Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı, who shared with me his immense scope of
knowledge, encouraged me in every stage of my study, and have been a source of
inspiration for me.
I am also thankful to Julie M. Aydınlı for her guidance and help, especially at the
stage of making my long and complex sentences more understandable. I am also grateful
to Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Asst. Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya for kindly
accepting being a jury member in my thesis defense.
I would also like to thank all of my undergraduate and graduate professors who
contributed to the accumulation of my knowledge and intellectual capabilities.
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support,
encouragement and patience besides their intellectual contribution to this study. Special
thanks go to Nilgün Konur, Berkan Konur, Tunç Konur, Burak Karabağ, Özgür Çiçek,
Özlem Kayhan, and Berivan Eliş. I also thank Cem Kavuklu for his technical support in
solving the computer related problems I faced while writing this thesis, besides always
being a supportive friend of mine.
It would have been impossible for me to finish this study without the support of
all these people. Thank you all.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT  ..............................................................................................................iii
ÖZET  ........................................................................................................................ iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  ......................................................................................... v
TABLE OF CONTENTS  .......................................................................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  ............................................................................... 1
CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUALISTIC IMAGE OF WORLD
POLITICS………………………………………………………….... 7
2. 1 The Practical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics………………8
2. 1. 1 The Practical Evolution of the State-centric Image of World Politics……….. 8
2. 1. 2 The Practical Evolution of the Multi-centric Image of World Politics……... 11
2. 1. 2. 1 The Characteristics of the Multi-centric World………………………….. 12
2. 1. 2. 2 The Concept of Globalization and its Impacts on the Development of the
Characteristics of the Multi-centric World………………………………… 14
2. 1. 3 The Dualistic Image of World Politics……………………………………... 17
2. 2. The Theoretical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics…………18
2. 2. 1 The Theoretical Evolution of the State-centric World Image……………… 19
2. 2. 2 The Theoretical Evolution of the Multi-Centric World Image……………... 20
2. 2. 2. 1 Liberal Paradigm and the Dualistic World Image……………………….. 21
2. 2. 2. 1. i Pluralism………………………………………………………………...21
2. 2. 2. 1. ii Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Integration Theories………….. 22
2. 2. 2. 1. iii Regime Theories, Liberal Institutionalism and Interdependence
Theories…………………………………………………………………….. 23
2. 2. 2. 1. iv Sociological Liberalism………………………………………………. 25
2. 2. 2. 1. v The Importance of Individuals………………………………………… 26
2. 2. 2. 1. vi Theories of Globalization…………………………………………….. 27
2. 2. 2. 2 English School and the Dualistic Image of World Politics……………… 27
2. 2. 2. 3 James N. Rosenau and the Dualistic Image of World Politics…………... 29
2. 2. 2. 4 Practical Contributions to the Theoretical Evolution of the Dualistic
Image of  World Politics…………………………………………………… 32
2. 2. 3 Why is the Dualistic Image of World Politics the most Suitable Approach?..34
CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM………………………………………………………. 37
3. 1 Defining Terrorism……………………………………………………………. 37
3. 2 Defining Transnational Terrorism…………………………………………….. 39
3. 3 Clarifying the Concept………………………………………………………… 41
3. 3. 1 Transnational Terrorism vs. Other Types of Violence……………………... 41
3. 3. 1. 1 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. War………………………… 42
3. 3. 1. 2 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. Guerrilla Warfare………….. 44
vii
3. 3. 1. 3 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. Ordinary Crime…………….. 46
3. 3. 2 Transnational Terrorism vs. Other Types of Terrorism…………………….. 47
3. 3. 2. 1 Transnational Terrorism vs. Domestic State Terrorism………………….. 47
3. 3. 2. 2 Transnational Terrorism vs. Domestic Non-state Terrorism…………….. 49
3. 3. 2. 3 Transnational Terrorism vs. International State Terrorism………………. 50
CHAPTER IV: THREAT PERCEPTIONS, REFERENCE OBJECTS OF
SECURITY, AND SECURITY ACTORS IN THE
MULTI-CENTRIC WORLD………………………………………..54
4. 1 Threat Perceptions, Referent Objects and Security Actors in the State-centric
World………………………………………………………………………..56
4. 1. 1 Issues Perceived as Threats…………………………………………………. 56
4. 1. 1. 1 The National Interests of other States, Their Armed Forces, and the
Possibility of War………………………………………………………….. 57
4. 1. 1. 2 Domestic and International Terrorism as Tools for other States………….60
4. 1. 2 The Primacy of the State…………………………………………………… 61
4. 2 Multiple Threat Perceptions of the Multi-centric World……………………...  61
4. 2. 1 Socio-economic Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World…………...  62
4. 2. 1. 1 Impoverishment and Overpopulation……………………………………. 62
4. 2. 1. 2 Economic Dependencies and Development Problems…………………... 65
4. 2. 1. 3 Spread of Infectious Diseases…………………………………………… 65
4. 2. 1. 4 Uncontrollable Migration………………………………………………… 66
4. 2. 2 Cultural Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World……………………..69
4. 2. 2. 1 Identity Crises……………………………………………………………..69
4. 2. 2. 2 Cultural Misperceptions and Misunderstandings, Human Rights and
Freedoms Violations……………………………………………………….. 70
4. 2. 3 Environmental Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World…………….. 70
4. 2. 3. 1 Depletion of Natural Resources………………………………………….. 71
4. 2. 3. 2 Global Climate Change and some Other Threats………………………... 71
4. 2. 4 Non-traditional Military/Political Threat Perceptions in the Multi-Centric
World………………………………………………………………………..73
4. 2. 4. 1 Weapons of Mass Destruction…………………………………………….73
4. 2. 4. 2 The Revolution in Military Affairs………………………………………. 74
4. 2. 4. 3 Failed States and Intrastate Wars………………………………………….75
4. 2. 4. 4 Transnational Organized Crime and Transnational Terrorism……………77
4. 3 Multiple Reference Objects of the Multiple Threat Perceptions……………….79
4. 4 Non-state Security Actors of the Multi-centric World........................................81
4. 4. 1 Individuals as Non-state Security Actors.........................................................82
4. 4. 2 Subnational and Supranational Groupings as Non-State Security Actors…...83
4. 4. 3 TNCs/MNCs as Non-state Security Actors.....................................................83
4. 4. 4 NGOs as Non-state Security Actors................................................................85
4. 4. 5 Transnational Organized Crime Organizations as Non-state Security
Actors..............................................................................................................85
4. 4. 6 Transnational Terrorist Organizations as Non-state Security Actors..............86
CHAPTER V: TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS AS NON-STATE SECURITY
ACTORS…………………………………………………………….90
5. 1 State Support and International Terrorism in the Cold War Era……………….93
5. 1. 1 International Terrorism as a Foreign Policy Tool……………………………93
5. 1. 2 How Did States Support International Terrorist Organizations……………...95
5. 2 Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Aftermath of the Cold War………….99
viii
5. 2. 1 Changed State-support of Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Period………….99
5. 2. 2 Globalization and Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Post-Cold War
Era………………………………………………………………………….102
5. 2. 2. 1 Globalization as Facilitator of Transnational Terrorism…………………103
5. 2. 2. 1. i Facilitating Role of Globalization as Liberalization………………….. 103
5. 2. 2. 1. ii Facilitating Role of Globalization as Supraterritoriality…………….. 109
5. 3 The Characteristics that Attribute Actorness to Transnational Terrorists…….113
5. 3. 1 Having a Global Ideology…………………………………………………..114
5. 3. 2 Challenging the State Sovereignty………………………………………….114
5. 3. 3 Ability to Conduct Foreign Policy………………………………………….115
5. 3. 4 Ability to Affect the Domestic, Foreign, and Defense Policies of the
States……………………………………………………………………….115
5. 4 The Convergence of these Characteristics of Transnational Terrorists with the
       Definition of Actorness………………………………………………………..116
CHAPTER VI: CASE STUDY: AL QAEDA  ……………………………………118
6. 1 Historical Evolution of Al Qaeda……………………………………………..119
6. 1. 1 Al Qaeda in the Cold War…………………………………………………..119
6. 1. 2 Al Qaeda in the Aftermath of the Cold War………………………………..120
6. 1. 3 Al Qaeda in the post-September 11 Period…………………………………122
6. 2 Al Qaeda and Transnational Actorness………………………………………..123
6. 2. 1 Al Qaeda and Failed States…………………………………………………124
6. 2. 2 Al Qaeda and Utilization of Globalization…………………………………125
6. 2. 3 Al Qaeda as a Decentralized and Deterritorialized, yet Institutionalized
Body………………………………………………………………………..127
6. 2. 4 Al Qaeda and Alliance Building…………………………………………... 129
6. 2. 5 The Ideology of Al Qaeda: ‘Jihadism’……………………………………...131
6. 2. 6 Al Qaeda as a Challenge to State Sovereignty Competing with the State….132
6. 2. 7 Al Qaeda’s Foreign Policy………………………………………………….133
6. 2. 8 Al Qaeda’s Impact on the Domestic, Foreign, and Defense Policies of the
States……………………………………………………………………….135
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION..............................................................................138
7. 1 Research Findings……………………………………………………………..138
7. 2 Response Mechanisms of the State-centric World and Their Ability to Meet
 the Challenge Posed by Transnational Terrorism………………………….142
7. 2. 1 Armies and Military Methods………………………………………………142
7. 2. 2 Alliances and International Cooperation…………………………………...143
7. 2. 3 Deterrence…………………………………………………………………..147
7. 2. 4 Diplomacy…………………………………………………………………..149
7. 2. 5 Sanctions……………………………………………………………………150
7. 2. 6 Using Intelligence Services…………………………………………………152
7. 3 The US “War on Terrorism”…………………………………………………..153
7. 4 Practical and Theoretical Outputs……………………………………………..154
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………….157
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1. The Dualistic Image of World Politics.......................................................... 17
2. Duality in terms of Global Counteterrorism.................................................. 35
3. The Stages of Convergence between the State-centric and Multi-centric
Worlds…………………………………………………………………….. 154
  
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
On 11 September 2001, the World Trade Center and Pentagon of the United 
States were attacked by terrorists and severely damaged, to a degree that no other 
actor, including any state, was able to do before in US history. These attacks, first of 
all, demonstrated that even the world’s only superpower, which had until now 
successfully protected its homeland from the attacks of other states, could be reached 
and hurt by attacks conducted by transnational terrorists. Another thing these attacks 
made clear is the changing nature of security threats in the post-Cold War era. 
Although states continue to pose security threats to each other, other threats, like 
transnational terrorism, have become security challenges in the system. As a result, 
states have begun to put terrorism on the forefront of their security agenda and the 
US has declared a ‘war on terrorism’. 
 An important point here however, is that the measures being taken against 
transnational terrorism are the same as those that are used against the threats posed 
by other states. Even the word ‘war,’ that has been declared on terrorism in the 
aftermath of September 11, indicates that state-centric mechanisms are the tools that 
will be used against transnational terrorism. But transnational terrorism is not a 
security threat that arose from the state-centric world and it is not posed by states. It 
is a challenge posed by non-state security actors, namely by transnational terrorists. 
With the help of the processes of globalization, a multi-centric world with multiple 
actors and security threats rose in a nested manner with the traditional state-centric 
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world. Transnational terrorists have found a place to grow and become effective 
within this multi-centric world and started to pose security threats not only to states 
but also to the people within the state-centric world. Thus, the challenge here is 
‘transnational’; but the response issued to meet this challenge is ‘international’.    
Within this framework it is important to study transnational terrorism, which 
threatens all of us and to pose the question of whether it is possible to give an 
effective international response to transnational terrorism. In order to be able to 
answer this question, the differences between the threat perceptions1 in the multi-
centric world, which include transnational terrorism, and traditional threat 
perceptions, must be understood. To do so is important because the answer to the 
question lies in the rise of the transnational terrorists as non-state security actors, thus 
as threat posers, whose nature can be explained via the nature of the threats perceived 
in the multi-centric world. The response to the threats they pose must be formulated 
according to this fact. In other words, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
existing response mechanisms against a new threat and to find out what kind of a 
response should be given, we must first of all understand with what we are 
confronted. Suggestions in the literature, on how we should respond to transnational 
terrorism, that fail to clarify this problem, remain short of meeting the challenge. 
Therefore, this thesis will deal with the question of whether it is possible to give an 
effective response to transnational terrorism with the existing international response 
mechanisms, by clarifying the problem we face, i.e. the rise of transnational 
terrorism as the new threat of the era, and transnational terrorists as the non-state 
security actors that pose this threat. In doing this, how international terrorism has 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis the word “perception” is not used to indicate that the threats in both the state-
centric world and multi-centric world are not real. They are real and the threats in the multi-centric 
world threaten the state-centric world as well and vice versa. However, the issues perceived in the 
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been transformed into transnational terrorism and how transnational terrorism has 
become increasingly independent from the states and state-centric system will be 
explained. Moreover, how much the existing international response mechanisms 
meet the challenge posed by this transnational terrorism threat will be evaluated. It is 
important to discuss these issues both at the theoretical and practical levels. At the 
theoretical level this discussion will help us to understand the structure of the global 
system, and the nature of the challenges and actors that arise within it. At the 
practical level, this discussion will be useful to see the shortcomings of the existing 
counterterrorism policies and find better ways to meet this challenge that threatens 
the well-being and security of the people all around the world. 
In discussing whether it is possible to give an effective response to 
transnational terrorism with the existing international response mechanisms, this 
research relies primarily on qualitative analysis of existing books, articles, and 
documents. Furthermore, from time to time, statistical data will be presented in order 
to strengthen the arguments. Furthermore, in order to operationalize the arguments 
made Al Qaeda, which is the best example in order to demonstrate the arguments in 
this thesis, has been studied as a case. 
On the other hand, at the theoretical level, a toolbox methodology will be 
used. In other words, several different theoretical perspectives will be utilized 
depending on which one explains the issue at hand better. This methodology is 
adopted because a single theoretical perspective falls short of explaining all the 
aspects of the question posed. For example, a realist perspective fails to explain the 
emergence of non-state security actors within the system, an element that must be 
explained in order to understand the rise of transnational terrorists as non-state 
                                                                                                                                                                    
multi-centric world as threats are not perceived as threats in the state-centric world. Therefore, 
“perceived threats” is used here to indicate that they are threats and are accepted as such. 
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security actors. On the other hand, a liberal perspective fails to explain why a strictly 
international and state-centric response is adapted against transnational terrorism. 
Therefore, a dualistic image of world politics, which is ideal for explaining each and 
every aspect of the question whether the existing international response mechanisms 
meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism in an effective manner, has been 
developed. In order to understand why a strictly international response has been 
given, the state-centric world image has been adapted; while multi-centric world, 
image that co-exists and intersects with the state-centric one, is used to explain the 
rise of the transnational terrorists as non-state security actors and the emergence of 
issues like transnational terrorism as new security threats within the system. 
Within this framework, in the following chapter, the theoretical bases of the 
thesis, namely the evolution of the dualistic image of world politics, will be 
explained. Firstly, the practical evolution of the state-centric and multi-centric worlds 
that constitute the dualistic image of world politics will be mentioned. Secondly, the 
theoretical roots of these two worlds in the area of international relations theories 
will be examined. In doing this, the reflections of the state-centric world in realism 
and of the multi-centric world in liberalism and the English School will be dealt with. 
The works of James N. Rosenau, who examined the state-centric world and multi-
centric world concepts in his studies, will also be analyzed, as will the works of other 
authors who adopted a dualistic perspective without referring to it or to its theoretical 
foundations. Finally, my views on why the dualistic approach of world politics is the 
most suitable approach in trying to answer the research question of this thesis will be 
mentioned. 
In the third chapter, the concept of transnational terrorism will be clarified. 
First of all, the problem of defining terrorism in general and transnational terrorism 
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in particular will be stated. Then how the term is used throughout this study will be 
mentioned. Later, the differences of transnational terrorism, as it is defined in this 
study, from other types of violence and terrorism will be explained by emphazing the 
differences of transnational terrorism, which finds itself a place in the multi-centric 
world, from international terrorism, which is a part of the threat perceptions of the 
state-centric world. 
In the fourth chapter, the threat perceptions, reference objects of security and 
security actors in the multi-centric world will be examined. But before these, the 
threat perceptions within the state-centric world and the primacy of the ‘state’ as the 
only important actor in the state-centric system will be briefly explained in order to 
state the differences of the threat perceptions within the multi-centric world from the 
threat perceptions of the state-centric world better. Then, the multiple threat 
perceptions in the multi-centric world, including socio-economic, cultural, 
environmental, and non-traditional military-political threats, will be explained. 
Thirdly, multiple reference objects of these multiple threats, including individuals, 
different kinds of groupings, societies, besides states, will be mentioned. Finally, 
non-state security actors in the multi-centric world, like individuals, groupings, 
MNCs/TNCs, NGOs and INGOs, transnational organized crime organizations, and 
transnational terrorist organizations, will be dealt with. These issues in the fourth 
chapter will be examined in order to show how the nature of the threats in the multi-
centric world, including transnational terrorism, with multiple referent objects and 
security actors differ from that of the state-centric world. This is an important step 
for clarifying the problem we face, namely the rise of transnational terrorism as an 
important security threat in today’s world. 
 5 
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In the fifth chapter, the actorness of transnational terrorists will be explained. 
In doing this, firstly, state support to terrorism -which made terrorism international in 
the Cold War era- will be mentioned. Secondly, the transnationalization of terrorism 
by freeing itself from the control of and dependency on states with the help of 
globalization in the post-Cold War era will be examined in order to explain the 
emergence of transnational terrorists as actors in the system. Thirdly, other 
characteristics that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists will be dealt with.  
In the sixth chapter, Al Qaeda will be studied as a case study in order to 
demonstrate the actorness of transnational terrorists. Therefore, firstly, the historical 
evolution of Al Qaeda will be examined. Then, the actorness of Al Qaeda will be 
analyzed based on the criteria set in the fifth chapter. 
In the conclusion part of the thesis, the research findings will be stated and 
the extent to which existing international response mechanisms are appropriate to 
meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorists as non-state security actors will 
be evaluated.        
  
 
CHAPTER II 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUALISTIC IMAGE OF WORLD POLITICS 
 
Throughout this thesis the answer to the question whether it is possible to 
give an effective international response to transnational terrorism will be sought. In 
order to be able to answer this question the nature of the threat posed by transnational 
terrorism will be examined. A part of the nature of the threat posed by transnational 
terrorism is the non-state actorness of transnational terrorists as perpetrators. One 
theoretical perspective alone cannot explain every aspect of these issues. In order to 
draw a clearer picture, the question posed above can be said to have roughly two 
major parts. The first part is the ‘international’ nature of the response mechanisms 
that are used to meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorism. This strictly 
‘internationalness’ of the response can best be explained with the state-centric image 
of world politics and thus with the realist paradigm. The second part of the question 
is the transnational nature of the threat and its being posed by transnational non-state 
security actors. This part of the question can best be understood via the multi-centric 
image of world politics and liberal paradigm, and to a lesser extent by the English 
School. If we look from the other way around, the rise of the non-state security actors 
and transnational threats cannot be explained by the realist paradigm, while 
liberalism cannot explain the strictly international nature of the response. Therefore, 
a perspective that combines different aspects of these approaches is necessary. Such 
a combination must be developed based on which perspective explains the issue at 
hand better. Thus, a dualistic image of world politics will be developed here. 
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Accordingly, the strictly international nature of the response that is adopted against 
transnational terrorism will be explained by the state-centric world image, while 
transnational terrorism as the security threat and transnational terrorists as non-state 
security actors will be explained by the multi-centric world image. However, the 
most important aspect of the dualistic image of world politics is that it accepts and 
explains the existence of the state-centric and multi-centric worlds together in an 
interacting and intersecting manner. From the beginning onwards, it is worth to 
remind that this duality in world politics is not a visible matter but a conceptual one. 
Throughout this chapter, the practical and theoretical evolution of the 
dualistic image of world politics will be explained. Firstly, the practical evolution of 
the state-centric and multi-centric worlds will be dealt with. Secondly, the theoretical 
roots of the state-centric world within the realist paradigm, and of the multi-centric 
world within liberalism and English School will be examined. Furthermore, also as a 
part of the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of politics, the works of James 
N. Rosenau and those of some other authors will be analyzed. Finally, in the third 
section of this chapter, my views on why the dualistic approach of world politics is 
the most suitable approach in explaining today’s events and for answering the main 
research question of this thesis, namely whether it is possible to give an effective 
international response to transnational terrorism, will be stated. 
 
2. 1 The Practical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics 
2. 1. 1 The Practical Evolution of the State-centric Image of World Politics     
The roots of the state-centric world dates back to the Peace of Westphalia 
signed in 1648 after the Thirty Years’ War conducted among the major powers of 
Europe. With this treaty ‘state’ had been put at the center of world politics and the 
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major principles of the state-centric world were determined. According to these 
principles, state has been recognized as sovereign both internally (the state is the sole 
supreme authority within its own territory and over its own population) and 
externally (no state has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states 
and each state has the right to act independently in determining its domestic and 
foreign policies). Thus, terms like ‘joint’ or ‘pooled’ sovereignty were unthinkable.2 
Furthermore, although there may be physical differences among the states, each and 
every state was recognized as legal equals in the system. This means that there is no 
superior authority that controls the states in the system. Thus, having a demarcated 
territory with a loyal population, the sovereign rights over these territory and 
population, being legally equal and independent, and having been recognized by 
others in the system as such became the major characteristics of states that constitute 
the system as the sole actors within it.3 
 Of course, these states were not ‘nation-states’ from the beginning onwards. 
The states began to become nation-states from the 19th century onwards and that 
became the rule of the day in the 20th century.4 A strong and shared identity emerged 
among people who constituted the population of a state and who came to be referred 
                                                          
2 Scholte, Jan Aart. 2001. “The Globalization of World Poltics.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., 
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 20-21. Here, ‘joint’ sovereignty means the joint rule of two or more states over the 
same territory. For example, it is argued that in Taba Negotiations between Israel and Palestine joint 
sovereignty over holy sites had been proposed but no solutions were reached. For more detail about 
this issue see Lefkovits, Edgar, “Olmert: No International Control of ‘Sacred Zone’”, Jerusalem Post, 
January 24- 2001. Available online: 
<http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/01/24/News/News.20156.html>. ‘Pooled’ sovereignty means 
voluntary subjection of states some of their sovereign rights to supranational institutions. For example, 
the members of the European Union agreed to subject themselves to supranational institutions like the 
European Court. 
3 Teschke, Benno. 2002. “Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from 
Absolutism to Capitalism”, European Journal of International Relations, 8 (1):6. Hirst, Paul. 2001. 
War and Power in the 21st Century. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 16. 
4 Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary 
International System. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 24. For a more detailed information on the 
developments of nations and nationalism see Cobban, Alfred. 1969. The Nation State and National 
Self-Determination. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 
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as the ‘nation’. In order to reinforce this sense of being a nation and the feelings of 
loyalty to the country, each state developed a distinctive flag of its own, 
“inspirational national anthems and oaths, and other rituals of citizenship and 
patriotism that are performed at public ceremonies.”5 Therefore, the relations among 
the sovereign nation-states, the sole actors in the system, started to be called as 
‘international relations’ and the rules accepted in the Peace of Westphalia had 
continued to be the major principles of the ‘international’ system. The Westphalian 
system and the rules it brought have been the roots of the international law that 
regulates the relations among these nation-states. 
 Within this system, composed of sovereign equals and no central 
international supreme authority, the states have to survive by their own means. They 
perceive threats from other states to their territorial integrity and independence. 
Therefore, they try to strengthen their military in order secure themselves in the 
system. Military capabilities became an essential component in the foreign policy of 
all states in order to pursue national security and national goals. States continuously 
developed new military tactics and weapons systems6 in order to enhance their 
power. Hence, ‘power’ has been the main concern of states, and power was 
calculated in military terms and mostly in connection with the ability of states to 
conduct war.7 Thus, states conducted lots of wars including two major wars that were 
called world wars. At the end of the Second World War, a Cold War started to be 
fought between two blocs composed of states. These blocs used lots of tactics in 
order to defeat each other, and these tactics included the utilization of terrorist 
                                                          
5 Brown, Seyom. 1995. New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics. (Post-Cold War 
edition) New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 11. 
6 Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary 
International System. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1. 
7 Sprout, Herold and Margaret Sprout. 1971. Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth. New York: D. 
Van Nostrand, 165. 
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groups. Hence, the major threat continued to be perceived from states and the object 
of these threats were also states as the sole actors in the system. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the Cold War ended, however states continued to perceive threats 
from other states, this time for example from the so-called ‘rogue’ states8, like Iraq 
and North Korea. Also the rise and strengthening of other states, like China and 
India, were perceived as threats to national security by some states, including the 
US.9 Therefore, the response mechanisms they developed to meet the perceived 
security challenges have always been state-centric and against other states that were 
perceived as enemies. This was a major result of the state-centricness of the world. 
Both threats and responses were state-centric because the only important actor that 
matter was states. 
 However, towards the end of the 20th century, by the help of the 
intensification of the processes of globalization, the situation concerning the world 
politics started to change. New security challenges with new and non-state security 
actors started to come to the forefront and threaten the well-being and life of the 
people as well as states. These issues can best be explained with the evolution of the 
multi-centric world in a nested manner with the state-centric one. 
 
2. 1. 2 The Practical Evolution of the Multi-centric Image of World Politics  
Towards the end of the 20th century new and non-state actors started to play 
important roles in the world politics besides the sovereign states. They challenged the 
sovereignty of the states by representing alternative power centers towards which the 
individual citizens of the states can shift their loyalties. Furthermore, individuals 
                                                          
8 The term “rogue states” was first used by the US for states that do not abide by international norms 
and laws. 
9 Brown, Seyom. 1995. New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics. (Post-Cold War 
edition) New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 140-176. 
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themselves started to play significant roles in world politics as a result of the 
improvements in their skills by the help of the developments in communications and 
transportation technologies and improved education. The processes of globalization 
can be used in explaining the evolution of these developments. At the end a multi-
centric world image with multiple actors and issue areas emerged and it intersects the 
state-centric world. In order to make further clear what we mean by multi-centric 
image of world politics it is worth first to state its characteristics; then, since 
globalization explains the development of these characteristics, in order to 
understand how this type of world image evolved, we should identify what we mean 
by globalization and what globalization means for the development of the 
characteristics of the multi-centric world. 
 
2. 1. 2. 1 The Characteristics of the Multi-centric World 
 The multi-centric world10 can be said to have four major characteristics. The 
first one is that there are multiple actors within the multi-centric world. This means 
that states are not the only actors that matter in the system. There are other important 
and non-state actors that challenge the sovereignty of the states by providing 
alternative power centers for individual loyalties. Furthermore, these actors emerge 
as threat posers within the system, thus threats to the security of the state and its 
citizens come not only from other states but also from these non-state actors. 
 The second characteristic of the multi-centric world is the loyalty shifts of the 
individuals from states towards other transnational entities. This has two main 
                                                          
10 In some studies the term ‘multi-centric world’ is understood in the meaning of multipolarity, thus as 
the existence of multiple states in the international system as important actors. (for a comprehensive 
explanation of this issue see Wolfish, Daniel, and Gordon Smith. 2000. “Governance and Policy in a 
Multicentric World”, Canadian Public Policy – Analyse de Politiques, 16(2): 51-72. However, 
throughout this study this term will not be used in that meaning. The way I use the term is explained 
within the text. 
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reasons. The first reason is, as stated above, the emergence of alternative power 
centers that meet the expectations of the individuals better than the state of which 
they are citizens. The second reason is the rise of global consciousness of the 
individuals and the improvements in their skills. These empower individuals and 
they associate themselves with transnational communities. As a result the 
sovereignty of the state is further challenged. 
 The third characteristic of the multi-centric world is the multiple threat 
perceptions. This means that issues like impoverishment, spread of infectious 
diseases, uncontrollable migration, identity crisis, and environmental problems that 
remain outside the borders of traditional military security problems are also 
perceived as threats in the multi-centric world. The decline in the importance of 
distances and borders, and increase in the speed of interactions with transnational and 
supraterritorial character, resulted in the spread of these threats all over the world. It 
is to say, the effects of these problems that seem to be effecting only the 
underdeveloped parts of the world can be felt all over the world including the 
developed countries as a result of the processes of globalization. The emergence of 
these multiple security threats itself is mostly a result of the shrinking distances and 
borders, faster interactions and the emergence of multiple actors that may be threat 
posers besides the states. These problems threaten not only the states, but also the 
individuals, groups, and societies. At the end, since individual states cannot cope 
with these threats that transcend individual state borders alone, their sovereignty is 
further challenged. 
 The fourth characteristic of the multi-centric world is actually the result of the 
three characteristics mentioned, i.e. the weakening of the sovereignty of the state in 
its Westphalian meaning. As stated above the sovereignty of the state is weakened as 
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a result of the emergence of other non-state actors as new power centers, 
empowerment of individuals and loyalty shifts of them from states towards these 
new entities, and the emergence of new security threats that transcend state borders. 
The role of globalization in the evolution of all these characteristics is crucial. To 
that role we now turn.    
 
2. 1. 2. 2 The Concept of Globalization and its Impacts on the Development of 
the Characteristics of the Multi-centric World 
Globalization as a concept can be and is defined in many different ways 
depending on one’s perspective towards the world.11 Globalization is used 
throughout this study with two meanings, namely as liberalization and 
deterritorialization, in explaining the evolution of the characteristics of the multi-
centric world. The first conceptualization is based on the economic and technological 
aspects of globalization and the second one is mainly based on the political aspects 
of globalization. Thus, these two conceptualizations of globalization together provide 
a conceptual lens to understand the facilitating role of globalization for the rise of 
multiple security threat perceptions in the multi-centric world, non-state security 
actors and power centers, loyalty shifts of individuals towards these power centers 
and the challenge to state’s sovereignty in its Westphalian sense. 
 Firstly, globalization as liberalization means the large-scale opening of state 
borders. This is a result of the removal of regulatory barriers to international trade, 
travel, financial transfers, and communications.12 This type of globalization includes 
                                                          
11 For example, internationalization, universalization, modernization, Westernization/Americanization 
are among the meanings attributed to globalization. 
12 Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. “Global Capitalism and the State”, International Affairs, 73(3): 431.  
Hughes, Christopher W. 2002. “Reflections on Globalization, Security and 9/11”, Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs,15(3): 423. 
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the improvements in technology that facilitated and sped up the worldwide travel, 
transportation and communication.  
 Secondly, globalization as deterritorialization, or supraterritoriality, means 
that there is an increase of trans-border relations, thus transcendence of borders. 
Borders mean here “the territorial demarcations of state jurisdictions, and associated 
issues of governance, economy, identity and community.”13 Thus global relations are 
less tied to territorial frameworks, in terms of both borders and distances. The world 
is becoming a single place. As a result of technological developments like 
telephones, computer networks, radio, television, or air travel, persons all over the 
world have easy and quick contact with each other. As an example of such global 
phenomena we can give the CNN broadcasts and Visa credit cards, which are 
virtually unrestricted by territorial places, distances, and borders.14 Another example 
is that telecommunications and electronic mass media move anywhere across the 
planet instantaneously.15 Furthermore, a global consciousness is emerging and people 
start to perceive the world as a single place and affiliate themselves with 
communities, be it religious, ethnic or otherwise, that transcend state’s territorial 
borders.16 Therefore, individual loyalties may shift from states to other global 
communities. This empowers individuals while decreasing state sovereignty. This 
does not mean of course, that states as territorial units and territorial geography have 
lost all their relevance. There are still many situations where territorial places, 
distances, and borders are important, as in the case of migration.17 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
13 Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. “Global Capitalism and the State”, International Affairs, 73(3): 430. 
14 Scholte, Jan Aart. 1999. “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?”, CSGR Working Paper,  
31(99): 9. 
15 Scholte, Jan Aart. 2002. “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance,” Global 
Governance, 8: 286. 
16 Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. “Global Capitalism and the State,” International Affairs, 73(3): 431-432. 
17 Scholte, Jan Aart. 1999. “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?”, CSGR Working Paper, 
31(99): 9. 
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globalization as supraterritoriality is a new phenomenon. As stated by Jan Aart 
Scholte: 
The world of 1950 knew few or no airline passengers, intercontinental 
missiles, satellite communications, global monies, offshore finance centers, 
computer networks, or ozone holes.18  
However, today territorial spaces and global spaces coexist and interrelate with each 
other. 
In sum, globalization as liberalization empowered non-state actors, including 
individuals, by making it easier for them to acquire the necessary means for being 
effective actors in world politics. Moreover, globalization as deterritorialization 
resulted in the increase of transborder relations, i.e. relations less tied to territory. 
This type of relations led to the emergence of a global awareness/consciousness 
among the individuals. Thus, they started to associate themselves with transnational 
communities, like religious and ethnic ones, that transcend state boundaries. These 
loyalty shifts weakened state sovereignty. Furthermore, globalization both as 
liberalization and deterritorialization resulted in the emergence of security threats 
other than military ones. These threats, like immigration and environmental 
problems, transcend state boundaries. They also threaten the well-being and 
existence of individuals and societies besides the states. Since these threats transcend 
the boundaries of one state, states cannot deal with them alone. This also contributes 
to the weakening of state sovereignty. Thus, globalization, as liberalization and 
deterritorialization, has affected the evolution of the characteristics of the multi-
centric world. 
 
                                                          
18 Scholte, Jan Aart. 2002. “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance,” Global 
Governance, 8: 286. 
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2. 1. 3 The Dualistic Image of World Politics 
The outcome of the evolution of the multi-centric world that interacts and 
intersects with the state-centric one is a dualistic image of world politics. It is worth 
reminding here that this duality is not a visible one but rather a conceptual image of 
world affairs. This dualistic image of world politics can be roughly pictured as in 
figure 1.  
 
State-centric world   Multi-centric world 
FIGURE 1: The Dualistic Image of World Politics 
 
Besides its practical evolution, the reflections of this dualistic image of world 
politics can be seen in the field of international relations theories as well. Knowing 
the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of world politics is also necessary to 
understand and explain the aspects of the question of whether it is possible to give an 
effective international response to transnational terrorism. This is because theories 
are developed to understand the practice easier and better. Therefore, the next section 
of this chapter is devoted to the explanation of the theoretical evolution of the 
dualistic image of world politics.   
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2. 2. The Theoretical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics 
Actually in the field of International Relations dualistic thinking has always 
been commonplace although the dualities that are referred to vary. Scholars tend to 
think on the basis of external vs. internal, high politics vs. low politics, North vs. 
South, developed vs. underdeveloped, core vs. periphery, premodern vs. modern, 
zone of peace vs. zone of conflict, etc.. All of these dualities, some conceptual some 
geographical/territorial, exclude each other and are usually defined in an oppositional 
manner. However, the duality between state-centric and multi-centric worlds, as 
explained here, is a deterritorialized one and is different from the old types of 
dualities. The state-centric world and the multi-centric world do not exclude each 
other but they intersect. Those old types of dualities seemed to have remained within 
the state-centric world and are not part of the deterritorialized duality between the 
state-centric and multi-centric worlds.                 
The reflections of the emergence of a duality between the state-centric and 
multi-centric worlds can also be seen in theoretical studies. By looking at these 
studies we can observe the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of world 
politics, mainly within the liberal paradigm and to some extent in the studies of 
English School scholars. Furthermore, there are scholars who used this dualistic 
approach of world politics without referring to its theoretical dimensions but by 
taking its existence as an assumption in their studies. These studies are useful to 
understand the theoretical evolution of the multi-centric world that intersects with the 
state-centric world. However, in order to understand the strictly international nature 
of the state-centric world and its acceptance of states as the sole important actors in 
the international system we should look at the realist paradigm. Since the newly 
emerging security problems and non-state actors cannot be placed within the realist 
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paradigm, developing another perspective to understand these issues became 
necessary. This situation contributed to the evolution of a dualistic image of world 
politics theoretically.  
Within this framework, in this part of the thesis, first, in order to explain the 
reflections of the features of the state-centric world in international relations theory, 
the realist perspective will be briefly analyzed. Then, in order to explain the 
theoretical foundations of the multi-centric world that intersects with the state-centric 
world and the duality this situation creates, arguments in liberalism and to a lesser 
extent the English School will be examined. Also, as part of the theoretical evolution 
of the dualistic image of politics the works of James Rosenau, who dealt with state-
centric and multi-centric worlds in his studies, and the works of some other scholars 
that utilize a dualistic perspective in their studies without openly referring to it, will 
be briefly evaluated. 
 
2. 2. 1 The Theoretical Evolution of the State-centric World Image 
 As stated before, while explaining the characteristics of the state-centric 
world, in the state-centric world sovereign states are accepted as the only important 
actors. States are responsible for protecting their own territory, population, and the 
way of life of their citizens. Since there is no superior authority in the international 
arena that is above the individual collection of the sovereign states, states have to 
survive by their own means. For states, greater power means a better chance to 
survive. Here, power is defined narrowly in military strategic terms. Thus, states 
continuously try to improve and increase their military means and strength. However, 
this may be perceived as offensive by other states with the result that they will 
increase their military means and strengths as well. Therefore, while trying to 
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improve their own security, states threaten the security of other states. This is called 
as “security dilemma”. Therefore, more security for one means less for others. This 
is a “zero-sum game”. As a result international agreements and cooperation cannot 
last forever. Each state pursues it own national interests. Therefore, response to a 
common threat can only be strictly “international” and is limited with the borders 
drawn by the national interests of individual states. All these characteristics of the 
state-centric world are among the major assumptions and arguments of the theories 
in realist paradigm. Although there are differences among different versions of 
realism, the above mentioned assumptions and arguments are common in all of them. 
Thus, theories in the realist paradigm can be shown for the theoretical evolution of 
the state-centric image of world politics.19  
 
2. 2. 2 The Theoretical Evolution of the Multi-Centric World Image  
 The theoretical foundations of the multi-centric world can be seen in the 
liberal paradigm and to a lesser extent in some arguments of the English School. 
These theoretical approaches can be said to accept the dual nature of world politics. 
For example, liberal theories accept the co-existence of states and non-state actors in 
the system. These theories also accept the importance of multiple issues besides the 
traditional security concerns. In order to explain the theoretical evolution of the 
                                                          
19 For a detailed textbook explanation of the theories in the realist paradigm see Jackson, Robert H. 
and Georg Sorensen. 2003. Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baylis, John and Steve Smith. 2001. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. For a textbook explanation and original 
texts see Viotti, Paul R. And Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations Theory: Realism, 
Pluralism, Globalism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. For original works see Carr, E. H. 1939. Twenty 
Years’  Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: 
Macmillan. Hobbes, T. 1946. Leviathan. Oxford: Blackwell. Machiavelli, N. 1961. The Prince. Trans. 
G. Bull. Harmondworth: Penguin. Mearsheimer, J. 1995. “A Realist Reply,” International Security, 
20(1): 82-93. Morgenthau, H. J. 1960. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 3rd 
edition. New York: Knopf. Thucydides. 1954. History of Peloponnesian War. Trans. R. Warner. 
London: Penguin. Waltz, K. 1959. 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University 
Press. Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley among 
others.   
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multi-centric world we will now analyze the arguments of liberal and English School 
theories. 
 
2. 2. 2. 1 Liberal Paradigm and the Dualistic World Image 
2. 2. 2. 1. i Pluralism 
The first theoretical approach we should consider while analyzing the 
theoretical evolution of the multi-centric world image, which co-exists with the state-
centric world, is pluralism. According to pluralism, alongside the states, non-state 
actors, like Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Companies 
(MNCs), international banks, international organizations, transnational civil society 
organizations, transnational groupings including criminal organizations and 
terrorists, are important entities in international relations as independent actors in 
their own rights. There are transnational relations between states and these non-state 
actors that operate across national borders.20 Both governmental and private 
organizations may transcend state boundaries and form coalitions with their foreign 
counterparts.21 Furthermore, according to the transnationalism within the pluralist 
paradigm there are ties between societies that include much more than state-to-state 
relations.22 This increase in transnational ties and actors in the 20th century is largely 
a result of the increase in technology, communication, and economic ties. Thus, 
according to pluralists, the state-centric model of world politics is no longer enough 
                                                          
20 Viotti, Paul R. And Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 7-8. 
21 Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye (eds.). 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1974.  
“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, 27(1): 39-62. 
Peterson, M. J. 1992. “Transnational Activity, International Society, and World Politics,” Millennium, 
21(3): 371-388. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.). 1995. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cronin, Bruce. 2002. “The Two Faces of the United 
Nations: The Tension between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism,” Global Governance, 
8(1): 53-71. 
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to grasp the nature of world affairs in the present century, and an alternative image of 
the world, which includes non-state actors and multiple issue agendas, is required.23 
 
2. 2. 2. 1. ii Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Integration Theories 
 As a continuation of this pluralist school of thought, David Mitrany, 
mentioned the importance of transnational ties. According to him, collaborative 
responses from states are necessary in order to deal with the proliferation of common 
technical problems with which the individual states cannot cope alone. According to 
Mitrany, successful collaboration in one area would lead to further collaboration in 
related fields as a result of the benefits all states gain. Thus, states and societies will 
become increasingly integrated due to this expansion of collaboration in technical 
fields.24  Although the functionalism of Mitrany was mainly concerning technical 
issues, Ernst Haas attributed a political dimension to this line of thought. According 
to the neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas, “political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities 
toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the 
preexisting national states.”25 Thus, he is explaining the loyalty shifts and the 
‘pooling’ of sovereignty, which create supranational entities that at the end may lead 
to international integration. The European Communities, which later became the 
European Union, are the most common example for this. In general, the integration 
literature pays attention to economic, social, and technical transactions besides 
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 Rosenau, James N.. 1980. The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the 
Transnationalisation of World Affairs. New York: Nichols, 1. 
23 Viotti, Paul R. And Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 211-212. 
24 Mitrany, D.. 1948.  “The Functional Approach to World Organization”, International Affairs, 24(3): 
350-363. 
25 Haas, Ernst B.. 1958.  The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 16. 
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political and military ones and focuses on interest groups, transnational non-state 
actors and public opinion alongside the states.26 
 
2. 2. 2. 1. iii Regime Theories, Liberal Institutionalism and Interdependence 
Theories 
 Another theoretical perspective that contributed to the evolution of the 
dualistic image of world politics is the neo-liberal theories of regimes, which claim 
that international regimes can play an important role by helping states to realize their 
common interests. Non-state actors, along with states, are important according to this 
perspective as well. Sometimes non-state actors in combination with the states shape 
the international regimes along the line of which international politics are conducted. 
Also, they sometimes magnify and mitigate the effects of the regimes. Furthermore, 
non-state actors sometimes provide sources of information, channels for 
implementation, or other kinds of support to international institutions. These 
international institutions, in turn, provide access to the decision-making procedures 
for weaker states that might otherwise be excluded from the decision-making 
stages.27 Also, liberal institutionalism attributes to non-state actors this kind of 
importance.28 The complex interdependence theory of Keohane and Nye can be 
                                                          
26 Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Haas, Ernst 
B. 1971. “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing.” 
In Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 30-31. Haas, Ernst B. 1976. “Turbulent Fields and the 
Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization, 30(2): 173-212. Keohane, Robert O. 
And Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1975. “International Interdependence and Integration.” In Fred I. Greenstein 
and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science. (vol. 8) Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
363-414. Lindberg, Leon N. And Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.). 1971. Regional Integration: Theory and 
Research. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tsoukalis, Loukas. 1991. The New European 
Economy: The Politics and Economics of Integration. New York: Oxford University Press.  
27 Hocking, Brian and Micheal Smith. 1995. World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations. (2nd edition) London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 307. 
28 Keohane, R. (ed.). 1989. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory. Boulder, Col.: Westview. Keohane, R. and L. Martin. 1995. “The Promise of 
Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, 20(1): 39-51. Haas, Ernst B. 1980. “Why Collaborate? 
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mentioned here. According to them, there are transnational relations between 
individuals and groups outside of the state. Transnational actors, like NGOs and 
transnational corporations, will pursue their own separate goals free from the control 
of the state.29 There are multiple channels of communication, which can be 
summarized as interstate relations, relations between states; transgovernmental 
relations, relations between the different segments of the governmental body of the 
states; and transnational relations, relations between the actors other than the states 
like NGOs, MNCs, etc.. Furthermore, there is no clear hierarchy among issues such 
as the claim that politics and military security are more important than economics or 
other issues. Also, force is not always an effective instrument of policy.  For 
example, military force cannot be used in resolving economic conflicts  among the 
members of an alliance. As the complexity of actors and issues in world politics 
increases, the utility of force declines. The manipulation of interdependence, 
international organizations and transnational actors become more useful instruments 
of policy under these conditions.30  
Keohane and Nye argue that both realism, which takes unitary states as the 
only prominent actors in international affairs, assumes an hierarchy among issues 
and pursuing the use of force as the most effective instrument of policy, and complex 
interdependence, are ideal types of thought. In practice most situations fall in 
between these two, and sometimes complex interdependence explains reality better 
than realism.31 Here, although the authors do not directly mention it, they assume a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics, 32(3): 357-405. Rittberger, Volker (ed.). 
1993. Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
29 Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sorensen. 2003. Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 115. 
30 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Jr.. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 3-37. 
31 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Jr.. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 3-37. 
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duality between a state-centric world represented by realism and a multi-centric 
world represented by complex interdependence. 
 
2. 2. 2. 1. iv Sociological Liberalism 
Along these same lines of thought, there is also sociological liberalism. 
According to this perspective international relations is not only about state-to-state 
relations but also it is about transnational relations, such as relations between people, 
groups, and organizations from different countries.32 According to many sociological 
liberals “transnational relations between people from different countries help create 
new forms of human society which exist alongside or even in competition with the 
nation-state.”33 Relations between transnational actors are seen as being more 
cooperative than those between states. Also there may be overlapping memberships 
in such transnational groups that facilitate cooperation. Another thing that facilitate 
cooperation is the “simple act of communication”. Through communication people 
learn about others, their way of life, customs, practices and concerns. Thus, 
communication flows influence cultures and people’s sense of political identity. As a 
result, increased knowledge about people results in “mutual predictability of 
behaviour” and increases cooperation and even international political integration.34 
Actually, this relationship works reciprocally, i.e. transnational and international 
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organizations encourage habits of communication.35 Even in the neofunctionalist 
literature discussed above, signs of sociological liberalism can be seen. For example, 
neofunctionalists’ focus on transnational societal characteristics and transnational 
groups makes them important contributors to sociological liberalism. Furthermore, 
transnationalists, with their emphasis on the rise of non-state actors at the expense of 
states36 can be said to contribute sociological liberal understanding.37 
 
2. 2. 2. 1. v The Importance of Individuals 
According to liberal thinking, individuals are rational and they are self-
interested and competitive up to a point. They share many interests and can engage in 
cooperative action when this serves their interests better. Moreover, liberal theorists 
believe in progress. Individuals learn in time and at the end this lead them to 
cooperate for realizing their interests.38 This shows that in liberal thinking there is the 
belief that individuals can improve their skills through the processes of learning, and 
through cooperation with each other they become actors in the international system 
for their own rights which may differ from those of the states. This, in turn, 
contributes to the rise of the multi-centric world that intersects with the state-centric 
world. 
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2. 2. 2. 1. vi Theories of Globalization 
Theorists of globalization also refer to the duality in world politics. For 
example according to Jan Aart Scholte: 
 The international realm is a patchwork of bordered countries, while the global  
sphere is a web of transborder networks. Whereas international links (for  
example, trade in cacao) require people to cross considerable distances  
in comparatively long time intervals, global connections (for example,  
satellite newscasts) are effectively distance-less and instantaneous.  
Global phenomena can extend across the world at the same time and can  
move between places in no time; in this sense they have a supraterritorial  
and transworld character. … International and global relations can coexist, of  
course, and indeed the contemporary world is at the same time both  
internationalized and globalizing.39   
So, globalization has not ended the importance of territorial geography but created a 
new supraterritorial space alongside and interrelated with it (territorial geography). 
But, since not every event in today’s world is based on the geographical territory and 
since the sovereignty of a state is over a specified territorial domain, the sovereignty 
of the state is challenged to some extent. This, at the end, results in loyalty shifts 
from states towards other sovereignty-free entities with which individuals may 
associate themselves and this in turn further diminishes the state sovereignty.  
 
2. 2. 2. 2 English School and the Dualistic Image of World Politics 
Although the main theoretical roots of dualistic world image can be found in 
the liberal thinking, there are some arguments that reflect the features of this type of 
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world image in the International Society, or English School, as well. According to 
this perspective, although international society is a ‘society of states’, it is situated in 
between ‘international system’ of states and ‘world society’ of individuals, non-state 
actors and global population.40 Furthermore, according to Barry Buzan, in order to 
develop, international society must be supported by the elements of “‘world’ culture 
at the mass level”41 on both subsystem and global scales. On the other hand, the state 
system is the only candidate, which can provide a stable political framework without 
which world society cannot emerge.  Therefore, while international society provides 
the political framework of world society, world society provides the civilizational 
foundation for the development of the international society beyond a basic level.42       
 Hence, although not to the extent of liberal theories, we can detect a kind of 
dualistic understanding of world affairs in English School as well. On the other hand, 
when we combine the arguments of the liberal theories explained above, we can 
draw a picture in which transnational actors and interactions co-exist with states and 
besides state-to-state relations. Moreover,  there are different issue areas, like 
environmental degradation, that cannot be dealt with by individual states. This 
empowers some non-state actors that can deal with such issues better, at the expense 
of the states. All these points explain the co-existence of a multi-centric world and a 
state-centric world at the same time and in an intertwined manner. Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
39 Scholte, Jan Aart. 2001. “The Globalization of World Poltics.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, 
eds., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 15. 
40 Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Poltics. London: 
Macmillan. Bull, Hedley, and A. Watson. 1984. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. Buzan, Barry. 1993. “From International System to International Society: Structural 
Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School”, International Organization, 47(3): 340-351. 
41Buzan, Barry. 1993. “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, International Organization, 47(3): 340.  
42 Buzan, Barry. 1993. “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory meet the English School”, International Organization, 47(3): 340-351. 
 28 
developments in the individual skills led individuals to emerge as important actors in 
world politics as well. This is best formulated in the works of James Rosenau.43 
2. 2. 2. 3 James N. Rosenau and the Dualistic Image of World Politics 
 According to Rosenau, the world of today is a turbulent one because in 
today’s world the forces of integration and fragmentation coexist. Furthermore, there 
are non-state actors that play important roles in world politics besides the states. 
These non-state actors include individuals, which, as a result of the improvements in 
individual skills, themselves became important actors and bring different mentalities 
and perspectives to the issues of the day. Thus, Rosenau looks at the micro level 
besides the macro level and their relations in analyzing today’s world politics. Within 
this framework, individual skills were improved, sovereignty-free transnational 
actors gained importance in world politics, the sovereignty of states diminished as 
the authorities were reallocated and loyalties shifted. Thus, a multi-centric world 
arose alongside the state-centric world and the former often challenges the later, for 
example by creating new security challenges that the latter is not ready to cope with, 
like transnational terrorism. In order to understand these phenomena better, we 
should look in more detail at Rosenau’s explanation of skill revolution, authority 
reallocation, the diminishment in state sovereignty and the rise of the multi-centric 
world alongside the state-centric world in more detail. 
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At the micro level, as a result of a variety of sources like more education, 
travel, technological innovations like global television, internet, and fiber optic 
cables, individuals are undergoing skill revolution throughout which they gain 
greater analytical, emotional, and imaginative skills. Analytical skill means the 
ability to follow the events happening around the world and bring these into the 
agenda of their own countries and affect the national policies. Emotional skill means 
that individuals increasingly know what they want and what they support or are 
against. Improvement in the imaginative skills means the expansion of the 
imagination about the nature of other cultures and societies.44 Thus, today “the skill 
revolution has expanded the learning capacity of individuals, enriched their cognitive 
maps, and elaborated the scenarios with which they anticipate the future”.45 The 
skills of the individuals expand in the context of their own culture. Thus, as 
individuals’ awareness and capacity to affect the policies increases and as they start 
to define themselves with different concepts other than being a national of a state, 
they shift their loyalties towards other entities and they even emerge as actors in the 
system themselves. Therefore, the sovereignty of the state decreases both in quality 
and quantity. Moreover, the skills of actors like terrorists also expand in the context 
of their own culture and this increases their ability to conduct harmful terrorist acts 
all over the world, as well as serving to increase their devotion to their values and 
ideas. 
At the micro-macro level, in both public and private settings, the sources of 
authority shifted from traditional criteria to performance criteria of legitimacy. As a 
result, a kind of reallocation of authority started to take place. This reallocation 
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happens ‘downward’ to subnational groups and ‘upwards’ towards supranational 
organizations, such as IGOs, NGOs, professional groups, MNCs, and inchoate 
international social movements. The emergence of interdependence issues like 
environmental pollution, currency crisis, flow of refugees, drug trade, and terrorism, 
all of which transcend national boundaries, necessitates cooperation among all actors 
which contributed to the loyalty shifts. This erosion of the ability of the state to 
address problems and loyalty shifts at the end results in the erosion of state 
sovereignty.46 
All these affected the transformation of macro variable. As Rosenau 
indicates:  
Whereas the dominant structure for centuries prior to the present era was an  
anarchic state-centric system in which states, their organizations (intergovern- 
mental organizations), and their interactions shaped the course of events,  
today another system, the multi-centric system consisting of  diverse non- 
governmental collectivities (NGOs) [sovereignty-free actors], has evolved  
as a competing structure that often conflicts, sometimes cooperates, and  
endlessly interacts with the state-centric system.47  
Therefore, according to Rosenau the bifurcation between ‘multi-centric’ and ‘state-
centric’ forms, which are in competition with each other, characterizes the world 
politics of today in a complex and turbulent period. 
The September 11 attacks on the United States by Al- Qaeda demonstrates all 
these transformations in micro, micro-macro, and macro levels in a clear manner. 
The Al-Qaeda transnational terrorist organization emerged as a new actor in world 
politics as a result of increased organizational skills of terrorists, authority 
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disaggregation and loyalty shifts and challenges against the states. According to 
Rosenau, “The war between the world’s hegemon and a diffuse, nongovernmental 
organization is a classic instance of the disaggregated and bifurcated global 
structures posited by the turbulence model.”48 
 
2. 2. 2. 4 Practical Contributions to the Theoretical Evolution of the Dualistic 
Image of World Politics 
Another area where we can detect a dualistic perception of world affairs is the 
studies of some scholars who utilize a dualistic perspective without referring to its 
theoretical foundations or without explicitly referring to it, but by adopting it as a de 
facto situation. In this type of studies, events around the world, like the September 11 
attacks, are explained by referring to the features of the multi-centric world that 
intersects with the state-centric world. For example they refer to the emergence of 
global terrorist organizations as actors in the international arena besides the states, 
and improvements of the individual skills. Some of them also refer to the availability 
of unusual instruments for terrorist acts combined with the easy movement of people, 
money, weapons, and ideas around the world and revolution in information and 
communication technologies.49 In the words of Stanley Hoffmann “the dominant 
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tension of the decade was the clash between the fragmentation of states (and the state 
system) and the progress of economic, cultural, and political integration – in other 
words, globalization.”50 Before September 11, the idea in conventional international 
relations was that the war takes place among states, but September 11 showed that 
although poorly armed, individuals are now able to challenge and hurt the world’s 
hegemon/ only superpower. Thus, with the help of globalization, hopeless fanatics 
can easily access the means necessary to create an awful form of violence. This 
means that, individuals and groups are becoming global actors besides states and this 
results in the rise of insecurities and vulnerabilities. “Terrorism [has become] the 
bloody link between interstate relations and global society.”51  
Others accept the rise of the multi-centric world, although they do not 
explicitly refer to it, as different from the state-centric world while explaining the 
transformation of the state as a result of the developments that emanate from the 
multi-centric world and by the help of globalization. For example, in terms of 
economics, national economies of individual states are becoming globalized in the 
sense that production chains across regional and global borders are organized by 
transnational corporations. Also a globally integrated financial market emerged. In 
terms of politics, “[g]overnance is changing from an activity conducted by national 
administrations over well-defined territorial realms to an international, 
transgovernmental, and transnational activity that includes not only governments and 
traditional international organizations, but also nongovernmental organizations and 
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other nonstate actors.”52 It is argued that with the impact of globalization there is an 
upwards shift of sovereignty towards supranational authorities, and sideways shift of 
sovereignty towards transnational non-state actors.53 In terms of nationhood, states 
are challenged by other power centers for the loyalty of their citizens since these 
centers may serve better in order to meet some needs of the people that individual 
states cannot provide alone. Moreover, in terms of the identity of the people, the 
creation of identity is becoming individualized and collective identities that 
transcend state boundaries are emerging. As a result of all these threat perceptions of 
the states on their security change as well.54 Thus, the security problems become 
boundary-less, therefore, problems rising in one part of the world can easily and 
quickly be transmitted to the other parts of the world.55 All these at the end equal to 
an acceptance of the co-existence of the intersecting state-centric and multi-centric 
worlds. 
2. 2. 3 Why is the Dualistic Image of World Politics the most Suitable 
Approach?  
When we consider all these explanations on the theoretical development and 
practical reflections of a dualistic perspective of world politics, I am convinced that it 
is the best approach in explaining the events of today’s world in general, and 
transnational terrorism and international attempts to fight against it in particular. 
Transnational terrorism gains most of its strength from the multi-centric world, but 
the international response given to it so far remains within the state-centric world. To 
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be more precise, so far the threat perceptions of the states in the system have been 
state-centric, i.e. other states have been perceived as the threatening actors. 
Therefore, the response mechanisms against these threats were also state-centric, like 
using conventional armies or building a balance of power mechanism against the 
enemy. Thus, the states know only the tools to fight with other states. This type of 
response is the one used by the US in its ‘war against terrorism’ launched in the 
aftermath of September 11. However, it must be questioned whether the threats 
posed by the transnational terrorism of today can be met by the mechanisms of the 
state-centric world, since this transnational terrorism is situated in a multi-centric 
world which intersects with the state-centric world. It is to say, transnational terrorist 
organizations can conduct all types of actions where the state-centric world and 
multi-centric world intersects but they can also escape from the borders of the state-
centric world by hiding in the parts of the multi-centric world that remains outside 
the borders of the state-centric world. This situation can roughly be pictured as in the 
figure 2. 
 
State-centric world     Multi-centric world 
FIGURE 2: Duality in terms of Global Counter-terrorism 
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Therefore, although the US hit the Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and 
replaced the Taliban regime that supported Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda is still able 
to conduct terrorist activities and is continuing to attack its targets all over the world. 
This is a result of the deterritorialized nature of the transnational Al-Qaeda network 
that emerged with the help of the rise of the multi-centric world.  
It is worth recalling that the duality between the state-centric and multi-
centric worlds explained here is a conceptual one, thus it is not territorial, i.e. there 
are no clear-cut demarcation lines between the state-centric world and the multi-
centric world, rather this dualistic perception of world politics is related with the 
accepted characteristics of and perceptions about these conceptualized worlds. 
In short, the non-state actors situated in the multi-centric world can pose 
security threats to states as well, and we must question whether the conventional 
mechanisms of the state-centric world are sufficient enough to confront these 
challenges. On the basis of these, in order to be able to understand and explain 
whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational 
terrorism, a dualistic perception of world politics seems to be the best approach. By 
the help of the dualistic perspective we can better understand the nature of the threat 
posed by transnational terrorism and the international nature of the response that is 
being offered against it. As stated at the beginning, in order to be able to evaluate 
whether the existing international response mechanisms fit to meet the challenge 
posed by transnational terrorism, we should first analyze what kind of a threat we are 
facing. But, even before that it must be clarified what we mean by the concept of 
transnational terrorism. Therefore, the next chapter will deal with this issue. 
  
  
 
CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
 
3. 1 Defining Terrorism 
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put 
into words. They make themselves manifest. 
  Ludwig Wittgenstein56 
Although there has been much discussion and many studies on the definition of 
terrorism, it is almost impossible to find a terrorism definition on which everyone 
agrees. This is because everyone tries to define the term in a way that fits to his/her own 
interests and point of view, still by looking at the issue from a state-centric perspective. 
Since those who utilize terrorism, those who suffer from it, and those who have not 
confronted a direct terrorist attack tend to define the term differently, one man’s terrorist 
becomes another man’s freedom fighter.57 There is no consensus even on the criteria 
with which we should define terrorism. Some say that we should focus on the nature of 
the perpetrators. Others argue that we should focus on the characteristics/ nature58 and 
results of the acts. Still others suggest focusing on the terrorist means and aims59 or on 
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the targets.60 When we attach another term to this already ambiguous concept, like 
‘transnational’, the issue becomes further complicated. Therefore, it is not possible to 
find a concrete definition of terrorism in general, and transnational terrorism in 
particular, on which everyone agrees. On the basis of these complexities, my aim here is 
to conceptualize the term “terrorism” in general and “transnational terrorism” in 
particular in the way I use these terms throughout this thesis. 
 When we combine most of the factors that are included in the definition of 
terrorism by different analysts, such a definition emerges: Terrorism is the intentional 
use, or threat to use, violence against non-combatants or civilian targets, by states, sub-
national groups or individuals, in order to attain political aims like changing the existing 
system, through intimidation of fear directed at a large audience. The motivation behind 
the political aim may be ideological, religious, social or something else and the sub-
national groups or individuals conducting terrorism may have state sponsors as well.61 
 Terrorism is often referred to as the ‘asymmetric weapon of the weak’. It is a 
secret and unconventional way of fighting. Since terrorist are not capable of fighting 
with states through conventional ways, they utilize terrorism. They aim at creating fear 
among the societies of the targeted states or groups, so that these societies mobilize 
those who are in power to do something that serves to the terrorists’ interests. For 
example, one of the stated aims of Al Qaeda in conducting the September 11 attacks was 
to terrorize the American people and make them force their governments to call back 
their forces from the Middle Eastern region.  
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Furthermore, terrorists do not wear uniforms or other type of signs that may 
distinguish them from ordinary people. This contributes to the secrecy. They do not pay 
attention to moral or legal restraints. They use several different tactics, such as 
kidnapping, assassination, or bombing. All of these make terrorism relatively easy and 
cheap to conduct as a strategy, but expensive and hard to fight against.   
 Although this definition and the features stated above are very comprehensive 
and include lots of things into the concept of terrorism, they match to the way I use the 
term ‘terrorism’ throughout this study. The next crucial step is to clarify the 
transnational version of terrorism.   
 
3. 2 Defining Transnational Terrorism 
When a terrorist activity includes victims, perpetrators, or target audiences from 
two or more countries, and the organization of the terrorist group that is conducting the 
activity is spread across more than one country, then terrorism acquires a transnational 
character.62 For example, transnational terrorist activities may be planned in one place, 
the necessary training to perpetrators may be given in another place, and the actual 
incidents may be conducted in yet another place. Thus, the offices, headquarters, and 
training camps of transnational terrorist organizations may function in various countries. 
Also, transnational terrorist organizations may make attacks in different countries, the 
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members of these organizations may be from different countries,63 and the victims of 
their attacks can be from different nationalities.64 
Conducting transnational terrorist activities became easier with the developments 
in the communication and transportation technologies, and with easier and faster 
movement of technology, finance, ideas, knowledge, information, and people across the 
globe. As a result of all these developments there is no longer any need for a large, 
fixed, physical presence in order to be able to conduct and control operations over long 
distances. Physical distances and national borders that once separated terrorists from 
their co-conspirators, their targets and their audience have disappeared in today’s world 
of modern telecommunications and the internet.65 Therefore, as in the case of September 
11, terrorists may be trained in Germany, and get the necessary information for their 
operation through the internet. They communicate with the other cells of the 
organization, get financial resources from Saudi Arabia, and conduct operations in the 
US. For example, according to the US government Al Qaeda is operating in more than 
60 countries.66 Moreover, as a result of the world’s shrinking, there remains no place, 
which cannot be reached. For example, although the US is situated between two oceans, 
it can still be reached. Thus, transnational terrorism arises as a threat in and from the 
multi-centric world.  
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However, this deterritoriality, multiple nationality and having an effect on more 
than one country is not enough to call terrorism ‘transnational terrorism’. Another 
feature for terrorism to be transnational is that the terrorists involved not be under the 
control of or dependent on the support of any one state. They may receive direct and 
indirect assistance from different states, by some segments within some states, and from 
different ethnic and religious or ideological groups, and also from other terrorist 
organizations.67 But the important point here is that as long as transnational terrorist 
organizations are not ‘controlled’ by any particular state, thus preserve their 
independence, and thus remain transnational. This has largely became possible as a 
result of the rise of the multi-centric world. Thus, especially in the aftermath of the Cold 
War, some of the  international terrorism of the state-centric world that was under the 
control of some states or was dependent on them had been transformed into transnational 
terrorism of the multi-centric world.  
At this point, it may be worth clarifying the differences of transnational terrorism 
from other types of violence and terrorism, as some of the features attributed to 
transnational terrorism here may be similar with other types of violence and terrorism. 
However there are important factors that differentiate transnational terrorism from these.  
 
3. 3 Clarifying the Concept 
3. 3. 1 Transnational Terrorism vs. Other Types of Violence 
 In the attempts to define terrorism and its transnational version there emerge 
controversies over whether we can count terrorism as a type of war, guerrilla warfare, or 
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Available [online]: <http://terror.host.net.kg/definingterr.htm> 
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ordinary crime. However, terrorism in general and transnational terrorism in particular 
are different from all these other types of violence. Therefore, in this section these 
differences will be examined from general (differences of terrorism with other types of 
violence) to specific (differences of transnational terrorism from other types of 
violence).    
 
3. 3. 1. 1 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. War 
 As a matter of definition, a ‘war’ can be fought between armies of independent 
states. It is defined as “an armed conflict between two or more states conducted by their 
armies in order to force the other party to accept ones’ own will and it must be done on 
the basis of the rules determined by international law.”68  These rules were first proposed 
by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and later in the 19th and 20th centuries codified in the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions of the 1860s, 1899, 1907, and 1949. These rules grant 
civilian non-combatants immunity from attack, prohibit taking civilians as hostages, 
state the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives of states among 
other things.69 If the parties violate these rules determined by the international law 
concerning the conduct of war, these acts are accepted as ‘war crimes’ and can be 
punished after the war.70 Furthermore, in case of war, parties ‘declare’ war against each 
other so that each party knows the situation. Also the violence in war is one that is 
expected, continues and known.71 Thus, these characteristics of war and rules related to 
its conduct are mainly reflecting the features of the state-centric world. Therefore, it 
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69 Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 34. 
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71 Hilal Kılıç. 1996. Terrorizm ve Mücadele Yöntemleri. MA Thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 50. 
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would not be inappropriate to argue that war is a type of violence that can be situated in 
the state-centric world. 
 On the other hand, terrorists conduct their operations in secrecy, thus there is no 
declaration and it is not known when and how a terrorist act will occur. Terrorists do not 
obey to rules, legal or moral. Since their aim is to create fear and terrorize the public 
they mostly intend to kill civilians and non-combatants including the foreign 
representatives in countries. Moreover, and most importantly, terrorists are not states 
with armies, therefore, their activities and acts cannot be labelled as war. 
 In terms of comparing war with transnational terrorism, of course the differences 
between war and terrorism stated above are true for transnational terrorism as well. In 
addition, although both war and transnational terrorism affect the people of more than 
one country, armies that conduct war are composed of the citizens of a country while 
transnational terrorist organizations have members from the citizens of different 
countries. Even when coalitions are concerned, armies of different nations fight against 
the same enemy, but still each national army fights according to the rules determined by 
its own state and in accordance with its own national interests. Furthermore, as stated 
above, while war is conducted among armies of states, which are controlled by them, 
transnational terrorists are not under the control of any state and they do not fight for any 
state. Thus, when we look from the dualistic perspective, while the reflections of the 
characteristics of war can be seen in the state-centric world, the characteristics of 
transnational terrorism can be seen the multi-centric world. 
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3. 3. 1. 2 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. Guerrilla Warfare 
 Originally, guerrilla warfare is used to refer to military operations of irregular 
forces against the fear of an enemy, or of local inhabitants against an occupying force.72 
The term “guerrilla” which means “little war” evolved from the Spanish resistance to the 
1808 invasions of Napoleon.73 The essence of guerrilla warfare is to establish liberated 
areas in the countryside. There, they set up military units and other types of institutions, 
conduct propaganda and other political activities. In this way they aim to gain strength, 
grow in number and quality, and fight against the government forces.74 More or less the 
legal rules concerning war apply to guerrilla warfare as well. In guerrilla warfare 
civilians and non-combatants are not intentionally targeted. Guerrillas respect the rights 
of non-combatants and they exchange prisoners as in conventional war between states.75 
“Guerrilla war is a small war – subject to the same rules that apply to big wars, and on 
this it differs from terrorism.”76 This shared adherence is mostly because they seek 
public support and do not want to provoke severe repressive governmental reaction. 
 On the other hand, terrorists usually operate in cities in a clandestine manner and 
in small units called cells.77 Therefore, terrorism is not mass or collective violence, but it 
is conducted by a small group, although that group may have larger supporters that do 
not participate in the conduct of the activities.78 Unlike guerrilla warfare, terrorism is 
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75 Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. Terrorism and the Liberal State. London: Macmillan, 54-55. 
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directed against civilians and non-combatants. No rules, legal or moral, are taken into 
consideration by the terrorists.79 Also, terrorists aim to provoke repressive governmental 
reactions in order to justify their terrorist acts by proving their claims concerning the 
repressiveness of the attacked entity. Thus, terrorists aim to create an overreaction on the 
part of the attacked party. By this way they aim to blame their enemy by being the real 
terrorists and by being worse than terrorists themselves are.80 
 Again, these differences between terrorism and guerrilla warfare are also true for 
transnational terrorism and guerrilla warfare. In addition, while guerrilla warfare is 
conducted locally and aims to establish liberated areas in the countryside, transnational 
terrorism is conducted globally. This to say, guerrilla warfare is geographically based 
while transnational terrorism is deterritorial. Guerrillas establish bases in the  liberated 
areas in the countryside, while transnational terrorists establish bases and training camps 
in different countries, and organize in small cells all around the world. Furthermore, 
those who participate in guerrilla warfare are usually local inhabitants who fight against 
an occupying force although they may receive some foreign help, but transnational 
terrorist organizations are composed of people from different nationalities. Again, from 
all these compared characteristics, we can situate guerrilla warfare in the state-centric 
world and transnational terrorism in the multi-centric world.  
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3. 3. 1. 3 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. Ordinary Crime 
 The aim of an ordinary criminal is generally personal and material. Ordinary 
criminals do not aim to create acute fear in the society and give messages. The violence 
used by the ordinary criminals do not have the intention to create psychological 
repercussions beyond the act itself. Ordinary criminals, unlike terrorists, do not pretend a 
societal role for themselves, such as rescuing the society. They do not want to influence 
public opinion.81  
 On the other hand, terrorists’ actions have organizational and psychological 
aims. They aim to give a political message by their actions82 and create an acute fear in 
the society in order to reach their aims. Terrorists aim to create fear not in the actual 
victims but in the audiences, by creating the sense that they might also become a 
victim.83 Moreover the fundamental aim of the terrorists is to change the system, unlike 
ordinary criminals, who do not have the intension to alter the patterns of any political 
system. The terrorist believes that he is serving for a “good” cause and for a wider 
constituency.84 These differences between terrorism and ordinary crime also apply to 
transnational terrorism. Furthermore, unlike transnational terrorism, ordinary crime is 
usually domestic in character and sometimes international.    
 
3. 3. 2 Transnational Terrorism vs. Other Types of Terrorism  
We can classify the types of terrorism based on several things, such as terrorist 
aims (e.g., revolutionary terrorism, or separatist terrorism), geography (e.g., Middle 
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Eastern terrorism, Latin American terrorism, or Western terrorism), terrorist targets 
(e.g., domestic terrorism, or international terrorism), and perpetrators, thus according to 
the nature of terrorist groups and their organizations (e.g., state terrorism, or non-state 
terrorism). For the sake of my study and based on the definition I mentioned before, I 
am going to classify the types of terrorism based on the nature and organization of the 
terrorist groups/perpetrators and their targets. 
On the basis of these, I will contrast transnational terrorism, which is a type of 
non-state terrorism, with domestic state terrorism, domestic non-state terrorism, and 
international state terrorism. 
 
3. 3. 2. 1 Transnational Terrorism vs. Domestic State Terrorism 
 Domestic state terrorism is terrorism applied by a state/government (perpetrator) 
on its own citizens (target) within its own borders.85 It is also referred to as “terrorism 
from above”.86 In fact, the word “terrorism” is first used within this context to refer to 
the events that occurred after the 1789 French Revolution.87 At that period, after the 
uprisings of 1789, terror was the tool the revolutionary government used against the 
counter-revolutionaries and other dissidents to re-establish order during the transition 
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period characterized by turmoil and upheaval. At that time terror had a positive 
connotation unlike today.88 
 Later, terrorism acquired its negative meaning even in cases when it is utilized 
by a state, such as during the 1930s terror used by the German and Italian governments 
in their countries. In Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the governments established a 
system of fear and coercion through which they eliminated the so-called “enemies of the 
state”, like Jews and communists. Other examples include the 1970s right-wing military 
dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Greece; and the mid-1980s elected governments of 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Columbia and Peru, which used terror against their own 
citizens.89 
 Thus, the distinguishing characteristics of domestic state terrorism are, as its 
name implies, that it is conducted by the state through its official bodies, like its security 
forces and/or intelligence services, against its own citizens, within its own boundaries. 
On the other hand, transnational terrorism is conducted by non-state entities, although in 
some cases supported by some states or by some segments within some states, acting on 
their own behalf and not on the direction of any one state, against the nationals of 
several countries all around the world. Therefore, while transnational terrorism can be 
situated in the picture drawn by the multi-centric world image, domestic state terrorism 
can be placed within the state-centric world image.             
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3. 3. 2. 2 Transnational Terrorism vs. Domestic Non-state Terrorism 
 Domestic non-state terrorism is conducted by sub-national groups or individuals 
against the citizens of a nation, which have the same nationality with the members of the 
terrorist organization conducting the incidents.90 This terrorism of private groups is also 
called “terrorism from below”.91 In this case, terrorist groups, victims, and the aimed 
audience are from the same country. As an example to this type of terrorism we can 
show the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The origins of this organization 
date back to the days when all of Ireland was under British rule. Later in the 20th 
century, South Ireland acquired its independence under the name of the Irish Free State. 
Acceptance of this by some segments within the IRA caused a split in the organization, 
as hard-liners did not want to accept the British rule in Northern Ireland as well. 
Therefore, the hard-liners within the IRA continued to fight against the British 
Government in Northern Ireland.92 Since the activities of the IRA are directed against 
the citizens of one nation of which they are a part and conducted against civilians, their 
activities can be placed under the rubric of domestic non-state terrorism. The feature that 
attributes them a non-state character is that, although this type of organizations may 
receive support from foreign governments, they have their own existence, goals, and 
objectives distinct from these supporting states.93 
 Although this last point is true also for transnational terrorism, in terms of 
targets, members, and the aimed audiences transnational terrorism is different from 
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domestic non-state terrorism. The targets and aimed audiences of transnational terrorism 
are from multiple nations. Also, the members of transnational terrorist organizations 
have different nationalities unlike domestic non-state terrorist organizations. 
Furthermore, domestic non-state terrorism is geographical in aim and orientation, but 
transnational terrorism is deterritorial and global. Thus, the main difference between 
domestic non-state terrorism and transnational terrorism is that while the former is 
‘domestic’ in character and aim, the latter is ‘transnational’ as their name implies.  From 
a dualistic perspective, domestic non-state terrorism can be placed within the state-
centric world image, while transnational terrorism is situated in the multi-centric world 
image. 
  
3. 3. 2. 3 Transnational Terrorism vs. International State Terrorism 
We can divide international state terrorism roughly into two categories. The first 
one is international terrorist operations conducted by the agencies of a state, like its 
intelligence services, in a covert manner. Since it is covert and secret by its nature, it is 
difficult to prove state involvement in such terrorist activities. The US and the USSR are 
suspected to have been involved in such activities during the Cold War era. For 
example, during the early 1970s the CIA participated in clandestine operations in Chile 
in order to remove Salvador Allende, the then Chilean President, from power. These 
operations include the assassination of the commander-in-chief of the Chilean army, 
Rene Schneider, who refused to participate in the plans to remove Allende.94 In addition, 
in today’s world, Iran, Iraq (before the US intervention), Libya, and Syria are said to be 
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actively involved in terrorist activities. Therefore, terrorism became a covert warfare 
utilized by weak states against the stronger ones without facing the risk of retaliation.95   
The second category of international state terrorism is international terrorist 
activities conducted by terrorist groups or individuals controlled, supported and 
sponsored by the states in order to realize their aims without resorting to war. The states 
mentioned above, namely Iran, Iraq (before the US intervention), Libya, and Syria are 
suspected of supporting terrorists by providing them safe havens, training facilities, 
diplomatic immunity, weapons, and money among other things.96  
At this point, some scholars argue that if there is state sponsorship of terrorism, 
then this turns transnational terrorism into international terrorism.97 Here the important 
point is that, in international terrorism states are the main actors whether applying 
terrorism by themselves or via supporting the sub-national groups in order to realize 
their own policies and weaken their enemies. However, in transnational terrorism the 
aims and ideologies of the sub-national groups are of primary importance. They are not 
seeking to expand or retract national power of a country and they do not represent any 
one country. Transnational terrorist organizations have their own aims, agendas, 
capabilities outside the control of the supporter states and they utilize the aid coming 
from states in order to realize their own aims and not the aims of the states unless these 
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two converge. To clarify the point further, international terrorism is based on state 
control and support. It cannot exist without the support of a state. Transnational 
terrorism, on the other hand, is not under the conntrol of a state and is not dependent on 
the support of any state. Transnational terrorists are themselves actors in the system. 
Thus, when we look from the dualistic perspective, international terrorism that is based 
and dependent on state support can be seen to reflect the features of the state-centric 
world while transnational terrorism reflects the features of the multi-centric world. 
In sum, transnational terrorism is different from other types of violence; like war, 
guerrilla warfare, and ordinary crime; and from other types of terrorism like domestic 
state terrorism, domestic non-state terrorism, and international state terrorism. While all 
these other types of violence and terrorism can be evaluated with the state-centric world 
image perspective, transnational terrorism must be examined with the multi-centric 
world image perspective. Transnational terrorism is a type of non-state terrorism. Its 
targets, aimed audience, members, training facilities, operation fields as well as its 
whole organization is multi-national, meaning that it is not restricted to one country in 
terms of non of its components. Furthermore, even if transnational terrorist organizations 
receive aid from states, they nevertheless operate in an independent manner following 
their own aims and interests. Recently, with the rise of the multi-centric world, 
transnational terrorist organizations have become able to operate more effectively 
without the help of any state and became independent actors for their own sake. This 
point will be further explained in the fifth Chapter of this thesis. But before discussing 
the nature of threat posed by and actorness of transnational terrorism specifically, in 
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order to understand these issues better, we should first analyze the general context of 
which transnational terrorism is a part. Therefore, we now turn to analyze the nature of 
the threat perceptions, referent objects, and perpetrators of these threats in the multi-
centric world.      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THREAT PERCEPTIONS, REFERENCE OBJECTS OF SECURITY, AND 
SECURITY ACTORS IN THE MULTI-CENTRIC WORLD 
 
As it is stated, while conceptualizing the term, transnational terrorism carries 
the characteristics of the multi-centric world. Therefore, in order to be able to 
understand the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism, and thus argue 
on the instruments to fight against it, we should look at the threat perceptions, 
referent objects and security actors in the multi-centric world in general. In this way, 
we can analyze the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism better by a 
deductive manner, i.e. by applying the rules generated from the general to the 
specific. 
 Threat perceptions in the multi-centric world are multiple in terms of issues, 
reference objects, and perpetrators. In other words, different from the state-centric 
world, in the multi-centric world, issues other than military ones are perceived as 
threats. Among these issues are socio-economic, cultural, and environmental 
problems. These are threats to the security of individuals, societies, different kinds of 
groupings, organizations, and even to the international system besides the states.   
Furthermore, these types of threats are posed not only by states and their 
military forces, but also by non-state actors; like individuals, groups, and 
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. By the help of the multi-centric 
world, these non-state security actors can survive and operate without the support of 
states. In fact, the relationship between the non-state actors and the multi-centric 
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world is reciprocal. This means that, on the one hand, non-state actors rise as 
effective and strong actors with the help of the multi-centric world. On the other 
hand, the rise of non-state actors as power centers independent from the states led to 
the further development of the multi-centric world. This is because, the existence of 
non-state actors is among the major characteristics of the multi-centric world. 
Related to this point, the threats perceived in the multi-centric world threaten 
the state-centric world as well. Actually some of the problems that are perceived as 
threats in the multi-centric world, like the revolution in military affairs, WMDs, and 
terrorism, are also perceived as threats in the state-centric world; but not as posed by 
non-state actors. In other words, states perceive these threats still as coming from 
other states or as supported by other states. They do not see that these threats are 
mostly rising from the multi-centric world, and in turn, strengthening it. Therefore, 
they miss the important differences of the nature of the threat that is posed by these 
issues. 
 In sum, it is important to understand the multiple issues that are perceived as 
threats in the multi-centric world; to whom these threats are directed at; and by 
whom these threats are posed. In doing this, the major emphasis must be put on the 
perpetrators since this is the point which creates the problem in countering the threats 
of the multi-centric world by the mechanisms of the state-centric world. It is to say, 
the multiple security threats of the multi-centric world have their own non-state 
security actors that at the end can even pose military threats to the states. However, 
the response mechanisms of the states are against the threats that are posed by other 
states. Therefore, the effectiveness of these international mechanisms to meet the 
challenges of these non-state security actors, like transnational terrorist 
organizations, must be questioned. 
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 Within this context, in this part of the thesis I am going to explain these 
arguments by dealing with the issues that are perceived as threats in the multi-centric 
world, to whom these threats are directed at, and by whom they are posed.  I will 
start by examining the threat perceptions, referent objects and security actors in the 
state-centric world so that the differences of these from that in the multi-centric 
world can be seen better. 
 
4. 1 Threat Perceptions, Referent Objects and Security Actors in the State-
centric World 
 Physical security, meaning the protection of territory and people of a state 
against the attacks of other states, and ensuring survival with fundamental values and 
institutions intact, have been at the core of the security concerns of the states.98 Thus, 
national interest was centered on the protection and control of territory, people, and 
natural resources that can be done through military power. Military was absolutely 
important to the exercise of power.99 On the bases of these, issues perceived as 
threats in the state-centric world are military in nature and both the referent object 
and the perpetrator of the threats are states. 
 
4. 1. 1 Issues Perceived as Threats 
The central security issues for states, which are the principal actors in the 
international system, are survival, protection of sovereignty and independence, 
territorial and institutional integrity.100 Also, each state is responsible for ensuring the 
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maintenance of the basic requirements of its citizens. That is, they should provide 
physical security of life and property for them101 and protect them from outside 
interference and security threats.102 Therefore, the threat, use and control of military 
force by other states103 that can use these against a state itself, constitutes the major 
threat perception for that state in the state-centric world. Moreover, states threaten 
each other by other means, like utilizing terrorism in a covert manner, when open 
warfare is too risky. In sum, as far as the threat perceptions of the state-centric world 
are concerned there is a primacy of politico-military threats perceived as coming 
from other states. Thus, the threat perception was external and not internal.104 
 
4. 1. 1. 1 The National Interests of other States, Their Armed Forces, and the 
Possibility of War 
 The interests of other states, the strength of their armies and the possibility of 
war have always been central concerns of the states in the state-centric world. From 
the beginning of the state-centric system onwards states aimed to maximize their 
interests and at the same time protect their territorial integrity and independence. 
These two aims, namely maximizing ones interests while at the same time protecting 
territorial integrity and independence, clashed with each other and brought states into 
a confrontational conflict. Therefore, states conducted lots of wars throughout the 
history, some for maximizing interests and others for protecting their territorial 
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integrity and independence from those that try to maximize their interests. The 
dictum coming from the times of the Roman Empire onwards states this situation 
well: Si vis pacem, para bellum, i.e. “If you want peace, prepare for war.”105 This 
situation of war forced states to develop weapons that are better than those of the 
enemy. As technology advanced also the quality and quantity of the weapons are 
improved. Even, some states acquired the capacity to destroy the enemy completely 
although they may be destroyed as well. Therefore, military capabilities of the states 
they utilized in trying to maximize their national interests, and the possibility of 
devastating war have always been the major threat perceptions in the state-centric 
world. 
 During the Cold War period, there were two rival blocs composed of states 
and headed by the US and the SU. The major threat perceptions were coming from 
the rival blocs. Even the loss of independence of friendly states became a national 
security concern in this era, especially for the superpowers as a matter of strategy. 
As, the then President of the US, Truman stated, “[t]he loss of independence by any 
nation adds directly to the insecurity of the United States and all free nations.”106 
This understanding of national security was a reflection of the perceived necessity to 
develop the military establishment as a response to the military buildup of the SU. 
This understanding was further reinforced by the development of a nuclear device by 
the SU in the 1949. As a result, the US further increased its military budget and 
developed its military capabilities in a parallel manner with the SU. The major aim of 
the US at this period had been the containment of the SU on the Eurasian landmass 
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in order to protect its national security interests.107 Moreover, nuclear arsenals and 
the possibility of the mutually assured destruction had been the central concerns of 
the superpowers as well as the other states in the system during the Cold War period. 
 In the aftermath of the Cold War, states continued to perceive other states and 
their military capabilities as the major security concern and armed conflicts persist in 
the post-Cold War era as well.108 For example, the US continued to associate the use 
of military forces overseas with its national security109 and continued to intervene to 
the conflicts around the world, like in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, 
with the disappearance of superpower rivalry and Cold War restraints, the struggles 
between former rivals reerupted, as is the case in Yugoslavia. Moreover, serious 
conflicts continue in the Middle East, Southeast and South Asia, Southern and 
Central Africa and in the Balkans.110 Also, the failed states111 of the world were 
started to be seen as threat to the national security112 as a result of their creating safe 
havens for those that threaten the US and other states, like terrorists. Here, the 
perspective is still state-centric and failed states are seen as the main problem instead 
of the terrorists that situate themselves in such countries. 
 Furthermore, even other issues like developments in the economy were 
evaluated in terms of their effects on the national security of states and their 
contribution to the enhancement of military capabilities and tactics. For example, 
with money states can buy weapons from abroad and economic strength may 
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increase productivity also in the military sector that result in the development of new 
and effective weapons.113  
 On the other hand, since the developments in technology assured mutual 
destruction, conducting war became too risky and less useful. Therefore, states 
sought other ways to protect and enhance their national interests, like utilizing 
terrorism. Also, weaker states that could not cope with their stronger enemies with 
their conventional military power, utilized ways like terrorism and guerilla warfare. 
Therefore, domestic and international terrorism, not for the sake of their nature, but 
as a tool for other states became another threat perception in the state-centric world. 
But still this threat is perceived as coming from other states, instead of coming from 
the terrorist organizations themselves.   
 
4. 1. 1. 2 Domestic and International Terrorism as Tools for other States 
 As Thomas C. Schelling states, terrorism is a form of violent coercion that 
has the power to hurt and intimidate and therefore, it is a substitute for the use of 
overt military force.114 As war became too risky or costly states started to support 
terrorists in the enemy states that were fighting against the existing government 
(utilization of domestic non-state terrorism). As another way, states conducted 
clandestine operations with their own institutions, like the intelligence agencies. 
Sometimes they supported/sponsored terrorist groups or individuals which they 
controlled in conducting terrorist attacks against the enemy states (utilizing 
international state terrorism). Thus, terrorism had been used as an international, 
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defense and foreign policy tool.115 Therefore, the utilization of both domestic non-
state and international state terrorism as a response mechanism against the threats 
perceived from states is a two way sword, i.e. this was also another way of threat 
perceived by states from other states. 
 
4. 1. 2 The Primacy of the State 
Within this picture of the world, the principal actor is the state with its 
demarcated territory and population.116 Both the perpetrator and the referent object of 
the threats perceived is the state itself. Even if the lives and well-being of the citizens 
of a state is threatened, the state perceives the threat to its own integrity and well-
being. Furthermore, terrorists or other actors, like MNCs, are not accepted as actors 
and threat posers themselves, but they are seen as tools of the states, which use these 
other entities while they pursue their national interests. However, these primacy 
attributed to the state is not the case as far as the multi-centric world is concerned. 
There are actors other than the states, multiple referent objects of the multiple threats 
posed by these multiple actors in the picture drawn by the multi-centric world image. 
To these we now turn. 
 
4. 2 Multiple Threat Perceptions of the Multi-centric World 
 The developments that fostered the rise of the multi-centric world also 
affected the threat perceptions in that world by changing the nature and increasing 
the number of the threats perceived. Among these developments are the 
                                                                                                                                          
114 Referred in Crenshaw, Martha. 1988. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational 
Approahes.” In David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations. London: Frank Cass and Co. 
Ltd., 13.  
115 “International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy”, Congressional Digest, November 
2001, 258.  
 61 
 
 
improvements in every type of technology, increase in the quantity and quality of the 
skills of the individuals, rise of alternative power centers, loyalty shifts of the people 
from their states towards these other entities, and challenges posed to the sovereignty 
of the states. Besides the traditional military-political threats perceived by the states 
in the state-centric world, socio-economic and cultural, environmental, and non-
traditional military-political threats are perceived in the multi-centric world by 
individuals, groups, societies, organizations, as well as states. 
 
4. 2. 1 Socio-economic Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World 
First of all, in terms of socio-economic threats we can mention 
impoverishment and overpopulation, global economic dependencies and economic 
development problems, spread of infectious diseases, and uncontrollable migration.  
 
4. 2. 1. 1 Impoverishment and Overpopulation 
It may be worth starting by giving some numerical examples that demonstrate 
the scope of the threat posed by poverty in today’s world.  The estimated number of 
people died during the two world wars is about 30 million. On the other hand, people 
who currently die of hunger-related causes each year are 15 million.117 According to 
the UN statistics in the year 2000 more than 2.8 billion of 6 billion people of the 
world live in extreme poverty on an income of less than US $2 a day. On the other 
hand, the assets of the world’s three richest men are more than the combined gross 
domestic products (GDP) of the world’s 48 poorest countries. Moreover, the top fifth 
(20 per cent) of the people in the world who live in the highest-income countries 
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have access to 86 per cent of the world’s GDP, while the bottom fifth, in the poorest 
countries, has about 1 per cent.118 Therefore, billions of people are living in extreme 
poverty. These people are experiencing globalization that shaped the emergence of 
the multi-centric world not as an opportunity, but as a force of disruption and 
destruction, thus as an assault on their material standards of living.119 At the end, 
those people that do not see any other way in order to escape from their misery and 
poverty turn to fundamentalist and extremist ideologies. They also turn to terrorism 
as a weapon of the weak, which appears as the only possible way in their world-wide 
struggle against the strong.120 The annual UN Human Development Reports from 
1990 to the present systematically documented the gaps and their impact on the 
increasing antagonism between the poor and the rich. These reports show the linkage 
between global poverty and violence in numbers. The words of Luciano Benini, an 
Italian anti-globalist, states the situation very well. He says that:  
why wonder that someone is trying to earn Heaven by the terrorist actions 
when paradise on earth promised by neoliberal capitalism for more than four 
fifths of humanity is a mirage which moves away.121  
Deprivation and poverty becomes a source of tension between states and societies as 
well as a source of internal conflict.122 Poverty and inequality force people to choose 
between injustice and trying to get more shares from the existing scarce resources 
through violent means.123 As the gap between the rich and poor widened, “[m]ass 
communication and the shrinking of distances, while making every country a 
                                                 
118 The UN Millennium Report, Briefing Papers for Students, 2001, p.208. 
119 Kofi Annan’s address to the UN General Assembly, New York, 21 September 1998, 
(SG/SM/6707) in The UN Millennium Report, Briefing Papers for Students, 2001, p.134.   
120 Tehranian, Majid. 2002. “Global Terrorism: Searching for Appropriate Responses”, Pacifica 
Review, 14(1): 57. 
121 Benini, Luciano. 2001. “Una Nuova Convivenza Mondiale”. Available [online]: 
<http://digilander.iol.it/giovaniemissione/strageusa5.htm> 
 63 
 
 
neighbour to every other, has tended to increase rather than decrease the physical and 
psychological sense of insecurity.”124 
  If one of the reasons for the increasing poverty of the underdeveloped and 
developing worlds is the neoliberal capitalist policies of the developed world and 
globalized markets, one other reason is the rapidly increasing population. The growth 
of world population from 1 billion to 2 billion took 130 years, while it takes only a 
decade for its becoming 6 billion from 5 billion today. Moreover, more than 90 
percent of the added billion is living in the underdeveloped and developing parts of 
the world.125 Thus, more and more people are living in growing poverty. These 
threaten the well being of the societies and internal stability of the states by pushing 
people to fundamentalist and extremist ideologies including terrorism, as explained 
above. This in turn, creates instability in the international system and transcends the 
problem to the developed states and their societies as explained above. 
 Impoverishment and overpopulation are threats that are beyond the borders of 
traditional military-political threat perceptions. They are posed not by states directly 
and have their own security actors, mostly individuals. People loose their faith and 
loyalty on their governments since those governments cannot protect them from their 
misery. Therefore, they choose to shift their loyalties towards the representatives of 
extremist and fundamentalist ideologies, including terrorists. Thus, the effects of 
these threats can also be felt in the developed world by this way, i.e. through the 
terrorist attacks in the developed world or against the citizens of the developed 
countries. These threats are issues in the multi-centric world as their feature implies 
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although their negative reflections in the security arena can be felt in the state-centric 
world as well.    
4. 2. 1. 2 Economic Dependencies and Development Problems 
Economic dependencies and development problems have been another 
important  socio-economic threat perception in the multi-centric world. Transnational 
firms and companies as well as states themselves face pressures from global market 
and economic shocks. This at the end create tensions between and within societies 
between those that benefit and that suffer.126 Furthermore, economic crises in one 
state can rapidly affect other countries as a result of the interdependencies the global 
market creates.127 Of course this problem is more acute for the developing countries 
and their societies since they have much less influence over global markets than the 
developed countries, but still even the developed countries cannot remain immune 
from the threats posed by the economic crises in the global market.128  
On the other hand, the widening gap between the developed and developing 
states and their societies contributes to the rise of extremist and radical groups in the 
developing world that at the end may return to the developed world as terrorism. This 
point will be explained in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
4. 2. 1. 3 Spread of Infectious Diseases 
As a result of the easy travel of human beings from one state to the other, 
infectious diseases have become a transnational security concern that concerns 
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individuals and societies as well as states. For example, because of the black-market 
abuses of inoculation treatments and poverty, tuberculosis and malaria re-emerged as 
health hazards in the South and via human mobility these diseases spread to the 
developed North.129 Also HIV/AIDS is one of the nightmares of today’s world. 
Today HIV exists in virtually all countries of the world and it is in epidemic 
proportions in many of the countries130, especially in Africa. The spread of these 
diseases throughout the world can occur in several ways, like war and conflict, global 
warming, changes in the social and behavioral patterns of the human beings, rapid 
and unsustainable urbanization, and possibly (biological) terrorism, besides the 
global movement of individuals. Of course the easiness and speed of travel in today’s 
world much contributed to the spread of diseases since no part of the world remains 
inaccessible to human penetration. All these at the end result in the death of millions 
of people, economic hazards, psychological problems and even mass migration.131 
 
4. 2. 1. 4 Uncontrollable Migration 
The final socio-economic threat perception in the multi-centric world is 
uncontrollable migration. According to the data provided by UNHCR the 
approximate number of the refugees in the year 1951, when the UNHCR had been 
established, was 1.5 million while it reached 13.2 million in the year 1997. These 
numbers do not include those people that are displaced for reasons other than 
political, racial, ethnic or religious persecution (these reasons may include poverty, 
overpopulation, famine, natural disasters, environmental degradation and general 
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social breakdown) who are not accepted as refugees under international law. When 
we add these people, the number of immigrants around the world reach 
approximately 22.4 million for the year 1997-8.132 
From the multiplicity of the reasons we can say that there  are several types of 
migration including migration as a result of political, religious, and/or ethnic 
pressures, i.e. forced migration; illegal migration; migration for employment; and 
environmental migration.133 The end of the Cold War exacerbated ethnic conflicts 
and violent secessionist movements that create refugee flows. The dissolution of the 
empires and countries, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created insecure 
minorities in the smaller units that are created. The persisting difference in income 
and employment opportunities among countries encouraged economic migrants. 
Environmental degradation, droughts, floods, famines, and civil conflicts push 
people to flee across international borders and “new global networks of 
communication and transportation provide individuals with information and 
opportunities for migration.”134     
Besides the plight and sufferings of the people that migrate, migration 
threatens both the receiving and sending states and the citizens of the receiving states 
in several ways. As far as states are concerned, migration can threaten the sending, 
receiving, and transitory route states by creating social, economic, and political 
                                                 
132 Chalk, Peter. 2000.  Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence 
and Chaos on National and International Security. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 115. Baylis, John.  
“International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., 
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 271. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). July 1998. 
Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR. Geneva: UNHCR Statistical Unit, section V. 
133 Choucri, Nazli. 2002. “Migration and Security,” Journal of International Affairs, 56(1): 97-122. 
134 Weiner, Myron. 1995. “Security, Stability, and International Migration.” In Sean M. Lynn-Jones 
and Steven E. Miller, eds., Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 184-185. 
 67 
 
 
instability and unrest.135 Furthermore, migration threatens the states not only by 
creating internal problems but also by resulting in tensions between states. As 
examples to this we can mention the conflict between the United States and Great 
Britain over the forcible repatriation of refugees from Hong Kong; the US-Israeli 
controversy over the settlement of former Soviet Jews on the West Bank; the 
placement of Western migrants at the strategic locations by Iraq in order to prevent 
air strikes.136 
Migration may threaten the receiving societies in several ways by creating 
cultural, economic, and political problems. In terms of culture, immigrants may pose 
a threat to identities of the receiving societies based on common language, culture, 
association and in some cases religion.137 Economically, they may result in the 
increase of unemployment rates as well as creating extra burden for the budget. 
Politically, they may create tensions between the refugee sending and receiving 
countries, spur racist movements in the receiving country, may increase the number 
of some components of the society that have ethnic affinity with the immigrants that 
at the end disrupt the balances in the society and create internal conflicts some of 
them may reach the degree of secessionism.138  
However, “migration regimes of nation-states (largely framed by the state-
centric logic of the Cold War) are becoming problematic and ineffective as migration 
flows in a globalizing world are becoming multilayered and not easily controlled by 
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nation-states.”139 Uncontroled migration increasingly take its strength from the multi-
centric world. As a result the rules created by the states in the state-centric world 
context cannot meet the challenge and the threat posed by migration flows.  
Thus, besides threatening the states, migration of people results in the 
suffering of the people and threatens individuals that immigrate on the one hand, and 
it threatens the stability and well-being of the societies that face with the problems 
brought by the immigrants on the other hand.  
 
4. 2. 2 Cultural Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World 
 Another category of threat perception in the multi-centric world is the 
cultural one. Within this category we can count identity crises, cultural 
misperceptions and misunderstandings, and the resulting human rights and freedoms 
violations. 
 
4. 2. 2. 1 Identity Crises 
The national identities are challenged by the influence of global language, 
style, goods, entertainment, and all types of information flows.140 It becomes difficult 
to preserve the traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religion, thus  
preserve the national identity, unaffected. People start to associate themselves with 
groups that transcend state boundaries and this may result in the loyalty shifts from 
states towards other groupings, which threatens the states. This is to say, with the 
help of globalization identities have been de-territorialized, meaning that ethnic, 
religious or other types of groups display interactions that transcend territorial 
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boundaries and also engage with other non-state identities.141 With the words of 
David Held there emerges a “gap” between the nation and the state.142 In other 
words, the emergence of “overlapping cultures, crosscurrents, and crosswalks … 
gives rise to the crisis of national identity.”143  
 
4. 2. 2. 2 Cultural Misperceptions and Misunderstandings, Human Rights and 
Freedoms Violations 
The resulting group identifications may reach the level of extremism, be it 
ethnic or religious, which may become a threat to the integrity of nation-states on the 
one hand, and to the security of the ‘other’ groups against which the extremists 
define themselves on the other hand. The most referred argument for this point is the 
“Clash of Civilizations” argument of Samuel Huntington.144  
Thus, national identities are challenged by subnational identities, like ethnic 
ones, from below and  by transnational identities from above.145 One other point here 
is the violation of human rights and freedoms of the individuals. This threatens the 
integrity and legitimacy of the states besides the threatened lives and well-beings of 
the individuals and stability of the societies. 
 
4. 2. 3 Environmental Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World 
A third group of threats perceived in the multi-centric world is the 
environmental threats. The depletion of natural resources including energy and 
water, global climate change and warming, desertification, ozone depletion, 
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radioactive contamination and acid rain, and loss of biodiversity are among these 
threats. These threaten the individuals, societies and states in a way that is beyond 
the dynamics and reach of the state-centric world.  
 
4. 2. 3. 1 Depletion of Natural Resources 
The depletion of natural resources, like energy and water, threaten the quality 
of the lives of the people and in the case of water scarcity it threatens the very 
survival of the people. It contributes to food shortages and the emergence and spread 
of diseases.  
Besides the individuals and societies it also threatens the states. For example, 
one of the reasons of the Gulf War of 1991 was the control over oil.146 Water 
resources create tensions between Turkey and Syria. Arab countries and Israel are 
another example. Also, by threatening the lives and well-being of the citizens of the 
states, environmental threats may undermine the sovereignty of the states and may 
prevent them from attaining economic growth and development.147 The sovereignty 
of the states may be undermined, because states loose the confidence and loyalty of 
their citizens by failing to protect them from threats they are facing. 
 
4. 2. 3. 2 Global Climate Change and some Other Threats 
Global climate change  and warming is another factor that helps the 
emergence and spread of diseases and food shortages, thus contribute to threat levels 
the individuals and societies face. It can also severely harm coastal nations, 
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particularly those that lack the necessary infrastructure and the capacity to rebuild or 
recover after such catastrophes.148 
Also, soil degradation, i.e. desertification, results in declining agricultural 
productivity thus contribute to the poverty and famine around the world,149 but 
mostly in the underdeveloped parts of the world. 
The chemicals that are used contaminates the air to the extend of resulting in 
ozone depletion. According to the UNDP report of 1997, each year 3 million people 
die from air pollution and more than 5 million people die per annum from diarrhoeal 
diseases caused by water contamination.150 Furthermore, radioactive centrals and 
waste cause radioactive active contamination and acid rain in some parts of the 
world. All these threaten the health of the people and the existence of the planet earth 
very severely.  
Moreover, deforestation and extinction of species, thus biodiversity, threaten 
human security by resulting in the decrease in food supplies, materials for energy and 
construction, chemicals for pharmaceuticals and industry among many other 
consequences.151 
Besides general health problems and threat to the existence and lives of 
people, environmental threats mostly, with some exceptions like water scarcity, have 
economic implications, which at the end cause human sufferings and societal unrest 
that are reflected in protests against governments. In extreme cases people migrate as 
a result of environmental hazards creating political instability around the world.152 
Furthermore, since the developing world is and will be affected more from these 
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hazards the gap between developing and developed world will be widened and this 
will create further tensions between these two.153 
 
4. 2. 4 Non-traditional Military/Political Threat Perceptions in the Multi-
Centric World 
 As the final category, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA), arms proliferation and weapon sales even to non-state 
entities, failed states and intrastate wars, ethnic and religious conflicts that have the 
potential to spillover instability and insecurity around the world and radicalization of 
ideologies and extremisms, transnational organized crime, and transnational 
terrorism even changed the traditional military perceptions in the multi-centric world 
and created non-traditional military/political threat perceptions. 
 
4. 2. 4. 1 Weapons of Mass Destruction 
It is admitted by the former US president Clinton and the former Russian 
president Yeltsin that the most serious and pressing danger at the threshold of the 21st 
century is the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other types of 
WMDs, the technologies for their production, and their means of delivery.154 There is 
a threat that the WMD can fall into the hands of rough states, terrorists or other non-
state actors that will not hesitate to use them. The use of sarin gas by Aum Shinrikyo 
terrorist group in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 and dispersal of antrax through 
US mail in October 2001 show that it is possible for terrorists to use WMDs as soon 
as they acquire. It is known that the terrorists are seeking to access WMDs and using 
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the globalization of information technology to their advantage.155 If terrorists acquire 
WMDs, this will reinforce their actorness by placing them at the same table with the 
states. Even if they do not utilize these weapons, they will acquire the power of 
deterrence. It is to say, they will be able to make others do what they want by 
threatening them with using their WMDs. Furthermore, states won’t be able to 
threaten to attack the supporters of the terrorists, with a fear of receiving a nuclear 
retaliation. Moreover, WMDs can be used against the military power of states. For 
example, biological bacteriums that are used to clean petroleum from the seas can be 
used to destroy the fuel reserves of a state.156 In addition, the increase in the strength 
of the terrorist organizations that will have WMDs will make them more attractful 
power centers for some people to shift their loyalties. In turn, terrorist organizations 
will become further strengthened. 
 
4. 2. 4. 2 The Revolution in Military Affairs 
The developments in technology also affected the military sphere. These 
developments are generally referred as the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)’. 
Thus, greater information technology and “smartness” of weapons, besides their 
greater firepower, were used to define advantage for the future warfare.157 All these 
added to the destructive capacities of military assets. Moreover, the nation-sates are 
no longer able to control the diffusion of information and technology.158 Leading 
corporations in the private sector form strategic alliances. These are driven by 
competitive, cost-cutting, or cutting-edge innovative needs instead of techno-
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nationalism. Consequently, the defense production becomes transnational and the 
control of the state over these activities is further reduced.159 This feature of the 
RMAs made it a threat rising within the multi-centric world. 
 
4. 2. 4. 3 Failed States and Intrastate Wars 
Another important issue is that the typical conflicts of today have become 
intrastate instead of interstate, thus threatening the states, individuals and societies 
from within:  
Internal conflicts broke out in various parts of the former Soviet Union;  
declarations of independence by the component parts of the Federal  
Republic of Yugoslavia quickly led to fighting and ethnic cleansing; the  
disputes between warring factions in Liberia, Angola, Somalia and  
elsewhere in Africa became more intense and widespread; fierce and  
long-standing ethnic enmity led to genocide in Rwanda.160  
All these show that intrastate conflicts, rather than interstate ones, became one of the 
major destabilizing and insecurity creating threats of the day. 
These types of conflicts rise as a result of state weakness. Besides creating 
instability, failed states provide safe heavens for the terrorists to operate and conduct 
their training. This, to some extend, meet the needs of transnational terrorist 
organizations for places to establish training camps. Such places were provided to 
terrorists by states supporting and using terrorism during the Cold War. However, 
now, failed states meet this need without being able to control the terrorists and 
terrorists are not dependent on these states. On the contrary, sometimes the regimes 
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in the failed states need the support of the terrorist organization situated in their 
territories. This argument will be further explained in the next chapter of this thesis. 
The monopoly of the state on using force had been disintegrated; private 
security forces, civilian militias and bandit gangs  replaced the professional armies 
that had been broken apart. Since the rules and distinctions had disappeared, the vast 
majority of the casualties are civilians.161  
The processes of globalization, which shaped the emergence of the multi-
centric world, carries both integration and fragmentation tendencies with it. James 
Rosenau calls this phenomenon as “fragmegration”.162 On the one hand, the process 
of globalization has homogenizing effects that is combined with the “borderlessness” 
phenomenon. These homogenizing impulses include the diffusion of standardized 
consumer goods generally coming from the developed world, Western forms of 
capitalism and liberal democracy.163 On the other hand, it spurs the ethnic and 
religious awareness among the groups that transcend nation-state boundaries and 
thus encourage fragmentation. “At the local level, the more functional the world 
becomes, the more people feel the need to identify with a particular community 
based on values rather than utility.”164 Furthermore, “[t]he rejection of these 
globalizing tendencies in its purest forms is associated with and expressed by the 
resurgence of religious and ethnic politics in various extremist configurations.”165 
These characteristics demonstrate that the failed state and intrastate war threats are 
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rising within the multi-centric world, since they are reflections of the features of the 
this world. 
4. 2. 4. 4 Transnational Organized Crime and Transnational Terrorism 
Easy and speedy movement of goods, information and people combined with 
the improvements in communications and transportation technologies contributed to 
the rise of transnational organized crime. Especially drug-trafficking and increasing 
drug addiction creates severe problems for the societies. It even contributes to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS.166 Besides, especially in terms of financial issues, it is known 
that transnational organized crime organizations and transnational terrorist 
organizations are cooperating.167 Therefore, transnational organized crime threatens 
individuals and societies besides states not only through activities like drug-
trafficking, smuggling, and money laundering but also by facilitating the terrorist 
activities.                  
With the rise of the multi-centric world terrorism also took a new shape. 
Before, as a traditional threat in the state-centric world, terrorist organizations could 
not operate fully without the support of a state, therefore it was easier for the states to 
control those terrorist organizations. However, in the multi-centric world with the 
help of globalization, terrorists acquired the ability to operate without the support of 
any state and therefore terrorist organizations run outside of the control of the states. 
Moreover, the multi-centric world provided a large space for the terrorists to hide by 
providing them the ability to organize and operate in a deterritorialized manner. (This 
topic will be further explored in the next chapter). 
                                                 
166 Chalk, Peter. 2000.  Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence 
and Chaos on National and International Security. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 47-48. 
167 For a detailed explanation of this issue see G8 Recomandations on Transnational Crime, 2002. 
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The development and spread of information and technology increased the 
lethality of the terrorist attacks.168 The state collapse and the “privatisation” of its 
capabilities increase the possibility for terrorists to acquire the necessary capabilities 
to build or own WMDs.169 
Terrorists threaten individuals and societies by creating a sense of acute 
insecurity and panic thus result in a social-psychological damage and loss of 
underlying democratic identity, giving economic damage and in some cases causing 
contamination and vital infrastructural collapse.170 
One of the major characteristics of all these threat perceptions in the multi-
centric world is their being transnational in nature rather than being national or local. 
Even those that seem to be local or affecting only one part of the world affect the rest 
of the world as a result of the interconnectedness and technological improvements. 
These improvements may be in transportation or communications technology. 
Furthermore, these threats are as important as the traditional military threats of the 
state-centric world. Since if the citizens of a state have no food, clothing, shelter, are 
threatened by infectious diseases, have no access to clean water and breathable air, 
and threatened by terrorists, the possibility of an external military attack by another 
state does not seem to be the sole or primary threat. The point here is that, the value 
of anything is determined by how much of it one has (the law of marginal utility). 
Therefore, “[i]n a world of scarce resources, the goal of military security is always in 
conflict with other goals, such as economic welfare, environmental protection, and 
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social welfare.”171 Besides, there is always the possibility that these other threats may 
result in military confrontations as well. There emerged a “survival dilemma” 
besides the traditional “security dilemma”.172 
After examining the multiple threat perceptions in the multi-centric world, we 
should also look at the multiple reference objects of these threats. Since, as different 
from the state-centric world, the threats in the multi-centric world not only threaten 
the state but have also other reference objects.  
  
4. 3 Multiple Reference Objects of the Multiple Threat Perceptions 
Whether socio-economic and cultural, environmental, or non-traditional 
military-political threat perception, the referent objects, i.e. those that are threatened, 
are multiple in the multi-centric world as well. In other words, threats are perceived 
not only by states but also by individuals, societies and groups. In the multi-centric 
world these types of threats to individuals, societies and groups are important in 
addition to the traditional military threats the states face. However, states must take 
these threats into consideration also because even the threats that seem to threaten 
individuals and societies, like HIV/AIDS, have effects on the security of states since 
they produce political and economic, and even sometimes military hardships for the 
states.  
Therefore, both military and non-military threats to individuals (human 
security) and societies (societal security) including the groupings that transcend state 
boundaries constitute the threat perceptions and the referent objects in the multi-
centric world. 
                                                 
171 Baldwin, David A. 1995. “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War”, World Politics, 48: 127-
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These non-traditional threats, be they linked to climate change, resource 
scarcity, declining productivity, or transnational crime and terrorism, are concerning 
the whole world, since the entire world is now confronted with human-centered 
vulnerabilities.173 Human-centered vulnerabilities mean that the most important 
effects of the new threats are on the human-beings. The lives and well-being of the 
humans are threatened the most. The effects of these new threats on states are felt via 
their citizens. This is to say, as far as human-centered vulnerabilities are concerned, 
mostly, since the lives and well-being of their citizens are threatened, the well-being 
and integrity of the states are threatened too. 
Human security was prioritized in the 1994 UNDP Human Development 
Report. In this report the universality of concern for human security of all the people 
both rich and poor and the people-centered nature of human security concept were 
explained.174  
The shift in focus from states to individuals and societies opens up to scrutiny 
the state-society relations. The capacity and the legitimacy of the state and how it 
treats its citizens (especially in non-democratic countries, in terms of  the provision 
of fundamental rights and freedoms) becomes important in elaborating threat 
perceptions. Therefore, states themselves may be a source of threat for their 
citizens175 and this opens the way for the discussions of humanitarian 
interventionism.176 Thus, not only states but also ethnic, religious and other types of 
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groups become the reference object of security also when military issues are 
concerned.177 
Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde mentioned the reference objects of security in 
different sectors. According to them, as far as economic and societal sectors are 
concerned, the reference objects are states, individuals, groups within societies (e.g., 
tribes, clans, ethnic or religious units, classes, groups of individuals within national 
economy), societies, global markets, national economies, and civilizations. In the 
environmental sector the reference objects are the environment itself, human 
enterprise, societies, and again civilizations in the sense that there is a risk of losing 
the achieved level of civilization, and states. In terms of military and political 
sectors, states, societal groups (like tribes, minorities, and nations), transnational 
movements (including world religions), alliances (like NATO), emerging quasi-
superstates (like the European Union), international regimes, and civilizations are the 
reference objects.178     
Therefore, as far as the threat perceptions of the multi-centric world are 
concerned, the centrality of the state and its sovereignty as the major and only 
reference object of security has changed.179  
 
4. 4 Non-state Security Actors of the Multi-centric World 
 When the threat perceptions in the multi-centric world are concerned, it is 
seen that the actors that perpetrate such threats are multiple. Not only the traditional 
perpetrators, i.e. states, but also individuals, groupings (ethnic, religious, or 
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otherwise; like national liberation movements), Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
and/or Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and /or International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), 
transnational organized crime organizations, and transnational terrorist organizations 
are emerging as threat perpetrators in the multi-centric world.180 These sovereignty-
free actors of the multi-centric world are able to escape from the constraints of states 
and pursue their own goals.181  
 
4. 4. 1 Individuals as Non-state Security Actors 
Individuals in the multi-centric world have experienced a “skill revolution”, 
with the help of globalization, and this has enhanced the capabilities of individual 
and group members of organized criminals, ethnic insurgents, and terrorists so that 
they can conduct their actions more effectively than ever before.182 Furthermore, in 
terms of harming the environment, individuals create threats to their own immediate 
environment and to the planet earth on which they live. Thus, individuals emerge as 
security actors in the multi-centric world. 
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4. 4. 2 Subnational and Supranational Groupings as Non-State Security Actors 
Especially after the Cold War, individuals began once again to give their 
loyalty to and identify themselves with ethno-national groups, which are composed 
of people that share common civilization, language, cultural tradition, and ties of 
kinship, in addition to showing loyalty to the nation-states.183 This identification, in 
turn, has resulted in the increase in the importance of national liberation movements 
(NLMs) in world politics. “Since most states are multiethnic and many include at 
least one potentially threatening minority, the rising significance of ethnic groups 
reduces the relevance of nation-states in world politics.”184 One of the most 
prominent examples of NLMs that play a significant role in international politics is 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that, since the late 1960s, has played a 
key role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In terms of groups as threat posers, there are also “stateless nations”, like the 
Palestinians, the Tibetians in China, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, the 
Quebecois in Canada, the Muslims of Kashmir and Serbia, the Hindu Tamils in Sri 
Lanka, and the Kurds in the Middle East, who are effective actors in international 
politics.185 They create instabilities and threaten the security of the individuals, 
societies and states. 
 
4. 4. 3 TNCs/MNCs as Non-state Security Actors 
TNCs have a powerful influence on the global economic agenda setting 
together with private consultancies and private bond-rating agencies. They work 
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together with private business interests.186 These became security actors and threaten 
the well-being of individuals and societies through influencing, shaking and 
undermining the national economies of the states, resulting in loss of control by the 
states and preventing the development of domestic industries. As Caroline Thomas 
indicates: 
The Assian Crises have also heightened awareness of the ability of a handful of relatively 
new private financial actors such as hedge funds to exert massive leverage. They can force  
currency devaluation at a breathtaking pace, undermine national economic policy, erode  
national development and throw literally millions below the poverty line.187 
Moreover, it is the private sector that has become the prime creator and distributer of 
new technologies in the last decades. MNCs transfer technology through Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), joint ventures, international patenting, licencing, and 
knowhow agreements.188 The activities of the MNCs are good evidence for showing 
the growing inability of the sovereign state to effectively control and regulate the 
economic activities of the private sector.189 MNCs control a large amount of 
resources, thus they can easily move goods, money, personnel, and technology across 
national boundaries. This has strengthened them in terms of their bargaining power 
with governments.190 All these factors at the end make it easier for non-state groups, 
like transnational terrorists, to acquire the necessary means and knowledge to 
conduct their activities and even open the way for them to acquire WMDs. 
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4. 4. 4 NGOs as Non-state Security Actors 
Another type of non-state actors are the NGOs, like the International Red 
Cross, Doctors without Frontiers, Green Peace and Amnesty International (AI).191 
For example, AI initiates worldwide campaigns against states that violate human 
rights and mobilizes international community against such states. This, while 
working mostly for the benefit of the individuals, may threaten the states by shaking 
their position in the international system via deteriorating their reputation and 
credibility. 
 
4. 4. 5 Transnational Organized Crime Organizations as Non-state Security 
Actors 
One other type of non-state actor that threatens the individuals and societies 
as well as states is the transnational organized crime organizations. With the help of 
globalization these organizations have found the opportunity to intensify their 
activities. Drug trafficking, smuggling, money laundering and all other activities of 
these organizations  threaten individuals, societies and states in various ways ranging 
from harming the health of the individual, corrupting the societies, and shaking 
national economies. 
 Moreover, these groups work together with transnational terrorist 
organizations, thus contributing to the threat they pose. For example, transnational 
terrorists and transnational organized crime organizations cooperate in smuggling, 
money laundering, and drug trafficking activities for fund raising.192   
                                                                                                                                          
190 Bennett, A. L. 1991. International Organizations: Principles and Issues. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 264. 
191 Ataman, Muhittin. 2003. “The Impact of Non-state Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to 
Nation-states”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2(1). 
192 Radu, Michael. 2002. “The New Protracted Conflict, Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends  
and Challenges”, Orbis, Spring. 
 85 
 
 
4. 4. 6 Transnational Terrorist Organizations as Non-state Security Actors 
Transnational terrorist organizations, which are the most important ones for 
the sake of this study, are the last type of non-state security actors of the multi-
centric world that is to be listed here. Actually, this issue will be dealt in detail in the 
next chapter, but it may be worth to make a brief introduction here. Transnational 
terrorist organizations are composed of terrorists from various nationalities. Also, 
there is a collusion and cooperation between different terrorist groups that add these 
groups a transnational character. Thus, different terrorist organizations cooperate in 
terms of sharing training facilities, finance, information, expertise, etc., thus 
facilitating joint operations.193 These terrorist organizations became important actors 
that threaten the whole world with the help of globalization.  
Futhermore, transnationally organized terrorist groups are not only involved 
in violence but also “provide social services such as welfare, policing, education, 
employment, membership, identity and existential meaning to constituencies that are 
marginalized within the given political order.”194 In other words, they appear as 
becoming full-fledged security actors with features of supplying and demanding 
security, as well as being a securiy challenger.  
On the basis of these, September 11 events showed that non-state actors could 
seriously give harm even to a powerful state.195 These attacks gave much harm to the 
US in its own territory than most of the attacks conducted by the nation-states 
throughout the history. 
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Therefore, in the more and more globalized world of today, non-state actors 
pose a significant threat to nation-states. For example, more and more individuals, 
private companies, and other non-state groups are becoming the producers, 
consumers, and merchants of the global arms market. Importantly, their being non-
territorial, “enemies without an address” with the words of Bishara196, capture the 
current dilemma of the state-centric world that is used to fight only with territorial 
state enemies unprepared. Thus these non-state actors such as mafia, narco-terrorists 
and transnational terrorists introduced a new struggle that is fought in an 
unconventional manner into the forefront of the international agenda.  
For example, state-centric world is unprepared for suicidal terrorists with 
religiously motivated hatred who do not value international law and norms. At this 
point also the traditional modes of deterrence becomes irrelevant. Weaponized non-
state and sub-state actors do not occupy sovereign territorial space, they operate as 
self-contained cells that render decapitating strikes at a central decision-making 
structure ineffective, thus they cannot be targeted.197 Furthermore, how can one deter 
people that conduct suicide attacks?  
Thus, transnational terrorists are non-military actors that also pose military 
challenges. However, the state-centric world still responds to these in traditional 
manner with traditional counter-response mechanisms, namely with military means 
as if the enemy is a state/ military actor. The old cliché “if all you have is a hammer, 
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then every problem begins to look like a nail”198 summarizes the situation very 
well.199 
 Therefore, states fail to meet the challanges posed by these non-state security 
actors. In order to be able to meet these challenges state-to-state counter-response 
mechanisms have to become state-to-non-state as well. Among the proposed 
solutions one is that the states should cooperate with other non-state actors like 
private sector and global civil society to undermine or at least not enable terrorist 
activity,200 besides cooperating with each other and utilizing international 
organizations.  
From this point it may be worth switching to explain transnational terrorists 
as non-state security actors. In the ligth of the analysis made until here in thesis, we 
are already able to judge, to some extent, that the existing international response 
mechanisms are not enough to give an effective response to transnational terrorism. 
However, in order to see better why the existing counter-terrorism mechanisms are 
not enough to meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorism, we should look 
at the actorness of the transnational terrorists and to the nature of the threat they pose 
in more detail. In this chapter we analyzed the general framework of the perceived 
threats, referent objects, and security actors in the multi-centric world and their 
differences from the state-centric world. In the next chapter, we will analyze 
transnational terrorism in more detail, and apply the general features we examined 
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here to that specific threat. This will be the last step to answer the question whether it 
is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism, in a 
concrete manner.  
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CHAPTER V 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS AS NON-STATE SECURITY ACTORS 
  
It is commonly argued that during the Cold War period states, especially the 
two superpowers, supported the terrorist organizations that were fighting against 
their rivals, or even engaged in covert terrorist activities themselves.201 This was 
because terrorist activities seemed cheaper, easier, and less risky as long as state 
participation was kept covert. As a result, states that did not want to risk a nuclear 
war starting among themselves, which may result in nuclear holocaust, utilized 
terrorism.202 Since it is difficult to prove the relationship between states and terrorist 
activities, the possibility of retaliation was greatly reduced. This situation resulted in 
the arguments that the “cold war” was superseded by a “camouflaged war”.203 
On the other hand terrorist organizations were dependent on the support of 
states in order to be able to conduct their operations internationally in an effective 
manner. For example, states provided funds, weapons, training, diplomatic facilities, 
place to hide, technical and ideological support and other necessary logistical 
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Terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press, 156-158. 
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facilities for the international terrorists.204 All these strengthened them and increased 
their capabilities on the one hand, but enabled the states to control these terrorist 
organizations to a large extent on the other hand.205 This type of terrorism, to the 
extent that the states could control them206, remained within the framework of the 
threat perceptions of the state-centric world.  
 With the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the East-West rivalry, 
terrorist organizations mostly lost the support coming from the superpowers, 
therefore, state support to terrorism diminished and transformed. As a result of this 
development some terrorist organizations lost their effectiveness, however others 
found other ways to compensate for this loss of state/superpower support. This has 
mostly been accomplished through the opportunities created by the multi-centric 
world and the processes of globalization that fostered the emergence of the multi-
centric world. Rapid developments in technology facilitated communication, 
transportation, acquiring information, and different kinds of weapons among other 
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things, without the help of any state. Furthermore, besides technology and 
information, people, capital, ideas, and knowledge started to move across borders 
easier and faster. As a result, to some extent, these facilitations of the multi-centric 
world took the place of superpower support for the terrorist organizations in the post-
Cold War period.207 Also, other attributes of the multi-centric world, namely 
improvements in the individual skills and loyalty shifts among the people from states 
towards other entities including transnational terrorist organizations, contributed to 
this picture. All these at the end have transformed the transnational terrorists into 
non-state security actors in the new era and placed them outside of the threat 
perceptions of the state-centric world, despite their becoming one of the major 
problems that threaten the states.208 
 This chapter is devoted to explaining and demonstrating the above mentioned 
arguments. In order to do this, firstly, the dependency of international terrorists on 
the state support during the Cold War era will be explained. Secondly, how these 
terrorist organizations adapted to the diminished support of states and become more 
independent from the states in the aftermath of the Cold War and how this 
contributed to the emergence of these organizations as transnational actors will be 
mentioned. Thirdly, other functions of transnational terrorists, besides being able to 
operate without state support, that allows us to call them non-state security actors 
will be elaborated on. 
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5. 1 State Support and International Terrorism in the Cold War Era 
5. 1. 1 International Terrorism as a Foreign Policy Tool 
 During the Cold War period superpowers utilized terrorism as a foreign 
policy tool. Instead of risking a total nuclear war among themselves, which would 
have meant the destruction of each and everyone, they preferred to utilize terrorism, 
either by their own institutions or by helping the emergence of sub-national terrorist 
groups or by supporting the already existing terrorist groups, in a covert manner. 209 
Therefore, terrorism became the continuation of politics by other means.210 
 Of course, neither of the superpowers admitted that they were supporting the 
terrorists. Although the Soviet Union accepted that it was supporting the 
“revolutionary movements”, they strictly rejected to label them as terrorists. As a 
result of this, some Western scholars developed theories that blamed the SU for 
supporting the international terrorist organizations around the world and using them 
against the West. This argument stated that the SU had established an “international 
terrorist network” in order to spread its communist ideology throughout the world 
and defeat the West.211 
 On the other hand, some other scholars argued that the real terrorist network 
had been established by the US and also the other states of the First World. In 
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addition to the CIA’s clandestine operations, the US supported the regimes that were 
ruling with terror as long as they were anti-communist and also supported groups that 
revolted against communist governments.212  
Other states like Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Cuba also supported terrorist 
organizations throughout the Cold War period. Although these states may have had 
other national considerations as well, even their support occurred within the context 
of Cold War rivalries, and these states received support from the superpowers for 
their support to terrorism in this context.213 For example, Palestinians were supported 
by many states in the region in the course of their conflict with Israel. The major 
funds of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) came from the oil rich Arab 
countries. The SU supported these acts as a part of its policy to expand its influence 
in the Middle Eastern region.214 
Therefore, we can reach a conclusion which is that both of the superpowers 
contributed to international terrorism in the Cold War era and therefore they mostly 
had the capacity to control the international terrorist groups that they were supporting 
since these groups needed support from these states.  
Hence, as far as the international terrorists of the era are concerned, most of 
the terrorist activities of the time were conducted by people with little power. These 
people required resources in order to conduct their activities in an effective 
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manner,215 and thus, international terrorism could be harmful and realize its aims at 
that time, only with the material and financial support of the powerful states. 
Ultimately, in the Cold War era, international terrorism became possible as a result 
of two factors, namely the existence of motivated and mobilized actors that were 
willing to conduct terrorism in order to pursue their political aims, and states willing 
to support them for their own interests. Hence, international terrorism could preserve 
its existence and effectiveness primarily as a result of the assistance provided by the 
states, since “many terrorist organizations could not survive in the absence of 
encouragement, financial and material backing, and political support supplied by 
states.”216 According to Bruce Hoffman, a leading scholar on the issue of terrorism, 
state sponsorship enhanced the limited capabilities and operational capacity of 
international terrorists by “placing at their disposal the resources of an established 
nation-state’s entire diplomatic, military and intelligence apparatus and thus greatly 
facilitating planning and intelligence.”217   
 
5. 1. 2 How Did States Support International Terrorist Organizations 
States supported international terrorists in several ways. The first way of such 
support was financial. States provided the necessary funds for the terrorists to acquire 
the necessary equipment for their operations and to organize and conduct their 
activities. Although it is not always easy to find direct relationship between funding 
states and the terrorists a detailed example for this is the confessions of Nezar 
Hindawi, who was charged for trying to explode an El Al jet at Heathrow and was 
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put on trial in London in October 1986. He claimed that he was in contact with the 
Syrian Embassy in London and had received the necessary information on how to set 
the bomb on the plane from the Syrian Intelligence. Moreover, he reported having 
received US $ 12 000 from Syria to conduct this attack.218 
 The second way of state support was providing weapons and explosives to 
the terrorists, since it is easier for states to acquire these as legal entities that have 
defense departments and industries. This support includes the provision of high 
technology weapons, like rocket launchers and SAM-7s,219 that were mostly under 
the control of states at that time instead of MNCs (as explained in the previous 
chapter). For example, radical Arab states acquired weapons from the Soviet Union 
and passed them on to the Palestinians. The conservative Arab States also provided 
weapons to the Palestinian terrorist organizations, but at that time they were 
purchasing these weapons from the US and other Western states.220   
 The third way of support was providing training facilities for the terrorists. 
This was done in several ways. One way was by providing the necessary training 
facilities in terms of assets and territory to conduct their training. For example, 
training centers were established in the US by Nicaraguan groups and the US turned 
a blind eye to this.221 Another way was training the terrorists with one’s security 
forces. These forces trained the terrorists on using different types of weapons and 
explosives (as the Hindawi example explained above demonstrates) including 
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sophisticated ones, giving them physical training, teaching them how to combat, 
conduct infiltration, make surveillance, use sophisticated communications 
equipments, and gather intelligence. The SU is suspected to have trained Palestinian 
terrorists in the camps in the SU as well as in the Middle East.222 The SU hoped that 
their support to the Palestinians would enhance their position within the Arab world 
and erode the US position that was supporting Israel. Palestinian terrorists were able 
to learn terrorist tactics, like using Kalashnikov rifles and making bombs, in the 
Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.223 Also some members of the major PLO 
factions were trained at the Soviet foreign-military academy at Sanprobal on the 
Black Sea. Here these people were taught technical skills of terrorism, like blowing 
up vehicles and ammunition dumps and production of incendiary devices among 
other things.224 
 States also gave information, thus intelligence support, to the terrorist 
organizations besides teaching them the ways to gather intelligence. This was 
important for the terrorists because conducting a successful terrorist activity depends 
on accurate information on the target. Since states have a much wider and effective 
network for intelligence gathering, their intelligence support was essential for 
terrorists. 
 Another type of state support was logistical help. This included, in addition to 
the already mentioned weapon providing, the provision of transportation means. 
These include “the use of diplomatic pouches for the transport of weapons and 
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explosives”.225  Furthermore, states can provide safe havens, that is to say, places of 
sanctuary and protection for terrorists after they have conducted attacks elsewhere.226 
 Furthermore, states gave international terrorists diplomatic support. This 
included providing diplomatic immunity, passports, and other documents that are 
used to cover the real identities of the terrorists.227  
  Finally, states gave rhetorical support to terrorists. This was done by 
supporting the cause of the terrorists in their speeches and rejecting their being called 
as terrorists. Also, they supported them in the international arena, for example in the 
UN meetings.228  
 Thus, without the financial, material, logistical, tactical, diplomatic, and 
rhetorical support of the states it was nearly impossible for the terrorists to conduct 
effective and international terrorist activities. However, this situation changed in the 
aftermath of the Cold War era and terrorist organizations found other ways to 
compensate for the loss of state support of especially the superpowers, and at the end 
they became transnationalized. States had already strengthened the terrorists with 
their support in the Cold War era. This too has been a contributing factor to terrorists 
emerging as actors in the system. The earlier support greatly enhanced the terrorists’ 
capabilities and helped to transform them into more capable and powerful entities. 
This helped them to survive, and gave them time to find other ways to compensate 
the loss of state/superpower support in their transformation period in the aftermath of 
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the Cold War. Ultimately making them able to operate without any support from the 
states.229 
 
5. 2 Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Aftermath of the Cold War 
With the end of the Cold War, terrorist organizations lost the umbrella 
provided by the superpowers and the state support they were getting was diminished 
and transformed in nature. On the other hand, the features provided by the 
globalization phenomenon replaced the support of the states in many ways. 
 
5. 2. 1 Changed State-support of Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Period 
 As stated above, state support to terrorism has been diminished and 
transformed with the end of the Cold War. This happened in several ways. Firstly, 
the major support international terrorist organizations were receiving had been 
coming from the superpowers as explained in the previous part of this chapter. With 
the collapse of the SU the leftist oriented international organizations lost their major 
supporter. On the other hand, since its major enemy disappeared and since it 
remained as the only superpower in the international arena the US gave up its 
support to the terrorist organizations as well. 
 On the other hand, weak/or so-called ‘rogue’ states; like Syria, Libya and 
Sudan; continue to support terrorists on the basis of their aims. Since they cannot 
achieve their aims and cope with their stronger rivals through conventional means, 
they continue to utilize terrorism and give support to terrorists. However, unlike the 
Cold War period, these states do not have a guarantee from any superpower in their 
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support to terrorism and they can face retaliation more easily, even when they are 
suspected to be supporting terrorism. Still, these states continue to provide save 
havens and diplomatic support to terrorists when necessary.230 Another important 
point here is that these states are not able to control the terrorist organizations they 
are supporting. This means that, in order to fail to control the terrorists within its 
territory, a state does not necessarily have to be a failed state, its being weak is 
enough. 
 Finally, terrorists benefit from the situation of the so-called ‘failed’ states in 
the system. This type of states do not have control over their own territories. 
Therefore, terrorists can easily establish bases in these states without being disturbed. 
Furthermore, even though they do not have control over their own territories these 
entities are still called as ‘states’ and this enables them to benefit from the features of 
statehood. This is to say, they have the right of non-intervention in their domestic 
affairs within their own territory guaranteed by the international law. These provide 
terrorists very good save havens in which they can organize their bases and training 
camps without any intervention, either from the host state or from other states. Also, 
diplomatic support can be acquired from these states (as well as from other weak 
states) when necessary. The governments of failed states can issue legitimate 
passports to terrorists and enable them to move around the world without decoding 
their real identities.231 Moreover, terrorists sometimes even have control over the 
host states instead of vice versa and it looks like a terror group sponsoring a state. An 
example of this point was the relationship between the Taliban government in 
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Afghanistan and Al Qaeda before the US intervention.232 Another important point 
here is that even if terrorist organizations lose a base in a failed country, like Al 
Qaeda’s loss of its bases in Afghanistan after the US intervention, they can acquire 
bases in other failed states since there are lots of failed states in the system. For 
example, it is said that Al Qaeda seeks to establish new bases in other failed states, 
like Somalia, Chechnya, the mountains of Central Asia, Lebanon, or Kosovo.233 This 
is especially true because terrorists do not need to control the whole territory of a 
failed state. Control over a specific area is sufficient for their purposes. Besides 
establishing bases and training camps within these territories, terrorists also conduct 
fund raising activities. The weak or non-existent law enforcement capabilities of 
such failed states contribute to this function and terrorist organizations can easily 
engage in smuggling and drug-trafficking activities in these places.234 In sum, 
terrorists benefit from the sovereignty rights of the failed states as they remain 
beyond the reach of the sovereign state.235 
The diminishing and transforming of state support of terrorism and the loss of 
control by the states over the terrorist organizations, contributed to the emergence of 
terrorist organizations as independent actors. As the quantitative analysis made by 
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler demonstrates, there has been a downward shift in 
the number of international terrorist incidents in the aftermath of the Cold War.236 
This is a reflection of the decrease in state support of terrorists with the end of the 
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Cold War rivalry. As a result of this decrease it became more difficult to conduct 
effective trans-border attacks. However, the decrease in and transformation of state 
support also resulted in the loss of control over the terrorists as explained above. 
When these points are combined we reach a conclusion that without, or with less, 
state support the number of trans-border attacks decreased, however, since terrorists 
are now out of control, the lethality of these attacks dramatically increased. This 
increase in the number of deaths is an important feature of transformed terrorism of 
the post-Cold War era.237 During the Cold War era, the increase in casualties could 
increase the risk for both the terrorists by alienating the supporters and for the 
supporting state by increasing the possibility of retaliation. On the other hand, the 
independent terrorists of today do not care about alienating supporters since their 
main strength is coming from their ideology238 as will be explained later in this 
chapter.    
 
5. 2. 2 Globalization and Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Post-Cold 
War Era 
The concept of globalization is a highly contested one. Its meaning, whether 
it is a project or a process, and if it is a process, when did it start, are the major 
debates. However, no matter how we answer these questions we feel its impacts in 
our lives. In particular, from the 1990s onwards we started to feel its impacts more 
intensively and it has become a very important dimension of our lives. Developments 
have occurred in technology, especially in communication and information 
technologies. Furthermore, technology, labor, capital, finance, ideas, knowledge, and 
information started to move across borders easier and faster. All these contributed to 
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the rise of the multi-centric world next to the state-centric one as explained in the 
second chapter of this thesis. Globalization has been the process within this multi-
centric world that shaped its major developments. Terrorist organizations, as well, 
started to make use of these benefits of globalization and found themselves a place in 
the multi-centric world. Therefore, to some extent, the multi-centric world that 
reflects the features of globalization took the place of superpower support for the 
terrorist organizations in the post-Cold War era.239 Money, weapons, assets for 
training, information and intelligence, and transportation facilities which could once 
only be provided by states became easy for entities other  than states to acquire. 
These other entities include terrorist organizations. Thus, terrorist groups can create 
“networks of virtually connected, ideologically fused movements.”240 The rest of this 
part is devoted to explain these issues. 
 
5. 2. 2. 1 Globalization as Facilitator of Transnational Terrorism 
5. 2. 2. 1. i Facilitating Role of Globalization as Liberalization 
 The advances in technology and the expansion of networks of transportation 
and communication mean easier and faster movement of technology, finance, ideas, 
knowledge and information across the globe. But, what do these mean for terrorists 
who have the motivation to conduct terrorist incidents all over the world?  
Firstly, by utilizing these developments, terrorist organizations are able to 
find financing for their operations. The easy flow of resources across borders gives 
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terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, the opportunity to find 
funds for their operations both in legal ways, like establishing legal trade companies 
or charities, and in illegal ways, like smuggling and drug trafficking.241 Financial 
transactions of the terrorist organizations need not rely on high technology. On the 
contrary, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda use simple methods. For example, 
they use informal money-changing methods like the hawala242 system or direct 
currency transport, done through cash carried by individuals.243 Of course, this has 
become possible also by the easy movement of people and money across borders that 
has been a result of globalization as liberalization.  
Secondly, as a result of globalization, it is now easier and cheaper for the 
terrorist organizations to acquire the necessary and diversified equipment for 
conducting their operations.244 Furthermore, they can also easily acquire necessary 
information to build and use different kinds of weapons. In the 1990s, the knowledge 
on how to make bombs became available to almost everyone in the world. Even 
information on chemical and biological  materials, and how they can be used as 
weapons, became widely available on the internet.245 Although there are still some 
technical and otherwise difficulties, if terrorists acquire WMDs, they become 
strategically equal actors with states having the same destructive capabilities.246 
Furthermore, terrorists are in a position to more easily use those weapons because 
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they are not restricted by international law or moral rules or by their supporters, as 
states are restricted by their citizens. Moreover, they can apply a deterrence policy 
like states do. This means that they may apply a passive terror instead of active 
terror.247 The developments in technology also provide the terrorists the ability to 
convert non-weapon technologies to lethal weapons,248 as the use of commercial 
airlines in the September 11 attacks demonstrated. 
The developments in information technologies also made it easier for 
terrorists to acquire the necessary and critical information to conduct their 
operations, besides the information for building and using weapons. For example, the 
terrorists that conducted the September 11 attacks could have found the detailed 
plans and design characteristics of the World Trade Organization buildings, and the 
information on how large buildings can be destroyed.249   
Terrorist organizations also use the new technologies to be globally 
connected and to become more capable and effective.250 By this way they establish 
“globe-circling infrastructures” with “globetrotting individual members”.251 These 
two concepts mean that terrorist organization disperse both their organizational 
structure and manpower all around the world. 
Moreover, the developments in technology and liberal policies that made the 
movement of people across borders easier, has also increased the mobility of 
terrorists. By this way terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and others, 
could easily establish cells all around the world, including Europe and the US. These 
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cells operate as sleeping cells in these places and are activated during times of 
operation only. This keeps them secret and uncoverable. Through their easy 
movement ability, terrorist organizations can collect intelligence in an easy manner. 
As one scholar indicates, in today’s world, “[s]tates are more encumbered by 
territorially-based restrictions than are terrorist organizations.”252   
In addition, the developments in communications and travel technologies 
enable terrorists to operate in a decentralized manner. This means that terrorist 
organizations do not need a large, fixed physical presence that must be controlled by 
a centralized command structure in order to conduct and control operations over long 
distances.253 Instead, terrorists establish network like structures. These networks are 
composed of “loosely interconnected, semi-independent cells that have no single 
commanding hierarchy.”254 In this way terrorist organizations have been able to 
further transnationalize and disperse around the world. This decentralized structure 
also enables terrorist groups to adapt more easily to the changing circumstances. 
Although their base in one country has been destroyed, the effectiveness of the 
terrorist organization does not disappear as a result of this decentralized 
organization.255 An example of this is Al Qaeda, which continues to conduct its 
operations all around the world despite its base in Afghanistan having been 
destroyed. 
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Thus, this decentralization contributes to transnational terrorists’ ability to 
conduct effective operations all around the world. For example, a cell of the 
organization can conduct an attack within the framework drawn by the organization, 
but without any coordination with other cells, even without the command of the head 
of the organization. This factor also strengthens transnational terrorist organizations 
to the extent that, even if the head of the organization is captured or killed, the 
organization can continue to conduct effective operations.256 At this point they are 
like states, since states too continue their existence under different heads of states. 
However, different from states, decentralization adds strength to transnational 
terrorists, while it weakens the states. This is mostly because while transnational 
terrorists are deterritorialized, states are territorial. 
Another point is that the linkage between different terrorist organizations and 
between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations has 
increased as well. In this way they can share information and expertise and find 
different ways of acquiring weapons and finance, for example through smuggling 
and drug-trafficking.257 For example, the Basque ETA is acquiring finance through 
drug money. Actually, the ETA terrorist group in Spain is a perfect example of a 
terrorist organization that blends organized crime and terrorism very well.258 The 
southern Italian mafia work with clans that are associated with terrorism, and 
trafficking of drugs and arms from Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia.259 Interpol 
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Reports reveal these relationships between the transnational terrorist organizations 
and transnational criminal organizations.  
Furthermore, the cooperation between different terrorist organizations has 
increased as well. Terrorist networks share their training facilities and tactics, support 
each other financially, share logistical assets, intelligence, and weapons. Sometimes 
they conduct joint operations.260 Transnational terrorists can cooperate even with 
organizations that have different ideologies than themselves, as long as they have a 
common enemy.261 Similar to states, transnational terrorists try to acquire economic 
power and turn it into military and political advantage over their enemy. In order to 
do this, they cooperate with whomever it is necessary. Furthermore they sometimes 
cooperate with local groups, and thus act as a “franchise organization that employs 
local indigenous groups”.262 These local groups conduct attacks that are connected 
with the bigger organization through inspiration, logistics, communications, training, 
or technique.263 In addition, there are terrorists that are only inspired from the 
activities of, for example Al Qaeda. They conduct attacks similar to those of Al 
Qaeda, although they have no connection with it. For example, after the September 
11 attacks of Al Qaeda, the Basque ETA planned (but they were uncovered) to 
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explode the Picasso Tower in Madrid that resembles World Trade Center 
buildings.264 
Thus, globalization as liberalization, when combined with the technological 
developments, plays the role of facilitator for transnational terrorist organizations in 
several ways. 
 
5. 2. 2. 1. ii Facilitating Role of Globalization as Supraterritoriality 
Another facilitating role of globalization on transnational terrorism comes to 
the forefront when globalization is perceived as supraterritoriality. As stated earlier, 
this type of conceptualization of globalization includes reference to developments in 
individual skills, loyalty shifts, and the decrease in state sovereignty as individuals 
and other non-state entities emerge as actors in the global system.  
First of all the analytic, emotional, and imaginative skills of individuals, as 
explained with Rosenau’s concept of “skill revolution” in the second chapter of this 
thesis, has been greatly improved as a result of a variety of sources. Among these 
sources are more education, travel, technological innovations like global television, 
the internet, and fiber optic cable. Of course, these skills of the individuals expand in 
the context of their own culture. These at the end have two main implications. The 
first one is that, as individuals’ awareness and capacity to affect the policies 
increases and as they start to define themselves with different concepts other than 
being from a nation or a citizen of a state, they shift their loyalties towards other 
entities, like religious groups. Thus, the sovereignty of the state decreases both in 
quality and quantity. Secondly, the skills of the terrorists also expands in the context 
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of their own culture and this increases their ability, as well as their devotion to their 
values and ideas. 
One consequence of these is the authority crisis the states face.265 Since 
individuals start to define themselves with other communities or ideologies, like 
religion, their loyalties shift from state to those other entities.266 Among these entities 
there are also transnational terrorist organizations that have adapted ideologies or 
stances with which individuals may identify themselves. Also, having religion as the 
motivating ideology contributes to the deterritorialization of the terrorist groups by 
freeing them further, from being tied to a specific territory.267 This is because 
religions transcend the territorial borders of the states. 
 Another point here is that, globalization as deterritorialization (as well as 
liberalization)268 has helped the erosion of state sovereignty as explained before. As a 
result  some states lose their sovereign control over their territory and people. This is 
explained with the failed state concept in the previous part. This facilitated terrorism, 
by providing terrorist organizations spaces for planning their activities almost free 
from interference. Moreover, in these areas, terrorists can build training camps.269 
Thus, such states become safe havens for transnational criminal and terrorist 
networks. These safe havens are the places terrorists are engaging in smuggling and 
drug trafficking in order to raise funds for their operations. They can try to replace 
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the state as the power center and acquire the loyalty of the citizens. This becomes 
possible because the state does not possess that loyalty any more as a result of its 
weakness. By this way terrorists can gain supporters.270 This loyalty shift and 
decrease in the credibility of the nation-state can even occur in developed and strong 
states. As states cannot protect their citizens from the threat posed by terrorism, it 
means that they cannot perform their main reason of existence from a Hobbesian 
perspective, namely protecting their citizens from threats to their existence. This, at 
the end, results in the loss of credibility on the part of the nation-state.271    
All these mean that, alongside the dominant structure of the prior centuries, 
composed of states and their institutions and the events shaped by their interactions, 
today a multi-centric system arises and this system includes actors other than the 
states, i.e. non-state collectivities.272 Transnational terrorist organizations emerge as 
one of these non-state actors of the global era.273 The organization and structure of Al 
Qaeda is a good example of all these. It functions in more than 60 countries, thus 
spread all over the world. It is not dependent on any concrete territory or state, so it is 
a deterritorialized global actor.274 Indeed, the events of September 11 demonstrate to 
us that: 
Besides the remarkable organizational skills reflected in their actions, what 
they did was another instance of the long-term process whereby authority 
is undergoing disaggregation, with new actors who clamber onto the world  
stage and exercise authority through horizontal networks rather than  
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hierarchical chains of command and, in so doing, have the capacity to 
challenge states and generate widespread consequences.275       
Thus, the September 11 attacks demonstrated that transnational terrorist 
organizations have risen as non-state security actors in the global arena and this has 
become possible, to a large extent, with the help of globalization276 and the rise of the 
multi-centric world.  
 In sum, terrorists have learned to acquire finance, weapons, and information, 
to cooperate with each other and other entities, to escape from the restraints of 
borders and become deterritorialized, and to acquire loyal supporters by benefiting 
from the developments that intensified in the aftermath of the Cold War. Within this 
framework, with the help of globalization and the rise of the multi-centric world as a 
result, international terrorism has escaped from state control and became 
transnationalized besides preserving and even extending its effectiveness and 
capabilities. This effectiveness and independence from the state control has resulted 
in the emergence of transnational terrorists as non-state security actors that can 
threaten even the sole superpower of the era, namely the US. Furthermore, the 
loyalty shifts of people from states to this type of organizations has contributed to 
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their actorness. This is because these loyal people act as if they are citizens of 
transnational terrorist organizations. For example, they provide them money like they 
are paying tax to a state. 
 Besides the factors that are dealt with in the section, there are other factors 
that enable us to call transnational terrorists as important non-state actors that affect 
the stability and security in the system. These factors  will be explained in the next 
section. 
 
5. 3 The Characteristics that Attribute Actorness to Transnational Terrorists 
 Some of the factors that demonstrate the actorness of the transnational 
terrorists are similar to the states while some others are different. Among the factors 
that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists are the ability to act in the global 
arena independent from the control of any state. Transnational terrorists are 
organized in a decentralized and deterritorialized manner. This, together with other 
factors like the developments in technology, enable them to conduct effective 
operations all around the world. They build alliances with each other and with other 
transnational entities. But, in addition to this some small organizations or even 
individuals are inspired from the activities of transnational terrorists and conduct 
activities in the name of the bigger organizations, sometimes without any 
participation by the role model organization. These three main characteristics of 
actorness have been explained in the previous section. But, there are also other 
factors that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists. For example, the ideologies 
that bring transnational terrorists together are more global, like religious 
fundamentalism. This enables them to acquire loyal supporters all around the world, 
which act like citizens of a state. Besides these, the capacity to apply a foreign policy 
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and the ability to affect the foreign and defense policies of the states in the 
international system, including those of the US, are factors that attribute actorness to 
transnational terrorists. In this section I will deal with these points. 
 
5. 3. 1 Having a Global Ideology 
 The ideologies of the transnationalized terrorists of the post-Cold War era are 
based on religion, therefore it is more global in reach. It is possible to find persons 
from different religions in most, if not all, countries around the world. In this way 
terrorists can find supporters all around the world, solely based on religion.277 
Therefore, a certain understanding of religion, like jihadism in Islam, becomes for 
transnational terrorists what nationalism is for nation-states. The loyal supporters 
acquired by this way act as if they are citizens of these transnational terrorist 
organizations. For example, they (e.g., Saudi millionaires, Egyptian radicals, 
Yemenite preachers as far as Al Qaeda is concerned) give money as if they are 
paying tax. Others participate in the operations as if they are conducting their 
military service. But unlike the citizenship of a state, supporters of a transnational 
terrorist organization do these things voluntarily. Thus terrorism becomes “society-
sponsored” instead of state-sponsored.278 
  
5. 3. 2 Challenging the State Sovereignty 
In addition, transnational terrorist groups establish charitable organizations, 
schools, and even develop banking networks and credit agencies for the populace.279 
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These increase the quantity and quality of the people that become supporters of these 
organizations. Thus, transnational terrorist organizations stand as an alternative to the 
state, and in doing so, they challenge the control of the states over their population 
and territory. Since the sovereignty of a state is based on the control over its own 
territory and population, as well as use of force, transnational terrorists undermine 
state sovereignty, by undermining a state’s control.280 
 
5. 3. 3 Ability to Conduct Foreign Policy 
 Another important factor that makes transnational terrorists actors is their 
ability to conduct foreign policy. This means that by their attacks and declarations 
they send messages to some states and ask to make deals with some others. For 
example, some Arab regimes allow the fund raising of some Islamic extremist 
terrorist groups within their own borders in return that they do not attack these 
regimes.281 This point will become clearer during the discussion of the Al Qaeda case 
in the next chapter.  
 
5. 3. 4 Ability to Affect the Domestic, Foreign, and Defense Policies of the States   
As a continuation of this point, another factor of actorness is the ability to 
affect the domestic, foreign and defense policies of the states. As the citizens of a 
state lose their sense of security as a result of terrorist attacks, they may question the 
capability of the government of that state to protect them. This may become a factor 
that changes the election results.  Therefore, states sometimes play a “double game”, 
meaning that while in the international arena they act as an anti-terrorist, they at the 
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same time bargain with terrorists to prevent further destabilization.282 Moreover, 
states cooperate with each other in order to defeat terrorism. While they are building 
alliances, they choose states that are not supporting terrorism and that are conducting 
policies to fight against it. They make plans to protect their homelands from terrorist 
attacks. Even the US, the only superpower of the contemporary world, determines its 
national security policy against a terrorist organization instead of other states, as the 
US National Security Report of 2002 demonstrates.283 Then, that terrorist 
organization can be said to be an actor in the system.    
 
5. 4 The Convergence of these Characteristics of Transnational Terrorists with 
the Definition of Actorness 
After stating the characteristics of transnational terrorists as actors, we can 
evaluate whether they meet the criteria set to define actors in world politics. There 
are several definitions used to describe an actor in world politics. The most general 
of these definitions is that “any entity which plays an identifiable role in international 
relations”.284 If we accept this definition it is clear that transnational terrorists are 
actors of world politics because they obviously have an “identifiable role in 
international relations”. A more specific definition of actor in world politics had been 
made by Oran Young as:  
 any organized entity that is composed, at least indirectly, of human beings, 
is not wholly subordinate to any other actor in the world system in effective  
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terms, and participates in power relationships with other actors.285 
Also, Brian Hocking and Michael Smith made a specific definition of actor in world 
politics. According to them, those entities that meet the criteria of having autonomy, 
representation and influence are actors in the system. Here autonomy means the 
ability of an actor to act independently while trying to achieve its objectives; 
representation means the type of constituencies an actor represents; and influence 
means the capacity of an actor to make a difference concerning an issue within a 
certain context.286 When we look to the features of transnational terrorists listed in 
the previous and this section, they fit to these criteria of actorness and include other 
features that go beyond these determined minimum criteria. 
When we consider most of these features of actorness, Al Qaeda seems the 
only obvious example yet that carries all these features, therefore it is worth to study 
the emergence and features of Al Qaeda in order to better demonstrate the rise of a 
transnational terrorist organization as a non-state security actor. This is the topic of 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDY: AL QAEDA       
  
Al Qaeda is a network composed of different groups including Abu Sayyaf 
(from Philippines), Egypt’s Islamic Group, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (from Pakistan), 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al-Jihan (from Egypt), and Osama bin Laden’s 
own group.287 According to the information provided by the US government, Al 
Qaeda operates in more than 60 countries.288 It has cells and allies in these places and 
it sometimes cooperates with local organizations, thus it can conduct attacks all over 
the world. It has members from different countries, including Chechnya, Egypt, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somali, 
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen and also 
from Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and even the US.289 Its leadership staff is 
also composed of persons from different origins. Most importantly, it is not 
controlled by any state. It is financially independent, has a global goal and strategy, a 
global structure of cells, and an organizational structure that reflects the elements of 
an intelligence service, an army, and a multinational corporation.290 All these make 
Al Qaeda a ‘transnational’ organization and an actor in the world as the terms are 
defined throughout this study. Thus, in this chapter, the transnational terrorist 
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organization of Al Qaeda will be examined and how it reflects the characteristics of 
actorness, explained in the previous chapter, will be demonstrated. In doing this first 
of all the historical evolution of Al Qaeda will be explained and then the features of 
actorness that Al Qaeda carries will be evaluated one by one. 
 
6. 1 Historical Evolution of Al Qaeda 
 From 1979, the time the seeds of Al Qaeda were planted, onwards, Al Qaeda 
has undergone two  major transformations. The first of these happened with the end 
of the Cold War and the second major transformation occurred after the US 
intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001. As 
a result of these transformations Al Qaeda has emerged as a prominent non-state 
security actor in the global system. 
 
6. 1. 1 Al Qaeda in the Cold War 
 The nucleus of Al Qaeda was established in 1979 with the support of the US 
against the SU after the latter’s invasion of Afghanistan.291 It is argued that the CIA 
provided $500 million-per-year to the militants in order to arm and train them. The 
US provided them weapons, including high tech ones like stringer anti-aircraft 
missiles.292 Thus, it emerged as a proxy organization in conformity with the trends of 
the Cold War period. Therefore, it was dependent on the support coming from its 
state supporter at this period for training and other necessary facilities to conduct its 
operations. Still, the aim to rescue Afghanistan from Soviet invasion brought 
Muslims from different countries, like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Southeast 
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Asia, together. Here, besides fighting together they shared a powerful life 
experience293 and thus established a deep connection. 
 Osama bin Laden joined the anti-Soviet jihad in 1982 and he recognized that 
the infrastructure, especially for connecting people that come for jihad from different 
countries,294 and the necessary manpower to fight a protracted conflict were lacking 
in Afghanistan. In order to eliminate these difficulties, together with the leader of the 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood Abdallah Azzam, he established the Maktab al-
Khidamat, a kind of services office. Together, they collected lots of young Muslims 
to fight in Afghanistan.295 This organization was funded by Osama bin Laden 
himself, together with donations from Islamic countries and the US government.296  
 In 1988 Osama bin Laden established the Al Qaeda in order to expand the 
jihad in Afghanistan into a global pan-Islamic resistance movement besides the 
establishment of other overlapping and interrelated organizations by other people.297 
 
6. 1. 2 Al Qaeda in the Aftermath of the Cold War 
 With the end of the Cold War and loss of superpower support, Al Qaeda 
underwent its first transformation. As the SU left Afghanistan and later collapsed, Al 
Qaeda’s reason for existence disappeared since its major aim was to throw the SU 
out of Afghanistan. Therefore, it changed its target and its former supporter, namely, 
the US became its new enemy.  
At the same time the structure of the organization changed as well. After their 
struggle in Afghanistan against the SU ended, the mujahidens who fought there left 
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Afghanistan. Some went back to their home countries and others went to fight for 
other Muslims around the world, like in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya. However, 
those that returned back home were often not welcomed in their homelands as a 
result of the fear that the regimes had for the mujahidens’ religious fervor.298 These 
people that went home and were unwelcomed, together with the mujahidens that 
come back from Bosnia, as the Bosnian war ended, often chose to come to Sudan 
where Osama bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, was residing. Osama bin Laden was 
also among those who could not remain in his home country, since the Saudi 
government did not want him in Saudi Arabia as a result of his public activities and 
militant views that threatened the Saudi government. In Sudan Osama bin Laden, 
thus Al Qaeda, was able to build alliances with other terrorist groups from Egypt, 
Pakistan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Palestine. From this time onwards, Al Qaeda started 
its transnational operations. Not long thereafter however, in 1996, Osama bin Laden 
and his mujahidens were forced to leave Sudan as a result of US pressures on this 
country and they went back to Afghanistan, where a like-minded Taliban rule had 
gained victories. They cooperated with the Taliban and established themselves a safe 
haven299 there without being under the control of the Taliban regime. Thus, from this 
period onwards, Al Qaeda began to transform from being a proxy international 
organization controlled by a state to a transnational non-state mechanism outside the 
control of any state. 
In the aftermath of the struggle in Afghanistan, in 1989 there emerged a split 
within the organization concerning the strategy that should be followed. Abdullah 
Azzam, who was one of the main organizers of the struggle in Afghanistan against 
the SU, and was a role model for Osama bin Laden in his role in Afghanistan, 
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suggested that the organization should remain regional. This means that instead of 
attacking the US as the new enemy, Al Qaeda should strengthen itself in 
Afghanistan, control Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula, and later Central Asia after 
saving Kashmir. On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri, another leading figure, who 
comes second after Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda nowadays, and a former key figure 
in Al Jihad, wanted Al Qaeda to be a global organization, acting in a global manner. 
Accordingly, he argued, the time had come to attack the US.  The views of Zawahiri 
were also shared by Osama bin Laden. Azzam made the above mentioned arguments 
concerning remaining regional, but a few days later, he was murdered by a bombing 
assault. The suspect was Zawahiri according to some, and Osama bin Laden 
according to others. However, at the end, these developments resulted in the 
selection of acting globally as the strategy of the organization.300 The adaptation of a 
global strategy shifted Al Qaeda towards becoming a global actor. In 1998, Al Qaeda 
merged with Egyptian al Jihad and al Gamaa al Islamiya. With the support of other 
organizations from different countries the campaign came to be known as the World 
Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.301 Within this new 
framework Al Qaeda conducted several attacks all around the world including the 
bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), the USS Cole (2000) and 
the September 11 (2001) attacks.    
 
6. 1. 3 Al Qaeda in the post-September 11 Period 
 After the bombings of Afghanistan by the US in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda had to leave this country and restructure itself in a 
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new way. From this time onwards, Al Qaeda became a truly effective non-state 
security actor. It had become independent of any state in the aftermath of the Cold 
War and it became truly deterritorialized in the aftermath of the Afghanistan 
bombings by the US. This deterritorialization became the final stage in Al Qaeda’s 
evolution into a transnational non-state security actor in the global arena. This does 
not mean that it is not benefiting from the uncontrolled parts of the globe for building 
bases, but it means that it is not dependent on any base in any country and it can 
continue its existence in an effective manner ,even if it loses a base in any country, as 
a result of its decentralized organization.  
 Although pushed out of Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, Al 
Qaeda continues to conduct operations all around the world, including in Singapore, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Macedonia, Bosnia, Italy, 
France, Spain, and Turkey. It is still able to “communicate, reconnoiter targets, plan 
operations, travel, meet clandestinely, and obtain finances”.302.  
 
6. 2 Al Qaeda and Transnational Actorness 
 The features of transnational actorness has been listed as, first, the ability to 
organize in failed states and get support from states, especially rogue ones, while 
remaining out of their control. Second, the ability to find funds, weapons, 
information and other necessary means for their activities themselves by utilizing the 
developments in all kinds of technology and easy movement of people, capital, ideas, 
knowledge and information across borders. Third, having a decentralized and 
deterritorialized organizational structure so that having the capacity to conduct 
operations worldwide and the ability to continue its effective existence although its 
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leading figures are captured or killed. Fourth, having the ability to build alliances and 
be a source of inspiration for other terrorist organizations. Fifth, having an ideology 
with a global reach that provides loyal supporters to the organization all around the 
world. Sixth, having the capacity to challenge the sovereignty of the states not only 
by conducting attacks but also by establishing schools, charities, even banking 
systems as alternatives to those of states and contributing to loyalty shifts. Seventh, 
the ability to conduct foreign policy. And finally, the ability to affect the domestic, 
foreign and defense policies of the states including the sole superpower of the 
contemporary world. All these features are possessed by Al Qaeda as will be 
demonstrated. 
 
6. 2. 1 Al Qaeda and Failed States 
 As explained above, Al Qaeda used the instability within Afghanistan and 
established itself a base there in the mid-1990s. With the US intervention in 
Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, Al Qaeda had to leave this country. 
However, there are lots of other places around the world, like Somali, Iraq, 
Chechenya, Kashmir, etc., where the state control is weak or non-existent. Al Qaeda 
has been able to establish bases in these places in a covert manner if not openly.303 
 In particular the situation in Iraq can provide Al Qaeda very good 
opportunities for establishing a new base. Those people that are coming to Iraq in 
order to fight against the US forces are religiously motivated Arab volunteers. The 
struggle in Iraq can have the same dynamics and consequences as the SU 
experienced in Afghanistan. “The world series of jihad” may now go on in Iraq.304 
                                                 
303 Hoffman, in Symposium: Diagnosing Al Qaeda. August, 18, 2003. Available online: 
http://www.rand.org/newslinks/fp.html. 
304 Bowers, Faye, and Ilene R. Prusher. 2003. “Al Qaeda’s Reach Grows, with Help from Web”, 
Christian Science Monitor, 95(249): 2. 
 124
Therefore, Al Qaeda can gain from this struggle further members, reinforce its 
doctrine, and find new sources besides finding a new base to reorganize.305 
 In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was independent from the control of the Taliban, 
while it benefited from the opportunities provided by the legal ‘sovereignty’ of this 
state. In fact, instead of being controlled by the Taliban regime Al Qaeda controlled 
that regime to an extent and helped its staying in power by eliminating its major 
internal enemies. By this way Al Qaeda possesses the feature of actorness that 
necessitates being independent from the control of any state while it continues to 
benefit from the weaknesses of the state-system.    
 
6. 2. 2 Al Qaeda and Utilization of Globalization 
 It is well known that Al Qaeda benefits from the opportunities provided by 
globalization and the easy and quick access to all kinds of technology and easy 
movements of people, capital, ideas, knowledge, and information. Al Qaeda utilizes 
all kinds of technology including the internet, fax machines, air travel, and even 
satellite technology to acquire funds, weapons, information, and the other necessary 
means to conduct its operations around the world besides disseminating its ideology 
all over the world via these technological devices including its own web sites on the 
internet.  
Osama bin Laden disseminates his speeches and fatwas through video- and 
audiotapes, CD-ROMs and DVDs as well as by satellite TV and the internet. For 
example, the 13 volume “Encyclopedia of Jihad” and 1 volume “Jihad Manual” can 
be reached from the world wide web and e-mailed to jihadists and would-be jihadists 
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by Al Qaeda. These documents can also be found in CD format.306 All of the 
speeches and fatwas of leading Al Qaeda leaders including those of Osama bin 
Laden can be found from the internet in addition to being announced from satellite 
TV that can be watched from all around the world. Moreover, Al Qaeda publishes an 
internet magazine, called Al-Battar Training Camp, providing people the opportunity 
to be trained as mujahidens from their own home. It is stated in the magazine that 
“oh Mujahid brother, in order to join the great training camps you don’t have to 
travel to other lands. Alone, in your home or with a group of your brothers, you can 
begin to execute the training program.”307 
Benefiting from the low inspection possibilities on the flow of commercial 
cargo Al Qaeda is able to move every type of equipment including weapons around 
the world.308 “Taking advantage of lax asylum laws and immigration procedures, and 
the low level of scrutiny given to religious and charitable organizations, Al Qaeda 
has dispatched operatives and sleepers into Western countries, creating a network of 
safe houses and acquiring vehicles as well as equipment.”309 
 In 2001, Dahmane Abd al-Sattar, a member of a Tunisian-dominated Al 
Qaeda cell based in Belgium, was activated by the Al Qaeda leadership in order to 
assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, then leader of the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan. He travelled, with another fellow, as European-based Moroccan 
journalists, through the UK and Pakistan with Belgian passports and Pakistani visas 
to Afghanistan. They committed a suicide attack while interviewing Massauds and 
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both of the terrorists died besides Massaud.310 This story demonstrates very well how 
Al Qaeda makes use of all of the benefits of globalization and acquires all the 
necessary means for its operations itself without any need for states. This is the 
second feature that demonstrates Al Qaeda’s actorness. 
 
6. 2. 3 Al Qaeda as a Decentralized and Deterritorialized, yet Institutionalized 
Body 
 The structure of Al Qaeda is a complex one. It conducts operations all around 
the world by using several ways since it has the ability to function in multiple 
operational levels. Firstly, it uses cells directly linked to Al Qaeda’s command and 
control nucleus especially for major attacks like in the case of September 11. 
Secondly, Al Qaeda uses affiliated or associated groups it has trained, armed or 
inspired in some other ways. Al Qaeda has lots of sleeper cells dispersed all around 
the world. Some of these act on their own and conduct attacks in the name of Al 
Qaeda. “Most of the proposals for terrorist operations appear to come from the 
operatives in the field, rather than from the center.”311 Thirdly, there are local 
terrorists that do not have previous connections with Al Qaeda but are inspired by its 
tactics, motivations, speeches made by Osama bin Laden or by Al Qaeda as a whole. 
All these features of a decentralized structure enable Al Qaeda to operate all over the 
world without being seriously encountered. It is too difficult for states to cope with 
such a dispersed organization. As Hoffman states “[b]ecause Al Qaeda is neither 
monolithic nor leaves a single, identifiable ‘footprint’, nor has one set modus 
                                                 
310 Smith, Paul J. 2002. “Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New 
Realities”, Parameters, Summer: 38-39. 
311 Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. “Countering Al Qaeda”, Rand, 5. 
 127
operandi, the movement itself is all the more formidable and resilient.”312 Especially 
after it was forced out of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda benefited from its decentralized 
organization structure very much. After they lost their base in Afghanistan the 
terrorist cells further spread out.313 Furthermore, collapsing one small group does not 
have the same effect with taking down a major central organization. In order to 
create the same effect states have to cripple most if not all of these small groups.314 
According to information provided by the CIA, since the September 11 
attacks, 2/3 of the people that were in the leadership position within Al Qaeda have 
been captured.315 Among these people there were leading figures. Such as 
Mohammed Atef (who was the first rank military commander of Al Qaeda), Zeynel 
Abidin Mohammed Husseyin (who was third in the ranking among the leaders of Al 
Qaeda and was responsible from the overseas operations of the organization), 
Mohammed Mustafa Ahmed Havsavi (who was among the leading figures of the 
organization that was responsible for the financial issues), Mohammed Hamdi Al-
Ahdal (who was suspected to be among those who were responsible for the attacks 
on the USS Cole and French ship Limburg), and many others.316 A lot of banking 
accounts and financial assets of Al Qaeda have been frozen.317 Despite all of this 
progress, when we look at the number and intensity of attacks made by Al Qaeda 
after September 11, we see that there is no decrease. On the contrary, according to 
some arguments, Al Qaeda was conducting approximately one operation every 2 
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years before September 11, but this number has increased to two operations each 
year after September 11, and the battlefield has expanded.318 This is to say that Al 
Qaeda has preserved its capabilities to conduct attacks even in the Western world and 
the captured leaders have been replaced by others from the organization.319 Among 
the most important of these new leaders is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who is said to be 
responsible for Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey on behalf of Al Qaeda. Also, he is said to 
be an expert on chemical weapons and is said to have established good relations with 
the Ansar al-Islam organization operating in Iraq.320 At this point, Al Qaeda acts as if 
it is a state, i.e. the state as an entity continues its existence as their leaders change 
and so does Al Qaeda. Therefore, although the leading figures change, it seems that 
there has emerged an institutional continuity within the Al Qaeda structure, that 
enables it to preserve its effectiveness and existence. 
 
6. 2. 4 Al Qaeda and Alliance Building 
 Al Qaeda has strong relations with other terrorist organizations operating 
around the world. The peak of these relations was reached in 1998 when several 
organizations came together and established the World Islamic Front for Jihad 
Against the Jews and Crusaders. Besides Al Qaeda there were organizations from 
Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Chechnya, Philippines and Bangladesh within this 
establishment.321 
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 As the intelligence sources and the court testimony from the 1998 Embassy 
bombers demonstrate there is also an alliance between Al Qaeda and Hezbullah. It is 
argued that Al Qaeda learned to conduct two-tiered simultaneous attacks from 
Hezbullah. Through this relationship Al Qaeda may aim to pull Hezbullah and other 
radical Palestinian movements into the global jihad it has been conducting.322 
 Al Qaeda also acts as an umbrella organization for the local terrorist groups, 
in a sense it is franchising terrorism. It provides them with the necessary means to 
conduct activities. They can share the expertise and establish contacts with other 
groups via Al Qaeda, get logistical and financial support and advice on weapons and 
other issues.323 Also some of these organizations sometimes conduct attacks in the 
name of Al Qaeda. For example, it is said that the hotel bombings in Bali were 
conducted by the Jemmah Islamiya organization in the name of Al Qaeda.324 
 Another important point here is that there are organizations around the world 
that are inspired by Al Qaeda. For example, the assaults on 6 May 2003 in 
Casablanca are known to have been conducted by a local terrorist organization 
named Selefite Jihad Organization. However, the way the assaults are conducted, the 
organization of the militants and the ideological discourses were similar to that of Al 
Qaeda. Investigations demonstrated that the members of these organization were 
listening to the speeches of Abu Qatada (whose actual name is Omar Mahmud Omar 
and who was among the important ideologists of Al Qaeda and was captured in the 
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aftermath of September 11), and using the books Al Qaeda used in the training 
camps in Afghanistan.325 
 All these demonstrate that Al Qaeda has another feature of actorness, namely 
the ability to establish alliances in order to survive better in world politics and to be 
an example for other  similar entities. 
 
6. 2. 5 The Ideology of Al Qaeda: ‘Jihadism’ 
Al Qaeda members are from different ethnic and national origins but they are 
connected by their fundamentalist version of Islam. Also “dozens of local groups 
across the world [are] connected by [that] global ideology.”326 
Al Qaeda backs the traditional anti-imperialist feelings within the Middle 
East with religious motives and puts the concept of ‘jihad’327 at the core.328 The 
continuation of jihad in the various parts of the world has enabled Al Qaeda to 
protect its dynamism and brought it the possibility to reorganize and disperse within 
such regions.329 As a result of the globalness of the ideology of Al Qaeda, its goals 
and tactics spread to terrorist cells not directly tied to Al Qaeda, and, as former CIA 
                                                 
325 Kelley, Kevin J. 2003. “How Al Qaeda Carried Out Paradise Hotel Bombing”, All Africa Global 
Media, November 10, 2003. 
326 Fareed, Zakaria. 2004. “Terrorists Don’t Need States”, Newsweek, available [online]: 
<http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4615876/> 
327 ‘Jihad’ is a religious duty of the Muslims to spread Islam by waging war. Jihad can be made in four 
ways, namely by heart (in ones of heart against ones inducements to evil), tongue, hand, and sword. 
Only the final version is done by waging a physical war against infidels (The Encyclopedia Britanica, 
vol. 6). Only in under emergency, when the Muslim world is under threat, all the Muslims must 
participate in Jihad. (Knapp, Michael G. 2003. “The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam”, 
Parameters, Spring: 83). Osama bin Laden and his organization use jihad in this sense and argue that 
since the Muslim World is under threat each and every Muslim must participate in Jihad in return of 
an honored place in paradise. Osama bin Laden declared jihad twice, one on 26 August 1996 and the 
other on 23 February 1998. For a more detailed explanation of jihad and Al Qaeda’s use of jihad also 
see Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2001. “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad”, Middle 
East Policy, 8(4): 18-42. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. 2003. “Killing in the Name of 
Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11”, Middle East Policy, 10(2): 76-92. The Peace 
Encyclopedia’s web site on http://www.yahoodi.com/peace/jihad.html. Kepel, Gilles. 2000. “Islamism 
Reconsidered“, Harvard International Review, 22(2): 22-27.   
328 Lesch, Ann M. 2002. “Osama Bin Laden: Embedded in the Middle East Crisis”, Middle East 
Policy, 9(2): 82. 
329 Erkmen, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. “11 Eylül’den Sonra El Kaide”, Stratejik 
Analiz, Ocak 2004: 51. 
 131
Director George Tenet states, this “ensures that a serious threat will remain for the 
foreseeable future, with or without Al Qaeda in the picture.”330 Therefore, even if the 
identity of the actor that represents the jihadist ideology changes, as long as people 
are adhered to jihadism, a potential for actorness will always exist. The 
representation of the religious fundamentalist and jihadist ideology by Al Qaeda, has 
brought the organization to the level of being an ideology itself.331 
 
6. 2. 6 Al Qaeda as a Challenge to State Sovereignty Competing with the State 
Besides its legal aspects, in de facto, state sovereignty is based on the ability 
of states to control their territories, people and the use of force within their territories 
and in the name of their citizens. States are responsible for protecting their people 
from internal and external threats. Al Qaeda challenges all of these.    
In failed states Al Qaeda challenges state sovereignty in terms of controlling 
the territory as explained before. But Al Qaeda challenges the sovereignty of states 
not only in failed states but also in others. Al Qaeda uses its funds coming from the 
own investments of Osama bin Laden and from other wealthy supporters not only for 
terrorist attacks, but also for supporting religious schools, business enterprises in 
which they have interests, training camps, salaried agent network, and allies.332 All 
these at the end make Al Qaeda a competitor of the state for the loyalty of the people 
and weaken state sovereignty. This is because people that share similar ideologies 
with Al Qaeda prefer to submit their loyalty to Al Qaeda, which provides the services 
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normally states provide. Therefore, states lose control over their citizens and lose 
their loyalty. 
 Al Qaeda attacks all over the world challenge the monopoly of the state to 
use force and also the ability of the states to protect their citizens from threats 
coming both from inside and outside. Furthermore, it is known from documents 
found in Al Qaeda camps that the organization has the aspiration to acquire WMDs, 
even if it lacks these capabilities so far.333 If they acquire such weapons they will 
further challenge state sovereignty and become a strategic equal to nuclear powers 
though even more threatening because of their being unrestricted by any kind of rule 
be it legal or moral. 
 All these demonstrate that being able to challenge the major actors of the 
state-centric world, namely the states, Al Qaeda emerges as an important non-state 
security actor in the system. 
 
6. 2. 7 Al Qaeda’s Foreign Policy 
 Al Qaeda has objectives and conducts certain foreign policy moves via video-
types of the speeches and fatwas of the leading figures and via its operations/attacks 
all around the world. For example, Osama bin Laden suggested a truce with Europe 
in return for its alienation from the US and for pulling their soldiers back from the 
Middle East.334 In doing so, he tried to divide the enemy, like the ancient policies of 
the empires, ‘divide and conquer’. Furthermore, he shows new targets to attack in his 
speeches. Moreover, every time President Bush gives a speech calling a space, like 
Iraq, safe, Al Qaeda makes attacks there, thus, in a sense, conducting international 
relations. For example, the timing of the truce offer to Europe by Osama bin Laden 
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came shortly after a conference given by George W. Bush in which he defended US 
policies in Iraq and met with Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister. According to 
the diplomatic correspondent of the BBC, Bridget Kendall, this move of Osama bin 
Laden can be considered a propaganda attempt to counter what Bush said about the 
situation in Iraq and the Middle East in general.335 Al Qaeda seems to be a non-state 
actor that operates within the state system as if it is a state. 
Instead of giving official diplomatic notes, Al Qaeda gives messages through 
its attacks all around the world.  For example, in a video left near a mosque in 
Madrid after the train bombings of March 11 2004, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility 
and said that this was a punishment for Spain because of its collaboration with the 
US and its allies, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.336 Therefore, Al Qaeda 
perfectly utilizes terror as a diplomatic initiative and move. 
Moreover, the investigations made after the September 11 attacks 
demonstrate that Al Qaeda has the capacity to organize several operations at the 
same time, like a state has multiple foreign policies for many different states and 
situations simultaneously. For example the training for conducting the September 11 
attacks started more than a year before the attacks were made. The plans for these 
attacks were made still earlier. It is learned from the testimonies of the people 
accused of the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, that Al 
Qaeda started to move assets into place for these attacks from 1994 onwards. In 1995 
a key associate of Osama bin Laden came to the US in order to check the status and 
reliability of the local cells. All these means that Al Qaeda materialized the Embassy 
bombings of 1998 and the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 among other attacks at 
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the same time with its preparation for September 11 attacks. All these demonstrate 
that Al Qaeda has the capacity to prepare several major operations at the same 
time.337 
Therefore, its capacity to conduct foreign policy, although via different 
means, is another sign of the actorness of Al Qaeda.  
 
6. 2. 8 Al Qaeda’s Impact on the Domestic, Foreign, and Defense Policies of the 
States 
 If the opinion polls conducted in Spain just before the terrorist attacks on 
trains that killed and injured lots of people are analyzed, one can see that the 
governing center right Popular Party would likely not have suffered a defeat in the 
elections made a few days after these terrorist attacks, had the terrorists attacks not 
been conducted. These attacks and the way the government handled the issue in the 
immediate aftermath of the incident angered the people and resulted in a change in 
the election results, perhaps with the help of other factors. Later on, it was discovered 
that there was an Al Qaeda connection in these bombings. One of the pieces of 
evidence was a video left near a mosque in Madrid. In this video Abu Dujan Al 
Afgani, who claims to be a military spokesman for Al Qaeda in Europe, took 
responsibility for the attacks. This example illustrates the ability of Al Qaeda to 
affect the domestic policies of a state.338 Officials across Europe and in the US are 
afraid of such attacks that can be conducted by Al Qaeda or other terrorists inspired 
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by the success of the Spanish case, with the aim of affecting the election results, in 
these other countries.339   
Al Qaeda has also had several impacts on the making of foreign and defense 
policies of states in the aftermath of September 11. Firstly, the threat perceptions 
have changed and threats have started to be perceived as coming from non-state 
entities conducting transnational terrorism in addition to the conventional threats 
perceived from other states. This has brought terrorism to the forefront of states’ 
agendas in their relations with each other. For example, while building alliances 
states evaluate each other in accordance with their stance vis-à-vis terrorism. An 
example of this is that the US and its allies support President Pervez Musharraf, who 
took the office via a coup d’etat, in order that Pakistan will continue to support them 
in destroying the Al Qaeda cells and supporters in this country and prevent Al Qaeda 
militants from escaping or hiding in Pakistan.340 Such support is actually not new. It 
was given by the US to authoritative regimes who were anti-communist during the 
Cold War era. But it is for the first time that such cooperation is made against a non-
state entity, which confirms the actorness of this entity. Also, EU law enforcement 
specialists decided to meet in Madrid just after the terrorist attacks on 11 March 
2004, in order to discuss the ways to fight terrorism.341 This is another example of 
how Al Qaeda determines the agenda of the relations between states.  
Another point here is that the US has started to build its foreign and defense 
policy according to the fight against terrorism. The major discussions on security in 
the US just before the September 11 attacks were whether to build a national missile 
defense shield in order to protect the country from the missiles that could be used 
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mostly by the rogue states. However, now, like the threat perceived from the SU 
during the Cold War, the destructive threat of terrorism for the US and world security 
in the post-Cold War period has become the major determinant of US foreign and 
defense policy.342 This in turn necessitates all states in the system to redefine their 
positions in the system according to the position of the sole superpower on terrorism. 
Also, the pattern of conflict has changed from large-scale conventional wars between 
states to an asymmetric low intensity conflict in which one party is a non-state entity. 
However, in its declared ‘war on terrorism’ the US continues to act as if it is fighting 
with a state enemy and this causes it hardships. 
 
 All the examples and explanations above demonstrate the emergence of Al 
Qaeda as a non-state security actor in world politics. Its actorness has similarities 
with that of states as well as differences, because Al Qaeda is an actor of the multi-
centric world instead of the state-centric world. However, as the state-centric and 
multi-centric worlds coexist and intersect, so do the states and Al Qaeda as a non-
state security actor. Therefore, in their war on terrorism, states must recognize these 
fact, stop acting as if they are facing a state enemy from the state-centric world and 
as if the state-centric world is constituting the whole of the world system. 
 Having stated the features and nature of the threat posed by transnational 
terrorism and the actorness of transnational terrorists, and having demonstrated them 
on the Al Qaeda case, it is now possible to properly evaluate whether an effective 
international response to transnational terrorism, can be given.  
 
 
 
342 Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. “Countering Al Qaeda”, Rand, ix. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
7. 1 Research Findings 
Throughout this thesis the nature of transnational terrorism and the actorness 
of transnational terrorists have been analyzed. This has been done in order to be able 
to answer the question of whether it is possible to give an effective international 
response to transnational terrorism. In other words, in order to be able to evaluate 
what kind of a response is necessary to meet a challange, we should first know with 
what we are confronted. Therefore, first, a dualistic approach of world politics has 
been developed. In this way, the international nature of the reaponse that is tried to 
be given to transnational terrorism has been explained with the state-centric image of 
world politics. On the other hand, the transnational nature of the threat posed by 
transnational terrorism has been explained with the multi-centric world image. 
Furthermore, a dualistic image of world politics is used to explain how these two 
worlds intersect and thus show how the threats posed by transnational terrorism can 
also threaten the state-centric world. 
Transnational terrorism is among the threat perceptions of the multi-centric 
world. Therefore, in order to understand its nature, first the general nature of the 
threat perceptions in the multi-centric world has been analyzed. Then, these features 
have been evaluated, specifically, within the framework of transnational terrorism. In 
order to better understand the differences in the nature of the threat perceptions in the 
multi-centric world, the feautures of the threat perceptions in the state-centric world 
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have been briefly analzed as well. Accordingly, it is found out that, the only 
important actor in the state-centric world is the sovereign state. Therefore, both the 
referent object and perpetrator of the threats in the state-centric world are sovereign 
states. These sovereign states are legal equals and there is no superior authority in the 
system that can guarantee the safety and well-being of the states. Therefore, states 
have to protect their own. The only way to do this is to enhance one’s powers, and 
power is measured in military terms. Through this military power, states pursue their 
national interests. As a result, the national interests of other states, their armed forces, 
and the increase in improvements of the weapons of other states are the major threat 
perceptions in the state-centric world. Also, domestic and international terrorism as 
tools of other states are accepted as threats. In sum, the threat perceptions in the 
state-centric world are military in nature and posed by states against other states.  
On the other hand, threat perceptions in the multi-centric world are multiple 
in terms of issues, referent objects, and perpetrators. Socio-economic issues (like 
impoverishment and overpopulation), cultural issues (like identity crisis), 
environmental issues (like depletion of natural resources), and non-traditional 
military-political issues (like transnational terrorism) are among the threat 
perceptions in the multi-centric world. These issues became threats that threaten all 
the world by the help of the features of the multi-centric world. These threats are 
posed not only by states, but also by non-state actors whose referent object are not 
only states but also individuals, societies, and groups. The processes of globalization 
that shaped the multi-centric world, affected the emergence and spread of these 
threats. Among the impacts of globalization there are first the developments in 
communication, travel and transportation technologies. Second, easy and fast 
movement of individuals, information and all kinds of goods across borders. Third, 
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the decrease in the importance of distances and borders, and the increase in the speed 
of transnational and supraterritorial interactions. Fourth, improvements in the skills 
of individuals and loyalty shifts away from states to other power centers. Fifth, as a 
result of  the above, the weakening of state sovereignty. These features, at the same 
time, differentiate the threat perceptions in the multi-centric from the traditional 
threat perceptions in the state-centric world. 
In short, four main features can be stated that differentiate the threat 
perceptions in the multi-centric world from those of the state-centric world. First, the 
threats in the multi-centric world are multiple, thus not restricted with traditional 
security concerns. Second, the referent objects of these threats are multiple as well. 
This means that individuals, socities, and groups are threatened besides the states. 
Third, among the perpetrators of these threats, the major share is possessed by non-
state actors. This is to say, these threats are mostly posed by non-state actors. Fourth, 
these threats have been developed and spread with the help of the processes of 
globalization. These general features can be applied to transnational terrorism that is 
among the threat perceptions of the multi-centric world. 
Transnational terrorists are non-state security actors. They can act 
independent from states and in an effective manner, meaning that they can conduct 
harmful attacks all over the world. They can find finance, equipment, and 
intelligence through the facilities of globalization. Furthermore, globalization helps 
transnational terrorists acquire an increasing mobility and establish cells all around 
the world. Thus, they have a decentralized and deterritorialized organization. As a 
result, even if their heads are captured or killed, they can continue their effective 
existence. Transnational terrorists establish alliances with other transnational 
criminal and terrorist organizations. They have a global ideology and loyal 
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supporters. As a result of the development of a global consciousness among the 
people led by the developments in their skills, some people shifted their loyalties 
towards other power centers, including transnational terrorist organizations. 
Therefore, transnational terrorists challenge the sovereignty of states. Transnational 
terrorist organizations have the ability to conduct their own foreign policies. They 
also have the ability to affect the domestic, foreign, and defense policies of the states 
as actors in the sytem. All these features are demonstarated with the analysis of the 
Al Qaeda case. 
In fact, an other important research finding is that there is a mutual 
relationship between the multiple issues and actors, and the multi-centric world. The 
multi-centric world is reinforced and further developed as a result of the emergence 
of these issues as threats and by the rise of the non-state actors as independent from 
states. 
The threats perceived in the multi-centric world threaten the state-centric 
world as well, however, these issues remain out of the traditional threat perceptions 
in the state-centric world. But, some of them, like WMDs, RMAs and terrorism, are 
perceived as threats in the state-centric world as well, but not as posed by non-state 
actors. States perceive these threats still as coming from other states. Thus, the nature 
of these threats are misperceived. Therefore, the response mechanisms used to meet 
these threats are developed in accordance with this misperception. 
On the basis of these research findings, we can now look at the existing 
international response mechanisms and evaluate whether they can meet the challenge 
posed by transnational terrorism. 
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7. 2 Response Mechanisms of the State-centric World and Their Ability to Meet 
the Challenge Posed by Transnational Terrorism 
 In this section, the response mechanisms, in general, and counter-terrorism 
mechanisms, in particular, developed by states to meet the threats they perceive, will 
be analyzed. Then, whether they can be utilized to effectively meet the challenge 
posed by transnational terrorism will be evaluated.         
 
7. 2. 1 Armies and Military Methods 
In order to meet the major challenges to their security, which have 
traditionally been military threats coming from enemy states, states built up strong 
and capable military forces. They developed their military capabilities continuously 
by benefiting from the developments in technology. This reached to the point that 
states even used the developments in physics to create nuclear weapons. All these 
weapons at the end became major tools for states in order to counter the threats they 
perceive from the other states and their armies. 
In terms of countering terrorism, specialist military units have been 
developed. These units are used to rescue hostages, dispose of bombs, protect key 
points, dismantle terrorist organizations and capture terrorists, assassinate terrorist 
leaders, attack the bases and training camps of the terrorists in, for example, 
retaliatory strikes following a terrorist attack.343 
However, these measures are only partially useful as far as transnational 
terrorism is concerned. Armies and weapons can be utilized against an enemy that is 
situated in a territorially demarcated area. This is to say, as long as you do not know 
where your enemies are situated, you cannot bomb or attack them, no matter how 
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developed an army you have. Transnational terrorists have a decentralized and 
deterritorial organization. They have secret cells all around the world. Therefore, 
states cannot fight with them through traditional armies and weapons. The only use 
of the armies and weapons can be in punishing the states who support the terrorists. 
However, this does not stop transnational terrorists, because they are not dependent 
on any state supporter and can preserve their effectiveness as independent actors.   
 Moreover, in order to use specialized military units to rescue hostages, 
dispose of bombs, capture terrorists, and dismantle terrorist organizations, very good 
intelligence about the activities and personnel of the terrorists is necessary. However, 
the decentralized and dispersed nature of transnational terrorists make acquiring 
effective intelligence more difficult than ever. 
 
7. 2. 2 Alliances and International Cooperation 
As another response mechanism, states establish alliances with other states in 
order to augment their security.344 States had to possess the necessary means, 
including the physical resources, in order to be able to protect their territory and 
national interests. However, since the states have unequal military power and 
physical resources, they establish alliances with other states in order to balance the 
power of a common and stronger enemy.345 Even stronger states establish alliances in 
order to cope with another strong state. Alliances enhance the international 
perception of great power influence.346 Alliances can also be built in order to achieve 
collective security. Each member in an alliance expects that their alliance will protect 
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them from potential hostile attacks either by deterring the enemy/s or by the use of 
collective hard power, should deterrence fail.347  
 States also cooperate against terrorism. International cooperation against 
terrorism has several components, namely legal and practical cooperation, including 
issuing conventions, declarations and resolutions to fight terrorism, cooperating in 
law enforcement, and disrupting terrorist finances. 
International organizations like the UN pass resolutions for fighting against 
different aspects of terrorism in order to foster greater political action and 
cooperation among the member states. There are lots of narrowly focused 
conventions on terrorism-related issues. Among these are the Tokyo Convention on 
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the Hague 
Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons 
(1973), the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), the Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation 
(1988), the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for Purposes of 
Detection (1991), International Convention for the Suppression of Explosives (1997), 
and the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000).348 Of 
course not all of these are signed and ratified by all the states, but at least these are 
attempts to cooperate against terrorism. 
There are also UN Security Council Resolutions (S/RES) that are binding for 
the members of the UN. Among these are S/RES/635 (1989) on the marking of 
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plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection, S/RES/731 (1992) on the 
destruction of Pan American flight 103 and Union des transports aériens flights 772, 
S/RES/748 (1992) on sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/1189 
(1998) concerning the terrorist bomb attacks on 7 August 1998 in Kenya and 
Tanzania, S/RES/1214 (1998) on the situation in Afghanistan, S/RES/1267 (1999) on 
measures against Taliban, S/RES/1269 (1999) on international cooperation in the 
fight against terrorism, S/RES/1333 (2000) on measures against Taliban, 
S/RES/1363 (2001) on the establishment of a mechanism to monitor the 
implementation of measures imposed by resolutions 1267 and 1333, S/RES/1368 
(2001) condemning the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, S/RES/1373 and 
S/RES/1377 (2001) on the threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts.349 There are also UN General Assembly Resolutions on measures to 
eliminate international terrorism and regional conventions on terrorism issued by 
regional organizations like the League of Arab States, Organization on Islamic 
Conference, Council of Europe, OAS, and OAU.     
In addition to international legal measures, in order to combat international 
terrorism, also the military and police forces of states must ally and each states’ 
forces must operate within their own national borders and ensure the enforcement of 
law relating to issues from tracking bank accounts to information sharing.350 As an 
example of this type of cooperation, the US helps fellow states to improve their 
judicial and law enforcement capabilities through training them under the 
Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program. This helps to develop 
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working relationships between the US and other states in their fight against 
terrorism.351 
Furthermore, states are cooperating in order to block the finance of terrorist 
organizations and each state is responsible from preventing terrorists to raise, transfer 
and launder money within its own borders. Also, international organizations have 
issued a series of measures to fight terrorist finance. Among these are UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373, the FATF (Financial Aid Task Force) Eight Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Finance, and important initiatives by the G-8 and EU 
countries. Besides these, individual states in America, Asia, Middle East and Europe 
have passed resolutions to impede the passage of funds to terrorists.352 
However, as far as terrorism (not only transnational but any type of it) is 
concerned, international cooperation is problematic. This is because, as a result of the 
pursuance of national interests by every state, they cannot accept a clear-cut, 
universally acceptable definition of terrorism. Each state wants that the activities of 
the groups with which they have friendly relations should be left out of the definition 
of terrorism. Therefore, without agreeing on what is terrorism, states cannot 
cooperate against it effectively. This problem arises because states still act strictly 
according to their national interests and with a state-centric world image.353 
As far as transnational terrorism is concerned, disrupting terrorist finance is a 
difficult task as well. Firstly, within the multi-centric world, with the help of the 
processes of globalization, it is difficult to control the flow of capital and financial 
transactions all around the world. Only, the assets of transnational terrorists that can 
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be detected can be frozen by states within their own borders. Secondly, transnational 
terrorists sometimes use techniques that cannot be followed. For example, Al Qaeda 
use the technique of hawala to transfer money, as explained before. In this technique 
individuals carry the money from a place to other, instead of using banks. It is almost 
impossible to follow such kind of transfers. Thirdly, transnational terrorists get 
money from charities and people that are loyal supporters. This practice becomes 
important as transnational terrorists become independent power centers and as 
individuals shift their loyalties away from their states towards these power centers. 
For example, some people in Saudi Arabia are not happy with the governments’ 
positive attitudes towards the US and therefore support Al Qaeda. Thus, transnational 
terrorists’ being non-state actors that represent an attractive ideology, make it 
difficult to disrupt their finance with traditional response mechanisms.  
  
7. 2. 3 Deterrence 
Deterrence is a strategy used to prevent enemies from initiating unacceptable 
and threatening behavior. With deterrence, a state aims to prevent the enemy from 
engaging in a harmful behavior, either by creating a fear that it will be punished too 
severely, or by making it believe that it cannot successfully achieve its aims. In order 
for a deterrence policy to work, a state must have the necessary weapons, 
successfully communicate its message to the enemy, and the enemy must have a 
determined territorial existence and a fear of loosing something.354  
In particular, in the Cold War period, with the help of the nuclear mutually 
assured destruction possibility, deterrence worked very well as a countering policy of 
the perceived threats. The framework of deterrence helped to stabilize the relations 
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among the major nuclear powers for decades to a great extent.355 This was also 
because there was a clear-cut rival; i.e. the enemy was a territorial state whose 
location was easily detected. The powerful states, especially the US, continued to use 
the deterrence policy in order to prevent nuclear and conventional wars in the post-
Cold War period. 
In terms of countering transnational terrorism, deterrence cannot be used 
against transnational terrorists directly. This is because, transnational terrorists do not 
have determined territorial existence. They are decentralized and deterritorialized. 
Furthermore, transnational terrorists do not have much to fear. How can you deter 
people that conduct suicide attacks?  
On the other hand, deterrence may be used against state sponsors of 
terrorism, by the threat of retaliation, to increase the price of their support to 
terrorists.356 For example a raid conducted against Libya by the US on 14 April 1986 
was made as a response to Libya’s responsibility for several terrorist incidents. 
Among these incidents, there was the bombing of a nightclub in West Berlin on 4 
April 1986, in which US citizens died and were wounded. This raid by the US, 
considered to be a way of sending a message to other state sponsors of terrorism, and 
aimed at deterring them.357 However, transnational terrorists are not dependent on the 
support of states. They can provide their needs by their own means, with the help of 
the processes of globalization. Furthermore, they can establish bases and training 
camps in failed states and since there are lots of such places around the world, they 
can easily shift their facilities from one place to the other. Therefore, as a result of 
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the actorness of transnational terrorists, their decentralized and deterritorialized 
character, and by the help of the multi-centric world, deterrence does not work 
against transnational terrorists efficiently. 
 
7. 2. 4 Diplomacy 
 In order to deal with the threats states perceive from other states, they may 
use non-military means like diplomacy as well. Representation, reporting and 
negotiation are the three activities of diplomacy. Representation enables 
governments to convey their policy concerns and objectives to other states. But it is 
also used to mis- and disinform a state against ones enemies.358 For example, during 
the Cold War the SU sent a letter, as if it were coming from the US Undersecretary 
of State, to the Ambassador in Greece, claiming that the US was willing to support a 
military coup in Greece. In this way the SU aimed at creating an anti-American 
reaction in this country.359 
 Reporting means the gathering of information and intelligence by the 
diplomats about the country where their missions are. Much of this information is 
openly available but some of them are gathered clandestinely.360 
 Finally, negotiation is the third diplomatic activity and it aims to reach 
agreement with other countries over issues on which the parties have partly 
overlapping and partly competing interests.361 
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 Since the weaker powers must usually make concessions at the negotiation 
table as a result of the pressures by the stronger powers, the relationship between 
diplomacy and force has resulted in the emergence of a term called “coercive 
diplomacy”.362 Thus, diplomacy may be used as an alternative to military force by 
states in their search for enhancing their national security and interests.   
In terms of counterterrorism, diplomacy may be used to persuade foreign 
governments not to support terrorists and to conduct extradition agreements.363 
However, diplomacy remains as a tool that can be used in state-to-state relations 
only. It cannot be used to deal with transnational terrorists, because this will mean 
recognizing terrorists as actors. This is impossible for states and for the state-centric 
perspective. 
 
7. 2. 5 Sanctions 
 Another response mechanism against the perceived threats is issuing 
sanctions. Sanctions can be diplomatic, political, cultural, technological and 
economic besides military. Diplomatic and political sanctions may include public 
protest, censure, condemnation, cutting off or severance of diplomatic relations, 
withholding recognition, voting against the will of the enemy in international 
organizations.364 
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Cultural and technological sanctions may include cancellation of cultural 
exchanges and scientific cooperation, restriction or cancellation of telephone, cabal 
and postal links among other things.365 
Economic sanctions may be among the most important sanctions and they are 
used in order to secure international political or military objectives like forcing a 
government out of a territory it invaded or destabilizing a government.366 These 
sanctions may be in the form of boycotts (restriction of imports from a country), 
various kinds of embargoes (the prohibition of exports to a country) including arms 
embargoes,367 foreign assistance reductions and cut-offs, and export and import 
limitations.368 These sanctions may reduce the military capabilities of the targeted 
state.369 
As a matter of their nature, sanctions can only be adapted against states, and 
not against non-state actors. Therefore, only, the states that utilize, sponsor and 
support terrorism may be sanctioned by other states. The knowledge that a state is 
supporting terrorism provides states with a visible foe with territorially demarcated 
area, therefore states can impose military, political, or economic sanctions.370  For 
example, the US prohibited the states that are identified as supporting terrorism by 
the Department of State from receiving US economic and military assistance.371 Also 
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the UN mandated sanctions against Libya in order to punish it for its responsibility in 
the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombings.372 However, again, since transnational terrorists are 
not dependent on the support of any state, such sanction swill not mean much to 
them. 
 
7. 2. 6 Using Intelligence Services 
States use their intelligence services to collect information on the weaknesses 
and strengths of their enemies. Most of the experts argue that the most effective way 
to fight terrorism is to gather as much and as efficient intelligence as possible. In this 
way the terrorist organizations and their plans can be disrupted before they conduct 
their attacks. Moreover, a better multinational cooperation can be established against 
terrorists and their state sponsors and supporters.373 Intelligence also enables states to 
apply effective antiterrorism policies meaning that defending ones territories and 
citizens effectively by protecting the possible targets.374 It is true that terrorists have 
to be lucky only ones in order to conduct an effective attack, therefore, gathering 
intelligence is essential to frustrating the works of the terrorists 375 and also for 
reducing their capabilities.376 However, as far as transnational terrorists are 
concerned, it is difficult to collect intelligence. Transnational terrorists have a 
decentralized organization. It is difficult to detect all the terrorist cells dispersed in 
different parts of the world. Thus, transnational terrorists utilize the benefits provided 
by the multi-centric world and can hide within it successfully.  
                                                 
372 “International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy”, Congressional Digest, November 
2001, 259. 
373 “International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy”, Congressional Digest, November 
2001, 259. 
374 Crenshaw, Martha. 1988. “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approahes.” In 
David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 16. 
375 Wirth, Timothy E. 1993. “Meeting the Challenge of International Terrorism”, US Department of 
State Dispatch, 4(29), July 19, 1993, 516-519. 
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7. 3 The US “War on Terrorism” 
 In the aftermath of September 11, the US declared a “war” against terrorism. 
In this regard, it utilized all the mechanisms mentioned above in its effort to fight 
with terrorism. The US used its own intelligent agencies and also cooperated with 
those of other states in order to collect effective information especially on Al Qaeda 
and its major figures. It worked for the issuance of resolutions by international 
organizations, especially by the UN, related with fight against terrorism. It tried to 
establish a worldwide coalition against terrorism. It continues to apply sanctions 
against the states that are suspected as supporting terrorism. It conducted military 
assaults on the Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime that 
supported Al Qaeda, and later on, toppled the leadership in Iraq, which it accused of 
supporting terrorism. As a result, many leading figures of Al Qaeda were captured or 
killed, an important amount of its financial assets were frozen, and its major base 
situated in Afghanistan was destroyed and the states that were supporting Al Qaeda 
were frightened. However, Al Qaeda is still able to conduct effective terrorist 
activities in the aftermath of all these and actually the number of the activities it 
conducted increased in the aftermath of the Afghanistan operation of the US and its 
allies. This is a result of US attempts to deal with Al Qaeda as if it were an 
international terrorist organization that is able to operate only with the support of 
some states. However, this is not the case. Al Qaeda is a transnational terrorist 
organization that evolved with the help of the rise of the multi-centric world that co-
exists and collides with the state-centric world. Therefore, the counter-terrorism 
mechanisms of the state-centric world fall short of meeting the challenges posed by 
transnational terrorism and thus can be effective only to a limited extent. The use of 
                                                                                                                                          
376 Pillar, Paul R. 2001. Terrorism and US Foreign Policy. Washington, dc: Brookings Institution 
Press, 33. 
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the word “war” creates the impression that the enemy is clearly identifiable and has 
clear demarcated territorial existence, as if it is a state, so that it can be defeated with 
military means, but of course this is not the case.  
  
 As the analysis on the existing international response mechanisms and their 
limits to meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism demonstrates, 
international response mechanisms of the state-centric world can only work against 
the threats posed by states and to some extent against international terrorism which is 
a tool of the states. But, these response mechanisms cannot meet the challenges 
posed by transnational terrorists that are non-state security actors. This is to say, 
existing international response mechanisms can meet the challenges of transnational 
terrorism only to a limited degree. Only the challenges of transnational terrorism that 
remain within the state-centric world can be met with these response mechanisms. 
For example, state supporters of transnational terrorists can be attacked, or the failed 
states in which the transnational terrorists are situated can be destroyed. However, 
the challenges of transnational terrorism that remain within the multi-centric world 
cannot be met with these response mechanisms. What are the practical and 
theoretical outputs of these? 
 
7. 4 Practical and Theoretical Outputs  
 Since the challenges of transnational terrorism that remain within the multi-
centric world cannot be met by the state-centric response mechanisms, in order to be 
able to cope with transnational terrorism, these two worlds must further converge and 
cover each other. A part of the answer on how this can happen can be the 
transformation of the state and the state-centric world politics. This is to say, states 
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must learn to accept that there are important non-state security actors in the system. 
These non-state actors pose multiple threats that are beyond the traditional military 
threats perceived by the states. These multiple threats are threatening the individuals, 
societies, and groups besides the states themselves. Also, states must learn to push 
their national concerns back, as far as global interests are concerned. This is because 
global interests are important for everyone and without them national interests are 
difficult to pursue. If states cannot cope with transnational terrorism, they cannot 
protect their citizens and territory and thus lose their reason of existence. Therefore, 
the transformation of the state and state-centric view in this way, may result in more 
convergence between the state-centric and multi-centric worlds. Thus, these two 
worlds should cover each other better, and less or no place should remain outside 
their individual borders. These arguments can be roughly pictured as in figure 3. 
 
 
State-centric    multi-centric        s.c.w.         m.c.w. 377     s.c.w.- m.c.w. 
World      world 
 
 
FIGURE 3: The Stages of Convergence between the State-centric and Multi-centric 
Worlds 
 
 
 In terms of theoretical outputs, the dualistic understanding of world politics 
must be further developed. Especially, the features and nature of the multi-centric 
world and the rise of the non-state security actors must be further studied. Only in 
this way can we better understand transnational terrorism as a threat in the multi-
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centric world. Thus, only after understanding the problem we face, can we find ways 
to cope with it. Therefore, further research can be made on the rise of non-state 
security actors and the multi-centric world at the theoretical level, and on the 
possible counter-terrorism mechanisms to confront transnational terrorism at the 
practical level.     
 
377 ‘s.c.w.’ stands for ‘state-centric world’ and ‘m.c.w.’ stands for ‘multi-centric world’. 
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